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Gregory Vlastos claims that in the Gorgias Socrates is

confident that the elenchos is the only and the final
arbiter of moral truth.

Traditionally, the object of

elenchos has been viewed as not one of moral truth, but one
of simply revealing to Socratic interlocutors confusions and

muddles within themselves, thereby jarring their

unquestioning adherence to some moral dogma.

On Vlastos'

view, however, Socrates claims that he proves by elenchos

that an interlocutor's thesis is false.

How can he, when in

point of logic all he has proved is that the thesis is

inconsistent with the agreed-upon premises in that argument
whose truth Socrates does not undertake to establish?

While

Vlastos attempts to solve what he calls "the problem of
elenchos" with all the ingenuity that we have come to expect
from him,
way.

I

argue that there are two major obstacles in his

First, elenchos is not the only arbiter of moral truth
v

in the Goirgias.

Socrates has

number of other reasons for

a

believing certain things, but according to Vlastos, Socrates
looks to elenchos, and to nothing but that, for the truth of

his beliefs.

I

argue that, first, Vlastos' characterization

of elenchos is unsatisfactory,

for on his criteria it is

difficult to distinguish it from other kinds of arguments.
This in turn seriously hampers

elenctic arguments.

I

a

proper evaluation of

then show that at least in this

dialogue Socrates has certain religious beliefs that he
holds without relying on elenchos, and so elenchos is not
the only avenue for acquiring moral knowledge.

Under Vlastos' correcting lenses, Socrates emerges also
as a morally upright philosopher who would never knowingly

conduct fallacious arguments.

I

argue that Socrates cheats

at elenchos, and he does so in order to win over his

interlocutors.

I

conclude that because of certain

assumptions Vlastos makes about the character of the model

philosopher and the model method, he exaggerates the
strength of elenchos.
to,

If

I

am right, the Gorgias is witness

not the power of elenchos as Vlastos would have us

believe, but its limitations.

vi
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION

The Project

This is
be Socrates

'

a

dissertation on what Gregory Vlastos takes to

method in philosophical argument.

In the past

few decades, Vlastos' unceasing flow of articles and books

investigating various aspects of Socratic philosophy has

singlehandedly set the tone in Socratic scholarship.

According to Vlastos' own assessment, more studies on
Socrates have been published per year in the past 15 years
than there were per decade from the turn of the century
until the late 1970s.

In this dissertation,

I

concentrate

on the issues concerning Socratic method and moral knowledge

Although the debate is new, the

raised by Vlastos.

questions are ancient:
his puzzling arguments?

What does Socrates think he does in

What does he in fact manage to

establish in driving his associates into intellectual
deadlocks?

Just what does he know about moral matters?

If

he knows something, why does he say he does not, and more

importantly, how does he know what he knows?

Due to these

and related questions that Vlastos has forcefully put to

debate, Socratic scholarship is now enjoying lively

discussions occupying much of the journals, conferences, and
studies, to which

I

hope to contribute with this work.

The answers to the twin questions of what Socrates
does, and how he does what he does, are fundamental in

.

2

evaluating the content of the general Socratic project.
Given the commonly held view that Socrates is in many

respects the "father" of philosophy,

Vlastos' work on

Socratic method and Socratic conduct is exceedingly
important in giving us

glimpse of the model philosopher.

a

That is, if we can understand how he argues, and what he

establishes by his arguments, we can better evaluate his
specific claims about morality, and the moral life.

By

understanding the nature of his method, we can also better
appraise his own conduct as

a

philosopher.

One of the most distinctive features of Vlastos' work
on Socratic method is its innovative explanations for

apparent inconsistencies in the text.
there is always

Socrates is

a

a

In Vlastos' exegesis,

way to vindicate Socrates: Vlastos'

philosopher who has no views inconsistent with

one another, and Socrates is a man who has no actions

inconsistent with his views.

Though Vlastos puts forward

a

radical view of the Socratic method, he does so by accepting
a

fairly conventional view of

man and as

philosopher.

a

a

perfect Socrates, both as

This dichotomy in Vlastos'

thinking, and the philosophical issues that arise from it,

comprise the main theme of my investigation.
Starting with the publication of his seminal piece,
"The Socratic Elenchus ,"

1

Vlastos painted

a

picture of the

philosopher as a good man, and his method as the perfect

1

Vlastos

(

7a

]

a

3

method required to acquire and impart positive moral
doctrines.

The aim of this dissertation is to bring to

light some of the problems that show up in this picture.

This is important for the fact that Vlastos and his

interpretation of Socrates is forcing

scholarship that frequently inhibits
the texts.

In what follows,

I

a
a

new direction in the

natural reading of

present Vlastos' picture of

Socrates and his method, and address two specific claims

Vlastos makes:

That the Socratic method is the required

tool for moral knowledge, and that Socrates does not misuse
his method and cheat.

These are the two critical points in

this debate on method and knowledge, upon which

profoundly

I

disagree with Vlastos.
Before

I

turn to

a

discussion of these points, let me

first give the outline of the dissertation.
chapter,
I

I

present the scope of my project.

mean by 'Socrates' and what

Method to be.

I

present

I

In this
I

qualify whom

understand the Socratic

summary of the Gorgias

a

,

the

dialogue that plays the most significant part in

understanding Vlastos' interpretation of the method.
also explain what chronology of the Platonic dialogues
will follow, and explain how
In Chapter 2,

I

give

a

I

I

deal with the Greek texts.

brief history of the treatment

of elenchos by the leading Platonic scholars prior to

Vlastos' account of it.

Here

This chapter provides the

background information needed to evaluate Vlastos'

I

4

contribution to the field.

As it stands,

it is a summary

chapter.
In Chapter 3,
on elenchos.

I

I

present the evolution of Vlastos' views

start with his famous Introduction to the

Protagoras in 1956, in which he argued that Socrates is
committed to suspend judgement about the truth of the belief
he is examining by the very logic of his method. 2

There he

maintained that the Socratic elenchos was impotent in
providing knowledge of any kind.

Elenchos was good only for

increasing one's insight into the logical relations between
propositions, and exposing the inconsistency of
propositions.

set of

a

Vlastos revoked this view in 1983, and argued

that elenchos was plenty powerful in generating moral
knowledge.

He claimed that Socrates can prove, together

with certain assumptions, that the conclusion of

a

specific

elenchos is true, and the interlocutor's initial claim

tested in the elenchos is false.

3

Under Vlastos' correcting

lenses, Socrates came into focus as a philosopher who

acquired moral knowledge by means of elenctic
justification. 4

So Chapter

:

Vlastos [13], p.xxxi.

3

Vlastos [7a], p.40.

3

is mostly devoted to tracing

Vlastos wrote that what he could not see in 1956 was that first,
Socrates' assertion of ignorance was not ignorance in all areas of
knowledge, and second, Socratic knowledge needed to be qualified as
"elenctic" knowledge. Vlastos [2], p.269, cf. Vlastos [5], p.11-14.
4

.

.

5

the startling change in Vlastos' thinking throughout his
career.
In Chapter 3,

also mention, albeit briefly, the

I

debate which erupted after Vlastos' 1983 piece.

Two "camps"

emerged in understanding the logic and operation of the
Socratic examination, and evaluation of its results.

Agreeing with Vlastos, some argued that the Socratic method
was constructive, but disagreed as to the extent.

Some took

issue with the form or the purpose of the argument that

Vlastos was ascribing to Socrates, and others argued that
Vlastos could not account for the fallacies in elenchoi.

5

Other scholars opposed the idea altogether. Some argued that

elenchos could establish only the inconsistency of
propositions, not the falsehood of
this set. 6

conclude Chapter

I

3

a

a set of

particular member of

by presenting Vlastos' most

recent work on elenchos, published shortly before he died in
1991,

and the latest revision which has been published

posthumously this winter.

In his latest analysis,

elenchos

is more powerful than ever as the only method in moral

philosophy required to obtain moral knowledge. Here

I

discuss the role of mathematics which Vlastos claims

contributed to the demise of elenchos in the later

dialogues

5

6

Benson

Kahn

[

1

]

and

,

[

2

)

.

For a nonconstructivist account of elenchos, see especially
and 6
1
[

]

[

]

.

6

Chapter

is my critique of Vlastos 's claim that

4

Socrates needs elenchos to obtain moral knowledge.
this

,

I

argue that Vlastos

Against

account ascribes to elenchos too

much epistemic power, and overlooks the importance of
certain beliefs that Socrates holds without relying upon
elenchos,

in particular,

religious beliefs.

neglects or willfully omits

a

Vlastos either

serious discussion of the role

of the eschatological myth in the Gorgias.

I

argue that

this myth is an elaborate expression of some of the beliefs

that Socrates holds, without which no elenchos could get off
the ground.

If

understood as

I

am right, the Socratic project is best

form of preaching which relies on elenchos,

a

not to discover it as Vlastos has it, but to spread the good

word
Chapter

5

is my critique of Vlastos'

claim that

Socrates would never cheat in argument since that would be

antithetical to doing philosophy.

This chapter is mostly

devoted to evaluating the notorious Socratic refutation of
Polus in the Gorgias.

The argument is seriously flawed.

Vlastos argues that what appears to be

a

deliberate fallacy

is in fact an intellectual slip on Plato's part.

this,

I

Against

argue that if Vlastos is serious about the

historicity of the Socrates in the Gorgias

,

then he cannot

consistently argue for the conclusions that Plato would have
drawn about philosophy and sophistry.

For Vlastos' general

reluctance to attribute to the Socratic method certain

7

unsavory characteristics is due the fact that he thinks
Socratic method is clearly distinct from the sophistical.
This conclusion fails to square not only with historical but
also with the textual evidence.
I

In the rest of the chapter,

show why there are compelling reasons to believe that

Socrates cheats.
In Chapter 5,

I

also address Vlastos' presumption of

the persuasive competence of elenchos.

Vlastos would have

us believe that elenchos can and indeed does refute the

views of the interlocutors of Socrates, and furthermore, by
such refutation persuades them into leading virtuous lives.
I

argue that in this dialogue, Socrates in fact fails to

convince them that such
am right, the Gorgias,

a

life is more advantageous.

If I

instead of being the paradigm of the

persuasive efficacy of elenchos in turning people onto the
virtuous life as Vlastos believes, is the dialogue which
illustrates Plato's pessimism about it.
The Appendix is concerned with

a

puzzling claim that

Socratic elenchos is the same practice as dialectic.
showing the four senses of 'dialectic'
Platonic, and Aristotelian)

I

(generic,

In

Zenonian,

argue that the claim that

elenchos is dialectic is either vacuously true, or false in
other specific senses.
Vlastos' Socrates

The Socrates that this work will have as its subject is

Plato's Socrates as presented and defended by Vlastos.

Just

.

8

who Socrates is, and what we can know about the historical
man, known as "the problem of Socrates," is of course

project unto itself, which

I

leave to historians

7
.

a

The

testimonies from Xenophon, Aristophanes, and Aristotle on
the life and work of Socrates have been amply documented in

most of the secondary literature, thus

I

will not address it

For this work is not so much about the historical

here.

authenticity of the views expressed by the character
'Socrates'

in Plato's dialogues as it is about the claims

made by Vlastos on the nature of the Socratic method.

How

Vlastos establishes the conclusion that there are two
characters in Plato, both named 'Socrates,' also falls
outside the scope of this work

8
.

Therefore, from here on,

I

shall use 'Socrates' to refer to what Vlastos takes to be
Socrates, that is, the character in the early and

transitional Platonic dialogues.

And the Socratic method

7
Here is a sample of some of the competing views on what we can
and cannot know of Socrates, the historical man:
a) It is impossible to know anything about the historical
Socrates, and the only Socrates we can hope to know is the one of the
Platonic dialogues. See Burnet, p.128 ff.
b) Socrates may only be the production of a creative imagination,
See A.E. Taylor [1], p.25-36.
namely Plato's.
c) Plato and Socrates are a "continuous" whole; it is not only
impossible but unnecessary to try to separate them. See Hare, p.14;
Ehrenberg, p.373 ff.
d) Plato's Socrates reflects the historical man, Socrates; see
Grote, vol.l, 281; Cornford [2], p.302-309; Hackforth, p.259 ff;
Guthrie, vol III, p. 325 ff.
e) Instead of there being one Socrates in Plato, there are in fact
The Socrates of the earlier dialogues is representative of
two of them.
the historical man. See Vlastos [3], p.46 ff, and Brickhouse and Smith
p 9 ff
[4]
.

,

See Vlastos [3], Chapter Two for the ten theses to establish this
point.
p. 47-49
8

,

.

.

9

w ill be the insthod this character exercises in
those

dialogues
Here

I

must also make clear just which dialogues

by the "early" and "transitional" dialogues.

I

mean

As is well

known, the precise chronological order of Plato's dialogues
is uncertain.

However, the list that Vlastos accepts based

on stylometric and thematic inferences is as follows

9
.

Group IA: The earlier dialogues, sometimes known as the

"elenctic dialogues," by alphabetical 10 order and
abbreviation:

Euthyphro
Laches

Apology (Ap.), Charmides (Ch.), Crito (Cr.),
Gorgias

(Eu.),

(

G .)

,

Hippias Minor (HMi

Protagoras (Pr.), Republic

(La.),

I.

.

) ,

Ion ,

(R.)

Group IB: Transitional dialogues by alphabetical order:

Euthydemus (Eud.)

f

Hippias Major (HMa.)

f

Lysis (Ly.),

Menexenus (Mx.), Meno (M.).
Group II:

The middle dialogues, by probable

chronological order:

Cratylus (Cra.), Phaedo (Phd.),

Symposium (Smp.), Republic II-X (R.), Phaedrus (Phdr.),
Parmenides (Prm.), Theaetetus (Tht.)
Group III:

The late dialogues, by probable

chronological order:
Sophist (Sph.)

f

Timaeus (Ti.), Critias (Crit.),

Politicus (Pltc.), Philebus (Phlb.), Laws

(Lg.)

Vlastos [3], p.45-47; cf. Vlastos [7a]. For differences in the
chronology, see Brandwood [1], p.249-252; Kahn (3).
9

10
The order is alphabetical because the evidence for
chronological order within this group is tenuous.

a

.

10

The Socrates that Vlastos examines, and by
extension

I

will examine, is the Socrates of the dialogues only
in

groups IA and IB.

Although

I

will say nothing on either the

claim that this Socrates is representative of the historical
man,

or the assumption that there are two characters, both

named 'Socrates' in Plato,

I

will address some of the

problems which result from Vlastos' assumption of both.
A summary of the Goraias

Vlastos' interpretation of the Socratic method hangs
mostly, we might even say exclusively, on the Gorgias

On

his view, the dialogue falls somewhere in Group IA, and is

placed much before the Meno

dialogue in Group IB.

,

which is the last transitional

Vlastos finds in the Gorgias the

proof for his assertion that Socratic method generates moral

knowledge.

Vlastos also makes much of this dialogue as

providing the turning point in Plato's intellectual
development.

On Vlastos' view,

it is in this dialogue that

we see the last and most powerful example of the Socratic

method as well as the seeds of Plato's interest in geometry.
It is after the Gorgias, Vlastos argues, that Plato starts

his own journey up.

Again, though

the chronology of the dialogues,

I

will say nothing about

will point out some of

I

the complications that result from Vlastos' stringent

adherence to the relationship between the Gorgias and the
Meno.

In the following chapters,

I

will argue that there

11
3^*6

better ressons for supposing that they ere closer

together than supposing otherwise.
Let me give a brief overview of the theme of the

Gorgias.

The dialogue proceeds in three clearly marked

episodes.

The first part is a discussion ostensibly between

Socrates and the famous sophist Gorgias, but mostly

conducted with Socrates' eager friend Chaerephon and
Gorgias' ardent follower, Polus.

The discussion is about

the nature of rhetoric, as it is the most distinctive

practice of the sophists.
rhetoric is
occupation.

a

11

Famously, Socrates claims that

form of flattery, and as such,

it is a base

Hence, since they lead a life teaching and

practicing rhetoric, sophists lead

a

base form of life.

The second part of the dialogue takes place between the

young 12 admirer of Gorgias, Polus, and Socrates.

Polus

argues that sophists live much like tyrants, because they

have power in the city.

Like tyrants, sophists can do

whatever they see fit, and get away with it.
starts

a

This assertion

series of arguments against Polus, with Socrates

claiming that no one who lives

a

life of injustice has true

power, doing injustice is worse than suffering injustice,

and no unjust person who goes unpunished can be happy.

At

the end of three specific refutations of his views, Polus is

"

See my Chapter Five for a discussion of the sophists.

That Polus is young is important for Socrates' views of
philosophical discussion. See my Chapter 5, and Appendix.
12

.

12

silenced but remains unconvinced.

He leaves the scene to

Callicles
A wealthy and established businessman of Athens,

Callicles attacks the Socratic principles of justice, the
just man, and the just life as being childish ideals.

(Callicles thinks that philosophy is best done when young;

these ideals are unbecoming in an old man.)
of the dialogue,

In this section

Callicles puts forward his notion of what

the just life is.

It turns out that his view illustrates

the famous nomos-physis 13 controversy that sophists are

known to indulge in.

Morality, according to Callicles,

consists of societal norms drawn up by the weak for their
own protection, for in nature, the strong rule

14
.

Happiness

consists in total self-gratification, and letting one's

desires get as big as possible.

Against this conception of

happiness, Socrates puts forward some of his views of

orderliness and self-control, which he insists are the true
ingredients of happiness.

Psychic order and the orderly

life involves moderation, and subdued desires, according to

Socrates.

The unjust suffer from the corruption of excess

in their souls,

and as such they cannot be happy.

Callicles

13
Nomos is traditionally translated as 'custom' or 'convention' or
'law' meaning, in general terms, the societal norms that are set up to
guide behavior. Physls is usually translated as 'nature' meaning the
The controversy is over human laws versus
way things are in nature.
natural laws as the standard for moral evaluation, and is analogous to
modern discussions of relativism and natural law theories. See for the

historical debate Kerferd, p.100-130.
14
See for a discussion of the influence of Callicles' view on
Nietzsche, Dodds [1], p. 387-91.

13

refuses to go along any further in his conversations
with
Socrates.
Socrates is forced to continue the argument

by

himself; playing the part of Callicles, he puts himself

through various cross-examinations.
culminate in

a

myth about the after life and the condition

of the souls there.

the souls:

These examinations

The judges judge the accomplishments of

they send the just souls the Islands of the

Blessed, and the unjust to receive punishment.

The dialogue

ends with Socrates claiming that he believes these accounts,
and so he leads a life consistent with such ideals and calls
on others to do the same.
So,

in what follows,

Socrates is the figure in the

elenctic and transitional Platonic dialogues, and in
particular, he is the figure in the Gorgias
and defended by Vlastos.

Now

a

of sources.

I

Greek in question, which
unless

I

I

consult

a

variety

All translations are mine unless otherwise

In first use,

noted.

as presented

note on the Greek in this

In quoting from sources in Greek,

work.

,

give the transliteration of the
I

do not "latinize" or italicize

quote from others who do.
Elenchos: The Method

Now let me introduce the method of Socrates that
be talking about in the coming pages.

what Socrates does.

I

will

Let us start with

First of all, he is an odd

15

fellow.

Many of his
atopos, 'strange', literally, 'out of place'.
interlocutors are aware of Socrates' 'strangeness,' e.g. G. 494cJ "How
(cf. Eud. 305a3; HMi 369b7; Ap. 31c4; Ch.
atopos you are, Socrates."
15

.

14

Famously, he spends his life going about the
marketplace

instead of earning

a

living,

anyone he happens to meet.

for instance

— conversing

with

As he tells the jury in the

Apology, he talks with anyone, young or old, citizen or
stranger, virtually anyone who would converse with him,
29d-e)

(Ap.

Some of his associates observe that whomever

.

Socrates approaches is bound to be "drawn to him" 16 and
enter into

a

long argument.

We hear Socrates say,

example, that once he attracts someone into

a

for

conversation

with him, "I shall not let him go at once, or leave him, but
I

[

shall question him, examine him [exetasb], and test him
elenxb]

,

"

(cf.

Ap.

29e,

41b; G.

472c-d; R.I 352d)

The activity of testing others and scrutinizing their

views is what Vlastos broadly classifies as the Socratic
method, specifically, elenchos.

Elenchos is an art of

cross-examination for the purposes of refutation.

Some

scholars trace its etymology to the Homeric use of elenchos,

which means putting someone to shame by refutation.

In the

early dialogues, Socrates uses elenchos and its parent verb,

158d2, 167c4, 168al0; Pr. 309b7) For a discussion of this feature of his
personality, see Barabas.

Nicias reports: "Whoever comes into close contact with Socrates
and has any talk with him face to face, is bound to be drawn [ananke
auto] by him in the course of the arguments ... and cannot stop until he
is led into giving an account of himself, of the manner in which he now
spends his days, and of the kind of life he has lived hitherto; and when
once he has been led into that, Socrates will never let him go until he
has thoroughly and properly put all his ways to the test." (La. 187e)
16

.

15

elenchein, generously 17 as an activity of critical

examination of the ideas and beliefs of his interlocutors.
He believes elenchos to be his mission 18 in life at god's

command [kata ton theon

(

Ap

23b6)

.

]

,

and his investigations

to be in the service of the god [ten tou theou latreian (Ap.
23cl)

.

]

We know from the following famous story why Socrates

takes elenchos so seriously. In order to get to the bottom
of the rumors about him

— that

he was a busybody who

investigated everything and feigned wisdom

— his

beloved

friend Chaerephon asked the god at Delphi whether there was
a

mortal wiser than Socrates.

The answer by the medium

Pythia at the oracle is well-known: There was not.

At a

loss as to the meaning of this divine proclamation, Socrates

"very reluctantly" [mogis panu {Ap. 21b)

]

turned to the

activity of elenchos to investigate human wisdom.

He went

around examining those who were reputed wise, "anyone,

citizen or stranger, whom he thinks is wise," thinking if he
could find someone wiser than himself, then he would refute
the oracle.

{Ap.

20c,

23b)

As a result of such

investigations, people started assuming that Socrates

himself possessed the wisdom that he proved that his
There are more than 50 entries for words related to elenchos in
the Gorgias alone. See Brandwood [2],
17

agree with Brickhouse and Smith's [3] assessment that elenchos
is significant in the context of what Socrates thinks he must do to
arrive at the goals he thinks he has been given by a divine command.
However, whether elenchos is necessary to carry out his service to the
god is a controversy I cannot address here; see Reeve.
18

I

.

,

16

interlocutor did not have.
the god:

Then he understood the riddle of

neither he nor anyone else knew anything, but he

was wiser than others in one respect, that he knew that he
was ignorant, and others did not know they were.

These "tests" and "examinations" [elenchoi] almost
always are on questions about moral goodness.

By "moral"

Socrates means questions relevant to how one ought to live
(

R

•

3

52d)

,

what sort man one should be

happy and who is not

(G.

472c)

(G.

487e)

and who is

These issues are addressed

and debated in a general format of question and answer. It

has a few rules.

always adversary.

Elenchos is usually short, and almost
The answers are required to be short.

Socrates uses as premises the opinions of his interlocutor,
and he ostensibly makes sure that the interlocutor truly

believes in what he expresses as his own belief, and does
not just say that he does.

In each case,

Socrates either

reaches a conclusion that expresses the negation of some
claim made by his interlocutor, which Socrates had put under
examination, or the argument ends in an impasse, aporia.

Whatever the result, Socrates often ends the elenchos saying
something along the lines of the following: "But as for me,
my position is always the same:

these things are true or not." 19

I

have no knowledge whether
As a result, he frustrates

and even infuriates his interlocutors who went along with

19

Pr.

G.

348c,

509a, trans. Vlastos in Vlastos [13], p.xxxi; cf. Ch.
360e, 361c, 361d.

165b,

17

his elenchos

Most of the time they either quit the

.

argument or simply leave the scene.

But sometimes they are

so aggrieved that "men set upon him with their fists and
[tear] his hair out ." 20

Let me then present
by Vlastos

summary 21 of elenchos as defended

a

This is the method that Vlastos investigates,

.

and what he has to say about this method is what

investigate.

I

will

Vlastos says,

Socratic elenchus is a search of moral truth by
question-and-answer adversary argument in which a
thesis is debated only if asserted as the
answerer's own belief and is regarded as refuted
only if its negation is deduced from his own
beliefs 22
.

In what follows,

I

will first examine the history of the

treatment of elenchos in the last century.

I

will then take

up Vlastos' own treatment of it throughout his career.

Finally,

I

will examine the implications of some of his

assertions about the function and efficacy of what he takes
to be the ultimate method of moral philosophy.

20

Diogenes Laertius, vol.

i,

II.

21,

cf.

31-33.

See my Chapter 4 why this summary does not satisfy a definition,
fails
to shed light on our understanding of elenctic arguments.
and
21

22

Vlastos

[

1

]

,

p. 4

.

s

CHAPTER

2

THE HISTORY OF ELENCHOS

The Negative Method
In order to appreciate the immense contribution that

Vlastos

work on the Socratic elenchos has made to the

'

scholarship, we must first examine the views preceding his.
Some of these views profoundly influenced Vlastos'

treatment of elenchos.

For the purpose of this work,

I

will

only mention the views which distinguish Socrates in the

early Platonic dialogues.

Among those,

I

will pick those

whose main themes are explicit on the issue of the Socratic
method, and elenchos.

And for the purposes of brevity,

I

will only highlight the points pertinent to my discussion

without critical analysis of their merits.

1

Let me first say a few things about method and

Socrates never discusses his elenchos as

elenchos.

method 2

;

a

nor does he reflect on his own practice of it.

One

of course, practice something and not have a clear

can,

understanding of what one is doing.

Just how much Socrates

knows what he is doing is, and has been, just the problem.

Though not exhaustive, the list of the most influential sources
that informed Vlastos 's views is as follows by chronology:
(1875) Grote; (1886) Sidgwick; (1914) Burnet; (1929) A E Taylor;
(1932) Cornford; (1933) Shorey; (1953) Robinson; (1962) Kneale & Kneale;
See
(1968) Gulley; (1969) Guthrie; (1977) Irwin; (1979) Santas.
Bibliography for full references.
1

.

.

2
There is a mention of
I am using "method" rather loosely here.
the method (methodos) in the middle to later dialogues, i.e., R. 569a5Socrates of the earlier dialogues does not use this
etc.
7, 533b2-3
See Vlastos [7a], fn.3, fn.5, and Robinson [1], p.7-10.
word.
,

19

In the scholarly disagreement on this issue,
what is

generally accepted is that by his method Socrates drives
his

respondents to say contradictory things.
them,

This often leaves

and at times Socrates himself, perplexed.

3

Socrates

claims all too frequently that he knows nothing of the

answers to the questions he was testing others on.
of this profession of ignorance,

Because

Socrates has been

appropriated by rival schools of thought throughout the
centuries.

While many scholars grant that Socrates could

question others' beliefs without himself having the answer,
many others question whether Socrates could provide any

positive answers by means of his elenchos.
Until Vlastos argued otherwise in 1983, to most

Platonic scholars, including Vlastos himself, Socrates was
the enigmatic gadfly whose only mission in philosophy is to

show the contradiction in people's beliefs with respect to

moral matters.

Many scholars had taken his attempts to

refute the opinions of his respondents and his unwillingness
to offer an opinion of his own to be evidence for his

general skepticism. 4

This approach was the characteristic

of many views expressed in the 19th century.

The features of the Socratic method most discussed in
the 19th century were its negative nature, destructive

3

See Matthews [1], on the issue of perplexity [aporia].

See Long [1] on the influence of Socrates on Arcesilaus, and
early Stoicism; also see Annas [1] on the New Academy's interpretation
of Plato as a skeptic.
4

20

results, and its distinction from that of the
practice of
the sophists.
Kierkegaard was one such philosopher who was

troubled by the Socratic method, and what it was supposed
to
be for.

In his famous doctoral dissertation, Kierkegaard

clsimed that Socrates was "animated only by negativity.

Though he did not specifically address elenchos, Kierkegaard
loosely referred to the Socratic method as "the art of

asking questions."

He noted that while the "sophistic" art

consisted of answering questions, Socratic method consisted
in devising ways to expose the arrogance of those who

thought they had all the answers. 6

In Kierkegaard's view,

the purpose of answering questions was to display the wisdom

that the sophists thought they had, the purpose of asking

questions was to expose the fact that the interlocutor knew
nothing at all.

The Socratic questioning was done "not in

the interest in obtaining an answer, but to suck out the

apparent content with
remaining."

a

question and leave only an emptiness

The Socratic method was one such questioning,

and it naturally presupposed emptiness and negativity.

7

Eduard Zeller, another 19th century philosopher, also

described the Socratic practice in terms of its negative

No doubt Kierkegaard's Socrates is a
Kierkegaard, p. 52 ff.
However, even briefly stated, his approach relays
study in itself.
important information as to the treatment of Socrates in the academy
towards the end of 19th century.
5

6

Kierkegaard, p.70, fn

7

Kierkegaard, p.73 ff.

*

21

results.

Zeller took Xenophon's portrayal of Socratic

philosophical conversation seriously.

8

in Xenophon's

analysis, Socrates starts from the common opinions of men
to

arrive at general truths.

This method, according to Zeller,

is "the art of forming conceptions."

Socrates wants to get

at "the unchangeable essence of things" by what Zeller

called "the critical method."

This method involved getting

people to shed their erratic views on all matters.
Zeller's view, Socratic investigation was

a

So in

critical

instrument to smooth down "apparent contradictions by

separating what is permanent from what is changing." 9

According to most accounts, George Grote was the first
to use the word 'elenchos' in connection with the Socratic

method.

In his Plato and Other Companions of Socrates

,

published in 1875, he described elenchos as the method of
Socratic argumentation.

10

Grote characterized the essential

difference between the sophists and Socrates as being one of
method, namely, elenchos.

Vlastos' interpretation of

Socrates is greatly influenced by Grote and his notion of
using elenchos to save Socrates from the charge of being
sophistical.

11

Grote gave no account of what he meant by

See for the view that Zeller was naive in accepting Xenophon's
analysis, Vlastos [7a], p.44, fn.43, fn.45, fn.46.
8

9

Zeller, p.42

See Grote for "the negative procedure or Elenchus," vol.
and vol.iii, p.466.
10

ff.,

11

Vlastos [7a] p.40 ff.; cf. Vlastos [1], Chapter One.

i,

p.245

22

"method;" he used the word only to describe

procedure.

12

a

Socratic

Grote argued, for instance, that while the

sophists arrogantly assumed that they had knowledge and that
they could teach it for

a

fee,

Socrates professed doubt

and wanted to expose their false conceit.

1

*

He wrote,

The only way of dissipating such false persuasion
was, the effective stimulus of the negative test,
or cross-examining Elenchus, whereby a state of
non-belief, or painful consciousness of ignorance,
was substituted in its place. 14

Grote argued that Socratic arguments are essentially
negative, because they are not conducted for the purpose of

teaching or finding something, but only to expose and

destroy false conceit of the interlocutors.

"The negative

mission of elenchos" was to make men aware of not simply
their ignorance but false and "uncertified" beliefs mistaken
for knowledge.

The full purpose of the cross-examination

was thus "to humiliate the respondent,

[which] could hardly

fail to offend and exasperate him." 15

Henry Sidgwick also used the word 'elenchos' in

connection with the Socratic method in the late 19th
century.

He thought that this method was one of question

and answer.

In fact, he wrote that Socrates was the

inventor of the question-and-answer method, and the sophists

Grote, vol. ii, p.198-99.
13

On Cicero's authority, see Grote, vol.l, p.239.

14

Grote, vol.

iii,

p.245

15

Grote, vol.

iii,

p.245

23

of long speeches.

16

This view also shaped Vlastos' thinking

about the Socratic method as having
that of the method of the sophists.

a
17

format distinct from

Sidgwick also

characterized the guestion-and-answer method as being

essentially "destructive" and negative."
Sidgwick

According to

the Socratic method was negative, because it

,

brought ignorance home to the interlocutors and "exhibited
the scientific need of exact definitions of general

notions," which it was clear they did not have.

18

After the publication of these articles "method" was
taken as

a

way of loosely referring to the Socratic

elenchos. Was there a standard pattern to the negative

Socratic method?
what was it like? 19

Did it have a standard form?

If it did,

Kneale and Kneale offered an answer.

They argued that "the standard pattern of refutation
[elenchos]" consisted in an argument form,
1.
2.
3.

If p then g.
not-q
Therefore not-p.

16

Sidgwick [2]. See Nehamas [2] and my Chapter Four for a
It is not clear who
criticism of the contemporary avowal of this view:
Nor is it clear that long speech cannot be a
invented the q&a method.
part of the Socratic practice, and q&a of the sophistic.
17

Vlastos (7a], p.28, fn.7.

18

Sidgwick [1], p.23-24.

19
Early on in this century, scholars began to raise questions about
the specific form of the method, rather than speculations on its aim.
See Burnet and A.E. Taylor [2] for "hypothetical" method of Plato.
(They did not separate Socratic from Platonic methods.)

.

24

Since elenchos always proceeds with this logical
schema,

they argued, "this procedure can lead only to negative
results.

" 20

Agreeing in general with the notion that Socratic
method is negative, Richard Robinson offered
account of it in the early 1950s.

a

different

He counted 39 elenchoi in

the early dialogues, which he separated into direct and

indirect elenchoi; he classified 31 of them as indirect.

He

identified as indirect elenchos what Kneale and Kneale would
later present as the "standard pattern of refutation." 21

refute

a

thesis indirectly, in Robinson's scheme, is to

deduce

a

falsehood from that thesis.

To

Suppose, p, which is

the refutand, is offered as the moral belief of an

interlocutor that Socrates wishes to examine, and it is put

through the elenchos.

Socrates' aim is to show that p

together with some other premises entail not-p, so that the
interlocutor would rather abandon the thesis,

p,

than keep

The contradictory of the refutand is derived from

it.

itself
A direct elenchos, on the other hand,

is one in which

the contradictory of the refutand is arrived at from other

premises that the interlocutors also holds true.
direct refutation of

premises other than

p,

In a

not-p is shown to be entailed by

p.

20

Kneale and Kneale, p.7

21

Robinson [1], p.24.

Robinson claimed that it is not

25

always clear whether an argument is direct or
indirect, but
elenchos in general is a way of convincing men that they

are

ignorant of the things they thought they knew.
For Robinson the negative practice of Socrates had

positive purpose: moral education.

a

Robinson wrote that "the

ultimate aim of the elenchus" was not so much intellectual
education as it was moral improvement.

He said,

The art of elenchus is to find premisses believed
by the answerer and yet entailing the contrary of
his thesis
The whole essence of the elenchus
lies in making visible to the answerer the link
between certain of his actual beliefs and the
contradictory of his present thesis. 22
.

.

.

When the person is thus made aware of his contradictory
beliefs, Robinson maintained, he is curious with
know.

a

desire to

Socrates' elenchus was thus a method of implanting

intellectual knowledge in other persons.

Robinson was

convinced, however, that elenchos neither imparted knowledge
nor increased it.

He said,

"[elenchos] only prepares the

ground for it." 23

Elaborating on the theme that the negative procedure of
the Socratic method has

a

positive goal, Norman Gulley

argued in the late 1960s that the negative and destructive

"manipulation of the elenchus" has an educational goal.
This is the goal of stimulating his respondents to seek out
the truth for themselves.

“ Robinson [1],
23

p.15,

Robinson [1], p.12.

He wrote,

and p.16.

,

26

[Socrates] thought that the provocative shock to
the
individual provided by the elenchus and the
realization of the individual's desire to resolve
contradictions could be effective only through direct
personal question. 24

Gulley argued that the educational aim in the Socratic

method consisted in confronting each person individually,
examining his set of beliefs to see if he has the right
set 2S of moral views.

By dealing directly with the

individual's opinions, Socrates is able to reveal any

inconsistency and to stimulate search for further truth more
forcibly than by any other method.
The Positive Method

Arguing against all earlier accounts mentioned above,
Terry Irwin maintained in the 1970s that Socratic elenchos
has a constructive purpose and constructive result. 26

In

his Plato's Moral Theory, he argued that elenchos brings

argumentative support for Socrates' affirmative doctrines. 27
Socrates has certain moral principles, which he assumes are
true, and these principles guide and shape the conclusions

‘

Gulley, p.59, cf. 64 ff.

25
The idea of a consistent "set" of moral views is controversial.
See Brickhouse and Smith, [5], p.190 ff. See next chapter.

This interpretation was based on his general
Irwin [6], p.37 ff.
point that for Socrates moral knowledge is a craft valued for its
results.
See Vlastos' objections to the "instrumental" nature of
Plato's moral theory, [9b].
26

This is also my contention. Where I differ from Irwin is that I
claim these affirmative doctrines are Socrates' religious beliefs. See
my Chapter Four. Irwin argued that some of Socrates' positive doctrines
rely on the "analogy between virtue and craft." This issue cannot be
discussed here, but see Irwin [6], p.37; cf 94, and Vlastos [7a] for
rejection of this view.
27

.

,

27

of his elenchoi. The function of elenchos,
according to

Irwin,

is to perforin both as a tool for criticism
and for

discovery.

That is why it was

a

"new approach among

Socrates' contemporaries" to moral questions.

Irwin argued,

"The elenchos is not merely destructive and critical.

It

yields positive results ." 28
In Irwin's analysis, Socrates is first critical; he

challenges and corrects the constraints of the ordinary
moral norms.

Though there are conflicts among the ordinary

moral beliefs, these conflicts cannot be resolved by

appealing to ordinary moral education.

For such an

education does not and cannot explain the principles upon

which such beliefs are based.
to expose the conflicts,

help bring about

a

Socrates' first task is

for he believes that elenchos can

"coherent moral view" by correcting the

contradictory beliefs.
sufficient.

So,

So exposing the conflicts is not

"The elenchos will work only if ordinary moral

beliefs are corrigible from within."

That is,

it will work

if the interlocutor is willing to revise his beliefs and

improve his views.

By means of his new approach,

Socrates

will get the interlocutor to see some general principles

about virtue, as

a

result of which the interlocutor will

have to adjust his other beliefs to suit the new principle.
conflict between

(a)

the interlocutors'

belief about what some virtue is; and

(b)

his beliefs about

The elenchos finds

28

Irwin

[

6

]

p. 68.

a

,
.

. .

28

particular examples of that virtue; and
about the good.

(c)

his beliefs

As a result of this conflict, the

interlocutor gives up some of (a).

Irwin wrote,

Someone who can define a virtue has adjusted (a)
and (b) to (c)
He will therefore not be liable
to the doubt and confusion of the interlocutors
refuted in the elenchos. His beliefs will be
stable; and stability is recognized as one
condition for knowledge 29
.

According to Irwin, the principles assumed true at the
outset of elenctic inquiry are not trivial; nor are they
arbitrary.

The principles are needed "to produce

a

coherent, rationally acceptable theory from elenctic

inquiry ." 30

On Irwin's view of the elenchos,

if the

interlocutor sees that he has conflicting beliefs, he will
figure out how to decide which belief he should reject.

Socrates assumes that any rational person will agree that

virtue is good, and his interlocutor will accept that view,
and correct his beliefs accordingly.
In Irwin's analysis,

"Socrates' moral principles and

his method of moral inquiry are inseparable ." 31

The

principles on which elenchos relies are required for the
constructive results.

The principles themselves are

justified by the interlocutors' acceptance of them in the

‘

30

31

Irwin

[

6

Irwin [6]
Irwin

[

6

p 62
.

]

]

,

p.70.
p. 71

.

.

29

elenchos.

Hence the method is powerful enough to defend
the

principles
Irwin's depiction of Socrates and his powerful
method

portrayed

a

man overconfident in his method, according to

Gerasimos Santas.

He argued a few years after Irwin's

seminal work on Plato's moral theory that analyses such as
s

give exaggerated importance to what Socrates knew

and to the efficacy of his method.

Santas argued that

Socrates is actually trying to discover answers to some very

difficult and novel moral questions

32
.

His main way of

discovering the answers is by examining the answers that
others give, which include some widely held beliefs of his
time.

Santas argued that Socrates sometimes knows the

answers to the questions he is raising, and sometimes he
does not.

The reason he refutes all the answers he gets may

be that all the answers he gets are inadequate:

Some may be

wrong answers, some too narrow, and some contrary to what
Socrates believes.

What his main line of elenchos does is

to test a belief or an answer by seeing what the belief

committed the believer to.

Santas maintained, however,

"One's powers to see such commitments are always limited,
Socrates' powers only

a

bit less than most people's ." 33

Santas concluded that

a

man such as Socrates who takes so

much care to emphasize what one knows and what one does not

3:

33

Santas

[

1

)

,

p. 71

Santas (1], p. 73 ff.

.

30

know, would not claim to possess knowledge in
advance of the

elenchos
By the time Vlastos published his revised view on

elenchos early 1980s, he had already been swayed by these
two accounts of a positive elenchos.

He had read and

responded to the views of Irwin and Santas; though he agreed
with both conclusions that elenchos is on the whole,

a

constructive device that Socrates employs, he came up with
what he dubbed

a

more "defensible" account of the method of

Socrates than either Irwin or Santas had presented.

.

CHAPTER

3

THE THREE AGES OF ELENCHOS IN VLASTOS

The Impotent Elenchos: 1956
In his Introduction to Protagoras, Vlastos argued
as

many others before him,

1

and claimed that Socrates' method,

due to its peculiar nature,

is incapable of justifying any

affirmative judgement. "Almost everything Socrates says is
wiry argument," he wrote. 2

However, despite the uncertain

results of his wiry arguments, Socrates was "perfectly clear
about the (far more important fact) that his method neither

assumes nor affords certainty about the truth or falsehood
of any one proposition." 3

Why?

Because, Vlastos argued,

Socrates really does not know; he only investigates.
An investigative method's aim cannot be final

demonstrative certainty, according to Vlastos.

Its practice

is compatible with suspended judgement as to the material

truth of its conclusions.

In making such claims, Vlastos

was taking Socrates at his word, and relying on texts in

which Socrates insists that he does not have the answers to
the questions he raises,

(cf.

Ch.

165b,

"Had Socrates thought of his method as aiming at

See my Chapter

2

:

Vlastos [13], p.xxxi.

3

Vlastos [13], p.xxx.

348c.)

166c; Pr.
a

certain

32

demonstration of particular truths," Vlastos concluded,
"he
would not have talked this way." 4
Originally, Vlastos thought that Socrates would not

have struck mechanically to
7

single pattern of argument,

a

for "logical pedantry is excluded by the spontaneity of a

live discussion." 5

However, Vlastos argued that all

elenctic arguments are the same in one respect 6

contradictory of some proposition,
more propositions other than p.

p,

:

the

is deduced from one or

(In this respect, Vlastos'

depiction of elenchos agreed with what Robinson dubbed as
the "direct elenchos."

)

He explained p as being a premise

"which seems true at first sight and is pronounced 'true'

right off by the inter locutor

"*
.

On this view, Socrates

usually starts his elenchos by asking:
interlocutor says

p,

'p or not-p ?'

If the

Socrates proceeds with his argument in

the following manner with each premise being secured by the

agreement of the interlocutor.

According to Vlastos,

Socrates argues the following way:
1.

p implies g, and q implies r.

4

Vlastos [13], p.xxx.

5

Vlastos [13], p.xxviii, fn.13.

6
In 1956, Vlastos was sure that no two elenchoi follow the same
Changing his mind, in 1983 he
form (cf. p.xxvii) or logical pattern.
claimed that there was a "standard" elenchos that can be found in most
See my Chapter 1
of the elenctic dialogues, especially in the Gorgias
for the chronology of the dialogues.
.

7
In "indirect elenchos" falsehood follows from
See my Chapter 2.
the refutand without the aid of extra premise (s).

8

Vlastos [13], p.xxvii.

.

33
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

s implies t.
t implies not-r
But not-r implies not-q which implies not-p.
Therefore, t implies not-p.
Therefore, s implies not-p.
,

s

Therefore, not-p. 9

Vlastos argued that the conclusion of this argument,
not-p, could never amount to the proof that the refutand,
p
is false unless its contradictory is deduced from no other

premise than p itself.

According to Vlastos, this never

happens in the elenctic dialogues, so the only result is the

demonstration of the incompatibility of p with the other
propositions that figured as premises in the argument.

10

This too is "a long way short of proving that p is false,"

Vlastos wrote.

Socrates can only be certain that p is false

if he is certain that the additional premises are true.

The outcome of the elenctic argument is to force the

interlocutor to make

a

choice between p and the premise

from which not-p was deduced.
of the Socratic method, then,

(s)

The essential accomplishment
is the contradiction created

by the assertion of p together with other premises; but it
is left open whether not-p is true.
So,

early in his career, Vlastos evaluated the Socratic

method on the assumption that Socrates has no interest in
showing his interlocutors that what they maintain is false.

q

10

Reconstructed from Vlastos's own,
Vlastos [13], p.xviii.

[13],

p.xxvi.

.

34

All Socrates is doing is investigating with his

interlocutors how what they believe is related to
of other beliefs,

a

number

so that they can see for themselves what

commitments they are making, if they accept the truth of
their main premise.

Whatever decision they make is theirs.

He can't make it for them, for he does not know; he only

inquires

Almost 30 years later, Vlastos took back most
everything he said was true about the Socratic method.

He

now claimed that Socrates could prove, with his infallible
method, the truth of not-p, because elenchos is a tool not

only for investigation but also for acquiring knowledge.
The Potent Elenchos: 1983
By Vlastos' own admission,

Irwin's work on the positive

nature of elenchos was responsible for the about-face in his
thinking.

11

In his now classic piece, Vlastos wrote that he

had been wrong in thinking that the Socratic elenchos has

a

function only to expose the conflicts in the thinking of his
interlocutors.

"I guessed wrongly twenty-five years ago in

put into my Introduction to

the account of the elenchus

I

the Protagoras ," he wrote.

"So have others before or

since." 12

He said that he now saw what he had missed

earlier:

Although Socratic elenchos fails to have final

demonstrative certainty, it does not follow from that that

11

vlastos [3], p.9-11; cf. Irwin [6).

12

Vlastos [7a], p.28.

See my Chapter 2.

,

.

.

.
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this method has no other kind of certainty, or that elenchos
is compatible only with suspended judgement.

Elenchos could

be shown to have a definite epistemological function.

The

"standard elenchus," 13 as Vlastos now dubbed it, can not
only reveal, on a regular basis, contradictory beliefs, but
it can also "establish substantive doctrines of his own." 14

According to Vlastos' new conception, the standard
elenchos had the following components:
(1)

The interlocutor asserts a thesis, p, which
Socrates considers false and targets for
refutation.

(2)

Socrates secures the agreement to further premises, q
and r.

(3)

Socrates argues, and the interlocutor agrees, that q
and r entail not-p.

(4)

Socrates claims to have shown that not-p is true, and p
false

Earlier in his career, Vlastos had argued that Socrates
never meant to go beyond the point
As we have seen,

same 16

:

a

(3)

15

great many scholars had maintained the

that the Socratic method is inherently non-

constructive, it merely points out

a

conflict that may arise

from holding certain beliefs together.

13

in his elenchos.

Elenchos thus aimed

Vlastos [7a], p.38, fn.29.

Some of them are: the just man will not harm
Vlastos [7a], p.38.
his enemies R 335); to teach men justice is to make them just (G.
460a); it is better to suffer deserved punishment than escape it (G.
494e
etc
14

(

.

)

Vlastos [7a], p.40 ff. for his discussion of how he differs from
Grote and Zeller, who both claimed that elenchos stops at (3).
15

16

See my Chapter

2
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at putting respondents to shame by refuting these

conflicting beliefs the interlocutors are supposed to live
by and the very principles they claim to know.

it can

provide no substantive views of how such knowledge can be
acquired.

Now, Vlastos argued, the proposition p in point

(1)

must be abandoned, because it has been refuted, and in

(4)

its negation has been established.

Thus that not-p is

true is the true outcome of elenchos.

Vlastos was now faced with the challenge of justifying
this assertion.

How can Socrates can claim, as Vlastos

states Socrates does, to have proved that p is false, when
all he has established is the inconsistency of p with the

other premises?

Nothing in the standard elenchos, taken by

itself, would ever justify point (4), that not-p is true and

p is false.
elenchos,

In other words,

(1),

(2)

result, point (4)?

and

(3)

how can the components of

taken together guarantee the

This was what Vlastos called "the

problem of elenchos."

He described the problem as "how is

it that Socrates claims to have proved a thesis false, when

in point of logic,

all he has proved is that the thesis is

inconsistent" with the premises whose truth he has not

undertaken to establish in that argument.

17

Before we turn to how he resolves the problem of
elenchos,

let me say a little about the conditions under

which Vlastos claims the standard elenchos is conducted.
17

Vlastos [1], p.21, cf.

[7a].

—
37

The elenchos starts when an interlocutor makes some moral

claim that Socrates has been searching for, and wishes to
examine.

What is Socrates searching for?

Vlastos suggests,

For truth, certainly, but not for every sort of truth
only for truth in the moral domain. If we wanted to
know what is the wholesale price of olive oil on the
Peiraeus market, Socrates would not propose that
elenctic argument is the way to find out. 18

Nor is it the way to find out truth in mathematics or

metaphysics; Socrates keeps examinations to questions about
morality.

'Moral'

issues are those about how one ought to

live, what sort of man one should be, how one gets to be

virtuous, and so on. Socrates, in the words of Vlastos, is

"street evangelist," who wishes to conduct

a

a

joint search

with anyone who is willing to talk and reason with him on
these matters
So,

— as

long as they participate honestly.

on Vlastos' view,

Socrates imposes certain

constraints on his interlocutors for elenchos to succeed:
(1)

They must abstain from speechifying.

19

Admitting that

he cannot handle long speeches, Socrates asks his

respondents be prepared to cut their answers short.
33

5a2 -4

,

cf.

329b,

336b.)

And

(2)

(Pr.

they must say what they

believe personally, what Vlastos dubbed as the "say what you
believe" rule.

(cf.

350a; G. 495a,

500b.)

Cr.

40c-d; Pr.

19

337c,

346a,

Socrates honors all opinions, whether

it is of the wise or the many,

18

331c; R.

as long as the interlocutor

Vlastos [7a], p.32.
This is only an ostensible requirement, see my Chapter

5.

.
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believes that view, and does not answer contrary to his real
opinion [para doxan]
Eud. 286d

;

20
(

R

.

346a;

337c; Cr.

47a,

47d,

49c-d;

500b.)

G.

Keeping these constraints in mind, we can now go back
to the puzzle of elenchos.

The "crucial text" which Vlastos

— and argue
elenchos — is in

says forced him to abandon his earlier position
for his strong conclusion in the standard

the Gorgias

,

in particular,

in an elenchos against Polus. 21

Here is that standard elenchos, drawn up by Vlastos:
(1)

Polus believes that p: to commit injustice is better
than to suffer it.
Socrates considers p false and
targets it for refutation.

(2)

Socrates secures the agreement to further premise, q:
to commit injustice is baser than to suffer it.
[Socrates also secures Polus' agreement to a host of
other premises, which Vlastos bundles up as conjunct r
whose contents he takes to be irrelevant here.]

(3)

Socrates gets Polus to agree that q and r entail what
Socrates takes to be the logical contradiction of
Polus' thesis, not-p, to suffer injustice is better
than to commit it.

(4)

Socrates claims to have shown that not-p is true, and p
is false.

Here Vlastos thinks that what Socrates claims is that p
has been proved not just inconsistent with q and r, but

proved false. 22

This conclusion, according to Vlastos, is

Vlastos [7a], p.35.
21

See my Chapter

5

for an evaluation of this argument.

22
Interestingly, Vlastos
vlastos [7a], p.47, also fn.48.
acknowledges that he sets aside questions relating to the logical
validity of this argument. He cites Santas [1] for authority that it
See my Chapter 5 for my argument that it is fallacious, and that
is.
fallacy in elenchos may hold the key to assessing its results.
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supported by whet Socrates says in the text.

The crucial

line is 479e5, where Socrates declares,

Has it not been proved that what was asserted [by
myself] is true? [oukun apodedeiktai hoti alethe
elegeto?] (trans. Vlastos) 23

Vlastos thinks that Socrates is making

a

perfectly

general claim here: Socrates can do the same in all of his

elenctic arguments.

Socrates would not have made the claim

above that he has proved not-p true, unless he thought that
he could offer

a

compelling proof for the falsehood of

p.

Socrates is convinced, Vlastos argues, that when he shows
his interlocutors that the negation of their thesis can be

derived from the conjunction of premises to which they have
agreed, they will never succeed in saving their thesis by

retracting conceded premises, q and r

— as

long as they hold

on to their original thesis, p.

Three decades earlier, Vlastos argued that elenchos
faced the interlocutor with making a choice between p and

other premises such as q and r.

The case Vlastos is making

now is much stronger. No matter what premise they give up,
as long as the interlocutors hold on to p, they will always

be proven wrong because Socrates' will always find in the

interlocutor another set of beliefs which entails the

23
Alternative translations of the same passage pose conflicting
accounts of alethG, hence may underscore Vlastos' emphasis:
(Irwin)
(1) "Hasn't it been proved that it was said truly?"
(Zeyl)
true?"
is
said
was
what
proved
that
been
it
"Hasn't
(2)
statement?" (Lamb)
(3) "Has it not been proved that this was a true

40

negation of their original thesis.

So,

what changed between

1956 and 1983?

The answer rests in certain "meta-elenctic" 24

assumptions Socrates must be making, which Vlastos now
claims he overlooked.

These assumptions not only supplement

the elenchos, but are necessary for its positive outcome.

These assumptions are not premisses in the argument, nor
does Socrates ever suggest that they are.

But without them,

Socrates could not claim that he "proved" something.

In

other words, Socrates would not be so confident about his

elenctic arguments unless he was making what Vlastos later
called the "tremendous assumption." 25

Assumption A
Anyone who ever has a false moral belief will always at
the same time have true beliefs entailing the negation
of that false belief.

Vlastos argues that Socrates himself must believe that
to prove the inconsistency of the thesis with the agreed-

upon premises is ipso facto to prove that, if the thesis is
false, no one can affirm it without generating contradiction
in his own system of beliefs.

He also claims that

Assumption A is not an arbitrary assumption on the part of
Socrates.

Vlastos writes,

Every time [Socrates] tangles with people who defend
thesis he considers false and he looks for true

Vlastos [7a], p.53, fn.59.
25

Vlastos [3], p.114, fn.32.

a

]

,
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premises among their own beliefs from which he can
deduce its negation the needed premises are in place:
they are always where they should be if A is true.
So
he has this purely inductive evidence for the truth of
A 26
.

Vlastos has one important qualifier for this tremendous
assumption.

Assumption A is made in the Gorgias only; in

all of the earlier dialogues Socrates is free of it. 27

in

this particular dialogue, Socrates' language is much

stronger than earlier elenctic dialogues.

In previous

dialogues Socrates describes the elenctic refutation of p by
saying that not-p "has become evident to us" [ephanfe hemin
353b5-6; Eu

(Pr.

"sees"

15cl-2; R. 335e5)

.

[horas (Eu.

that not-p.

Ila3)], or "knows"

In the Gorgias, however,

have "proved" 28

[

apodediktai

]

[iste (Pr.

3357cl)

Socrates claims to

that not-p.

Socrates is no epistemologist
but Plato is.

or the respondent now

]

,

according to Vlastos,

Socrates does not worry about the strength of

his claim for not-p.

He never asks, as an epistemologist

would, why we must believe that those who disagree with

Socrates must have those entrenched beliefs which he can use
to make them "see" the falsehood of their misguided

26

Vlastos [7a]

21

Vlastos [7b], p.71.

,p.53.

28
Vlastos [7b], p 72 "When both kinds of language are used in
close juxtaposition, it does look as though 'not-p has been proved true'
means to go further in some unspecified, but important, way than does
'not-p has been made evident'."
.

:

42

theses

24
.

Plato, on the other hand, thinks elenchos is

hopeless without some very strong methodological
assumptions.

It is in fact Plato who asks for reasons for

supposing that if Socrates thinks that his theses are

universally confirmed by elenchos, then he must think that
they are provable to everyone.

If they are provable to

everyone, then everyone must have true beliefs which entail
the negation of each of his false beliefs.

Thus, Vlastos

concludes that the tremendous assumption is "Plato's present
to his teacher, bestowed in the Gorgias where he is made to
say those very strong things.

.

.

of which there is no hint

earlier on ." 30
The explanation for the change in Socrates' language in

the Gorgias, according to Vlastos, is closely related to

another meta-elenctic assumption Socrates is making.

In

Vlastos's view, after years of searching, Socrates finds
that only his own system could survive the elenctic
challenge. Socrates' beliefs are "reassuringly consistent,"

according to Vlastos, because all others, when tested for
consistence, have failed.

In all of the elenctic arguments

in which he has engaged Socrates has never been faulted for

inconsistency.

So Socrates has evidence,

as before,

inductive evidence, for another assumption.

Vlastos [7b] p.74.
30

Vlastos [7b], p.73.
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Assumption B
The set of moral beliefs held by Socrates at any given
time is consistent.

Socrates does not say he knows that all his moral

beliefs are mutually consistent.

But in Vlastos' analysis,

all Socrates needs to say, and he appears to do so,

he believes this is so.

is that

So long as consistency of the set

stands against all challenges, Socrates would be perfectly

justified in holding Assumption

B,

and hence in supposing,

in consequence of Assumption A, that his belief-set consists

entirely of true beliefs.

According to Vlastos, from A and

B Socrates could infer with certainty that any set of moral

beliefs which was internally consistent would consist

exclusively of true beliefs.
belief, given Assumption A,

If it contained a false
it would also contain beliefs

entailing the negation of that belief.
and B yield assumption

Hence, assumptions A

C.

Assumption C
The set of moral beliefs held by Socrates at any given
time is true.

So late in his career, Vlastos changed his evaluation
of the Socratic method,

Socrates has

a

because he found that in the Gorgias

positive interest in showing his

interlocutors that what they maintain is false.

In other

dialogues, all Socrates is doing is investigating with his

interlocutors how what they believe is related to other

.

44

beliefs.

The choice is up to them if they find that they

have conflicting beliefs, which belief to let go.

But here

Socrates is showing that his interlocutors cannot maintain
the truth of their main premise, p.
up.

In effect,

They have to give it

Socrates makes that decision for them by the

power of his elenchos.

In the Gorgias

,

Socrates not only

investigates but he also knows.
One immediate question that came up after Vlastos'

article was published was whether or not elenchos, if it is
to yield positive results, requires these assumptions.

Couldn't Socrates establish not-p without assumptions A and
B?

Richard Kraut thought Socrates could, for elenchos is

plenty powerful without them

31
.

Kraut claimed that

a

proof

is possible without the methodological assumptions of A and
B.

Vlastos argued that

a

proof rests on true premises, and

since Socrates regards his arguments as proofs, he must have
reasons, namely assumptions A and

premises.

B,

for the truth of the

Kraut suggested that this reasoning is mistaken.

Citing Aristotle as authority on proof
argued that in

a

apodeiksis

]

,

Kraut

proof it is not necessary to have reasons

for the truth of premises.
a

[

First, the steps one can use in

proof are not inexhaustible.

finite number of premises.

So every proof contains a

Second,

in order to avoid

circularity, some of those premises will have to be

undemonstrated, hence are assumed true.

31

Kraut

[

3

]

"I take

it that

, .

.

45

Professor Vlastos is not demanding that Socrates'
arguments
do the impossible, " Kraut wrote, "that is prove not
only

the conclusion but the premises as well."

Socrates could

very well assume that some of his premises are true— as one
cannot always give reasons for everything one believes
"this fact does not deprive one of proof

— but

." 32

Kraut's objection was that the force of the elenchos
rests on the reasonableness of the premises, and not whether
or not they are not widely shared.

For Vlastos assumed

that without some contra-endoxic premises Socrates could not

arrive at contra-endoxic conclusions.

These premises must

therefore be supported by some strong assumptions,
specifically, A and B

33
.

But in Kraut's view, elenchos

could generate an unorthodox conclusion from
"humdrum" orthodoxies.

a

collection of

For the only crucial criterion in

the elenchos is that the premises be plausible.

Therefore,

assumptions A and B are not necessary for the success of
elenchos
What's more, Assumption B is not even true, Kraut
There is textual evidence that Socrates is genuinely

wrote.

troubled by inconsistencies in his set 34 of beliefs.

3:

Kraut [3]

33

,

Kraut

p.62.

Vlastos [7a], p.43, fn.41.

Brickhouse & Smith also objected to Vlastos' notion of a
consistent set and argued that for a set of sentences to be consistent
it need not contain only true (or only false) sentences; it need only
contain sentences from which no contradiction can be derived without
employing some other sentence not included in the set. See Brickhouse
Smith 5
p. 190
34

[

]

&

.

.
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suggested that we take Socrates seriously when he confesses
his shortcomings in sorting out the perplexing conclusions
to some of the arguments he has raised.

In fact, most early

dialogues end with genuine confession of such perplexity, he
argued.

"Consistency is not quite so important for Socrates

as Professor Vlastos thinks it is," he wrote, and so Vlastos
is wrong in turning the Gorgias into an exception

35
.

The emphasis Vlastos [and his critics such as Kraut]

placed on the logical and epistemological elements in

elenchos worried Charles Kahn, and other scholars

36
.

Kahn

argued that the dramatic and personal nature of elenchos is
just as important as logic. Elenchos could yield positive

results without methodological assumptions and extensive
debate on whether or not it is

silencing the interlocutor.

a proof.

It could do it by

Kahn's central thesis against

Vlastos was that all of the important elenchoi in the
Gorgias were ad hominem
his arguments

37
.

:

directed against the man and not

On Kahn's account, the ad hominem nature

Kraut [3], p.70, cf. Protagoras, Apology, Hippias Minor.
Brickhouse and Smith [5] also favored taking Socrates at his word when
Since Socrates claims that elenchos can be
he claimed perplexity.
practiced successfully by others (cf. Ap 23c2-7; 39cl-d5), Brickhouse
and Smith argued that consistency of Socrates' beliefs is not necessary
for the success of elenchos as Vlastos claims, hence Assumption B is not
true
.

36
See for their respective emphases in elenchos, Kahn [2] for the
drama. King for psychology of the respondents, and Stokes [2] for the
characters of the interlocutors.

37
See Kahn [2], p.76 ff. also p.248-258 for his view that the
standard elenchos does not exist in all of the so-called elenctic
dialogues

.
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of the elenchos is therapeutic

First,

31

'

in two important ways:

it helps the respondent rid himself of his
emotions

and prejudices, and facilitates the process of acquiring

knowledge.

And second, it helps the interlocutor see in

Socrates the paradigm of the good person.

Kahn concluded

that it is the personal elements in elenchos that are

essential to its success more than the logical nature of its

structure
The Omnipotent Elenchos: 1991 and 1994
In a posthumously published and revised version of the

1983 article 39

,

Vlastos presents an improved and all

powerful elenchos:

Socrates is able, by the power of

elenchos, to acquire moral knowledge.

Vlastos goes even

further in his bold thesis and claims that it is only by

elenchos that Socrates can acquire this knowledge.

version of

a

The new

seemingly omnipotent elenchos is due to two new

topics with which Vlastos was presently preoccupied:

Socratic disawoval of knowledge, 40 and Platonic interest in
geometry.

These two issues played an important role in

Vlastos' second re-evaluation of the nature and function of
elenchos.

The first

I

discuss in the next chapter.

Now let

me say a few words about what Vlastos takes to be the role

38

Also see Seeskin [2] for a discussion on the therapeutic
influence of elenchos on the interlocutors.
39

Vlastos [1], p.1-37.

40

Vlastos (6), also in [1], p.39-66.
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of mathematical studies in Plato's thinking and the

"disappearance" of elenchos from the Platonic corpus after
the Gorgias.

After the Gorgias, which he takes to be the last in the

elenctic dialogues, Vlastos claims elenchos drops out of the
dialogues.

The method of examining others turns into an

examination of Socratic hypotheses

— this

'Socrates' being no

longer the historic man but Plato's mouthpiece

41
.

Vlastos

argues that around the time he was writing the Gorgias,
Plato went through

a

profound change, and as he did,

elenchos dropped out of sight.

What accounts for this

profound change ? 42
Vlastos' answer is but

a

hypothesis: Plato's growing

interest in mathematics transformed his own outlook on the

method of philosophical argumentation.

As Plato became

interested in geometry, he discarded the method that
Socrates held as the "arbiter of moral truth," because he no
longer believed it worked

43
.

Vlastos gives historical

reasons in order to account for Plato's interest in this new
method.

Citing works from the late fifth, and fourth

centuries, Vlastos argues that there was

a

growing interest

in developing axiom sets in classical antiguity, which was

41

See his "Ten Theses" in Vlastos [3], p.45-81.

42

Vlastos [3], p.117 ff.

43

Vlastos [3], p

.

1

17

.
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fully completed by Euclid in his Elements
view,

44
.

in Vlastos'

interest in mathematical knowledge could also be seen

in the middle period of Plato,

notoriously unclear

— even

even though his discussion is

to specialists.

Despite the

complications in the details of his geometrical definitions
and examples 45
to Vlastos:

however, Plato's point was simple, according

,

He wanted to show that the logical structure of

the new method is antithetical to that of the elenchos.

The

Socratic elenchos could correct

a

a

mistake by eliminating

false belief, p, when it is shown that p contradicts

which the interlocutor holds.

q,

Plato realized, however, that

although elenchos could correct mistakes in the moral domain
it could never do that in geometry,

for a shortfall in

epistemic certainty is inherent in the elenctic method

46
.

The knowledge that Socrates gathers in the elenchos does not

entail certainty, and may, therefore, be used to mean simply

justifiable true belief.
other hand, is

a

The geometrical method, on the

model only for demonstration, one of

"investigating from hypothesis ." 47

To adopt this

methodological model for research in moral philosophy "is to
scuttle the elenchus," Vlastos argues, for the "say what you

44

See Vlastos [3], p.121, fn.63 on his views of the pioneering
ventures on geometrical elements, and fn.64 on the efforts to
systematize the partial theorems.
45

M.

76a4-7

;

La.

192b; cf. Elements I, Definition of 13 and 14.

46

See my next chapter for

47

Vlastos [3], p.123.

a

fuller discussion of this point.
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believe" rule of asserting premises that Vlastos took to be

essential to the elenchos would have to be foregone.
On Vlastos' hypothesis, Plato, unlike Socrates, took

geometric knowledge to be the paradigm of all knowledge,
including the knowledge of moral truths.
model,

in order to investigate a claim, p,

In the geometric

one must start

with a hypothesis, h. This involves investigating the truth
of h such that p is true if and only if h is true.

The

crucial question to be resolved in the geometrical model
what follows if h is true and if it is false?

is,

As the

geometrical method of investigation is applied by tying the
truth of p to that of h, one aims to demonstrate that p is
true because it is

a

necessary consequence of h.

known to be true because it is

a

h may be

necessary consequence of

the axioms of the geometrical system. 4

*

According to Vlastos, the Gorgias is the natural
turning point for Plato.

For it is in this dialogue that

his contact with geometry first shows up:

This is the first

time in the sequence of the Platonic dialogues, Vlastos
claims, that Socrates says he is speaking like

geometrician

49
.

a

However, it is in the Meno that Vlastos

first finds the full impact of Plato's new interest in

48

Vlastos [3], p.124.

49
Vlastos [3], p. 128, fn.87; cf. 465c, the proportions, as
cosmetics is to gymnastics, sophistical to legal art, rhetoric to
justice, etc., is said in the style of geometricians [eipein hosper hoi
The second reference to the geometricians, according to
geometrai).
Vlastos, is in the Meno, 76a4-7.

,

.
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mathematics on the content and method of philosophy.

in

this dialogue, the interrogation of the slave-boy with

respect to

a

geometrical problem was always thought to be

paradigm of the elenchos.

a

The boy is asked to find the side

of a square which duplicates the area of a given square,

whose side is two-feet long.

The boy guesses wrong twice,

and each time he is brought to understand that the false
answer, p,

is eliminated because p contradicts g,

what the answerer himself accepts as true.

and g is

On Vlastos'

view, however, the elenchos in this dialogue is good only
for correcting the boy's mistake, and it does not bring him

to the true answer.

"To bring him to it, Socrates must shed

the adversative role to which persistence in elenctic

argument would have kept him ." 50

Vlastos observes that

Socrates does indeed shed that role when he induces the boy
to "recollect " 51 the answer that the side of a square whose

area is twice that of

a

given square is the diagonal of the

given square.

What is new and non-Socratic here, according to
is the resort to geometrical method,

Vlastos,
a

new paradigm for knowledge:

50

which signals

Plato is not giving up moral

Vlastos [3], p.119.

Vlastos speculates that the doctrine of recollection is Plato's
For this doctrine that every person's
answer to Socratic elenchos.
soul existed long before birth and had prenatal knowledge about
everything, and that this knowledge is recoverable through recollection-explains Assumption A. The doctrine of recollection answers how it is
possible that every one of Socrates interlocutors had true beliefs in
See
their souls entailed by the negation of their false beliefs.
Vlastos 1
p. 29
51

—

[

]
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inquiry for mathematics, but instead he is finding
by which all inquiry must proceed.

a

process

He leads Socrates out of

the elenchos into a new method that mathematicians practice.

Caught up in the Greek aspiration at the time for scientific
knowledge, Plato viewed mathematics, according to Vlastos,
as the foundation for a system in which every statement

justifiable by argument is derivable from secure premises,
and every conclusion is indubitable as it is drawn therefrom
by necessary inference.

The results constitute necessary

statements which, as Aristotle later phrased it, "could not
be otherwise."

It is no wonder, Vlastos argues,

that Plato

saw the infallible method of Socratic elenchos as being

inadequate for such knowledge, and therefore he did away
with it in the later dialogues.

Vlastos maintains that Socrates in the early dialogues
has no notion of the theory of recollection, nor is he aware
of the geometrical method.

Therefore, he thinks that true

belief without certainty suffices to guide action aright.
On the basis of his analysis of the role of the geometric

method in the Meno

,

however, Vlastos speculates that Plato's

interest in geometry eventually takes him to the doctrine of
the philosopher-king of the Republic and the view that the

masses should be spared the hazards of the elenchos.

Vlastos writes,
Access to the critical examination of questions of
good and evil, right and wrong, may then be
reasonably withheld from all but the elite, and

even from them until they have finished
mathematical studies 52
.

I

will not take up this fantastic account of the

intellectual development of Plato, as it falls beyond
the
scope this project.

Instead,

I

will now turn to Vlastos'

other claim that elenchos, infallible though it may be,
the only method to acquire moral knowledge.

5:

Vlastos [3], p.125.

i

CHAPTER

4

ELENCHOS AND MORAL KNOWLEDGE

Is Method All?

Vlastos ' treatment of the Socratic method, while

providing us with creative solutions to age-old dilemmas,
presents many new and intriguing puzzles.

In the Gorgias

Socrates has some very strong moral doctrines.

According to

Vlastos, Socrates establishes these doctrines by elenchos
and elenchos alone.

with

a

In this chapter,

will be concerned

group of problems that arises from this claim.

what follows

I

In

will first explain the thesis Vlastos argues

and why we should resist it.

for,

I

1

will then present an

I

account of the role of certain religious beliefs in the

Gorgias and show that this presents

a

serious problem to

Vlastos' interpretation of elenchos as the method by which

Socrates obtains all his moral knowledge.

According to Vlastos' radical interpretation of the
Socratic method, elenchos is the foundation of Socratic
ethics.

Vlastos' new subtitle for his now famous article

"The Socratic Elenchus,"
is All." 3

2

sums up his view nicely: "Method

Vlastos' account of the elenchos gives Socrates

Briefly,
See my Chapter 3 for Vlastos' description of elenchos.
"elenchos" refers to an argument in which Socrates refutes an
interlocutor's thesis by deriving its denial from premises which that
interlocutor and Socrates agree to.
1

2

Vlastos [7a]; see my Chapter

3

Vlastos [1], p.1-37.

3

for a summary.

a

.,
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highly dependable method to produce certain results
at any
given time. Vlastos believes that elenchos is the only

method through which Socrates acquires moral knowledge.
4

Because it is the only means for knowledge in the moral
arena, Vlastos thinks that elenchos also provides the

persuasive force needed to exhort others to change their

mistaken moral beliefs.

Central to this view is Vlastos'

thesis
Elenchos is Socrates' sole access to moral knowledge.

T1

Before we turn our attention to the problems arising
from this thesis, let us first understand its terms and its
scope.

First, Vlastos argues that his thesis, Tl,

to be true only in the Gorgias

s
.

is taken

For Vlastos the Gorgias

contains the blueprint of the Socratic method.

In this

dialogue, Vlastos argues, Socrates is able, by "iron and

adamant" elenchos, to "prove" that the moral beliefs of
Gorgias, Polus and Callicles are false. 6

Accordingly,

Vlastos thinks that the Gorgias is witness to the triumph of
Socrates and the true method of moral philosophy.

And it is

here, he contends, that we truly come to understand the

4

Similarly, "Knowledge [is] reached and
Vlastos [1], p.61, fn.50.
tested through ... elenchus " Vlastos [1], p.55.
,

5
"Postscript to 'The Socratic Elenchus'," Vlastos [1], p.33-37.
From now on, all my references to Plato's text are to the Gorgias. See
my Chapter 1 for the chronology of the elenctic dialogues that Vlastos
accepts

6

Vlastos [1], p.33-34.

..

,
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nature of Socrates' method and so understand Socrates as

philosopher

a

7
.

Also crucial to Vlastos' thesis is what he thinks
Socrates does in an elenchos.

truth only in the moral domain.

He establishes truth, but

Vlastos says,

There is no reason to suppose that Socrates thinks
that truths in the domain of the productive crafts
or of mathematics or of logic are to be
ascertained by elenctic argument
8

.

Vlastos believes that Socrates is "a moralist pure and
simple."

In all the dialogues prior to the Meno

Vlastos

holds that Socrates exhibits "epistemological innocence,

methodological naivety ," 9 and practices only moral
inquiry

10
.

He has no epistemological worries about his own

method, and so he never inquires into moral theory

11
.

Nor

does he appeal to any meta-elenctic premises to arrive at
his conclusions in an elenctic argument

In Vlastos'

12
.

view, one of the most important functions of elenchos is to

examine "not just propositions but lives ."

13

This is the

7

See my Chapter 1 on Vlastos' claim that Socrates in the Gorglas
represents the views of the real Socrates, not of Plato.
8
Vlastos [1], p.5. Vlastos believes that the method of
mathematical discovery employed in the cross-examination of the slaveboy in the Meno is not elenctic but maieutic.

9

10

Vlastos

Vlastos

1

[

[

1

]

p. 25

,

]

,

p. 6

11

Vlastos [1], p.63.

12

Vlastos [1], p.25; cf. p.4-9.

13

Vlastos [1], p.8-9.

.
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existential dimension" of elenchos, which requires that the

elenctic arqument be based on premises which reflect the
actual moral beliefs of the interlocutors.
The word "moral" covers a wide range as it is used by

Vlastos in his thesis, T1

— so

wide in fact that what we

might ordinarily consider as non-moral are considered as
moral premises by Socrates.

14

Though he does not have

a

special word for it himself, Socrates understands by
"moral," according to Vlastos, all that pertains to how one

ought to live, what sort of person one should be, and who is

happy and who is not.

15

Included in this vast realm are the

notoriously problematic notion of arete, and of course, the
individual moral virtues.

16

On Vlastos' account, Socrates

examines by elenchos questions that fall in this vast domain
as if they have never been examined before.

By the right

method of moral philosophy, according to Vlastos, Socrates
is able to determine if a person is living the right sort of

life,

if he is the right sort of person,

and if he is truly

happy or not.
Let me also clarify the notion of knowledge in Vlastos'
thesis, for the paradox is plain:

Given his frequent

14
Such as a crucial premise, "all things are called beautiful
either on account of the pleasure they give or their usefulness." (474e)

15

Vlastos (1), p

.

7

;

cf.

G.

500c3-4; 487e-488a; 472c-d.

16
Such as courage, moderation, justice., piety, etc., investigation
into the nature of which constitute the thematic core of the elenctic
dialogues
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disclaimers to any sort of knowledge, how can
Vlastos claim
that Socrates has positive moral knowledge? To

this obvious

question, Vlastos has

Socrates makes

a

surprising and yet obvious answer:

a

dual use of his words for knowing.

Vlastos

thinks that this dual use signals, "two radically different

cognitive achievements," one of which Socrates disavows,
while the other he avows
not an epistemologist

,

17
.

In Vlastos

/

view, Socrates is

and so he is not interested in the

necessary and sufficient conditions for "infallible"
knowledge.

18

When Socrates disavows knowledge, as he so

often does, he disavows knowledge that one has the utmost

certainty of being true.

This knowledge is in

a

strong

sense certain knowledge, which is in Vlastos' technical

terminology, "knowledge r

.

"

On Vlastos' view, Socrates does

not expect his moral knowledge to meet "the fantastically

strong standards" of knowledge r

,

because presumably Socrates

realizes that his method of philosophy is inadequate for

acquiring this kind of knowledge.
in Vlastos'

What Socrates does avow,

judgement, at least in the Gorgias

,

is moral

knowledge that he acquires "by his own maverick method of

philosophical inquiry, the elenchus ." 19

This knowledge is

17

Vlastos [1], p.62.
For the original article, "The Socratic
Disavowal" see Vlastos [6].
18
See for sufficient conditions for infallible knowledge, Vlastos
Briefly, if p is infallibly known, then
especially fn.31.
p.52-55;
[1],
necessarily p is true.
For Plato as well as for Aristotle, this is
demonstrated by premises which guarantee p's truth.

19

Vlastos [1], p.49.
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in a weak sense elenctic knowledge, which is
in Vlastos'

technical terminology, "knowledge E

.

So according to

"

Vlastos, when Socrates avows any knowledge in the moral
domain, the content of that knowledge is propositions
that

Socrates thinks "elenctically justifiable." 20

it follows

that on Vlastos' account "to know" refers directly to what

Socrates seeks to and does achieve by elenctic inquiry; that
is,

Socrates knows only what he can establish by elenchos.
A virtue of Vlastos' distinction between knowledge,- and

knowledge E is that it saves Socrates from charges of
confusion and inconsistency.

This distinction nicely does

away with the apparent discrepancy, when, for example,

Socrates says in the Gorgias that he does not know if the

theses he proved are true, even after he proved them (508e6509a5

)

.

In Vlastos' reading,

that he has knowledge E

,

all Socrates means here is

but not knowledge,..

Socrates does

not know for certain that they are true, but he does know

that they are elenctically justified.

ignorance

...

never generate

doctrinal incoherence."

21

[s]

"Thus his avowal of

practical inconsistency or

So when Vlastos claims that

elenchos is Socrates' sole access to moral knowledge, we
should understand by it "knowledge E

"

We have now roughly examined all the terms except

'elenchos' in Vlastos' thesis.
20

Vlastos [1], p.56.

21

Vlastos [1], p.60.

Let us now briefly review

.
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Vlastos

'

account of

a

standard elenchos. 22

characteristic components in

a

There are four

standard elenchos, and

(

4

)

is

the point of controversy in the history of the
treatment of
23
elenchos.
(1)

The interlocutor asserts a thesis, p, which
Socrates considers false and targets for
refutation.

(2)

Socrates secures the agreement to further premises, 24
q
& r.
(g & r are not argued for, but accepted by the
interlocutor and Socrates.)

(3)

Socrates argues, and the interlocutor agrees, that
g
r entail not-p.

(4)

Socrates claims to have shown that not-p is true, and d
F
false.

Vlastos thinks that elenchos is
activity, which may take

a

a

multifaceted

number of different routes. So,

Vlastos thinks that it cannot be depicted by
of argument. 25

However,

&

a

single form

in trying to get clear on the

crucial point of how not-p is generated, several competing

" See my Chapter 3 for more detail.
23

See my Chapter

2

24
Vlastos exaggerates the frequency of such agreements, and
overlooks the cases in which Socrates obtains ostensible agreements,
e.g. "I'm going along with you both to expedite your argument and
gratify Gorgias." (501cl0, cf.516b4.) Sometimes he gains no acceptance
at all.
At the end of the Gorgias Socrates is reduced to conducting
elenchos by himself, for no interlocutor accepts any premise he puts
forward.
See Polus' responses in 470bl0, 4803, Callicles in 495b; 504b;
505c-d ; 506c; 513c; 519d; 522e.

25

Vlastos [1], p.ll. Although Vlastos considers an attempt to
assign a distinct form to elenctic argument as being incongruous to the
Socratic spirit of spontaneous debate, his account leaves us in the dark
as to exactly how to delineate, enumerate and differentiate elenctic
from other kinds of arguments. This in turn seriously hampers a proper
evaluation of elenctic arguments.
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patterns of elenchos have been suggested. 26

Vlastos thinks

that elenctic premises are propositions other than the

proposition under investigation,

p.

If Socrates had to use

as a premise the proposition under investigation, according

to Vlastos, Socrates would have to worry about the truth of

the whole of the premise set.

Since he is not worried about

any such thing, so Vlastos argues, the standard elenchos

must have the form of argument in which not-p is generated
from premises other than p. 27

So taking Vlastos'

recommendation, we may characterize 28 the standard elenchos
as follows:
1
2
3

.

.

.

q

&

r

then not-p
therefore, not -P
If q & r,

See Robinson [1], p.22 ff.
According to Robinson, the type of
elenchos that is most frequent in the early dialogues is "indirect"
elenchos, which employs the main thesis under examination, p, as a
premise in the argument, not-p is generated from assuming the truth of p
together with some other premises, q and r. So, when Socrates gets his
interlocutor to agree to the claims, q and r, he suggests that q and r
entail not-p. Vlastos argues that Socrates' positive doctrines are
established only by standard elenchos, in which the truth of the
refutand is never assumed in the argument. See Vlastos [1], p.12, p.35.
Vlastos rightly points out that Robinson fails to give references
to identify the "indirect" elenchoi in the texts, and so it is
impossible to assess his claim fully. However, Vlastos' account does
See my footnotes 28 and 29.
not take us any further either.
27

Vlastos [7a], p.39.

Also unclear in Vlastos' account is if we should take his
characterization to represent the prototype of elenchos. For the
syllogisms of Socratic elenchos fall into many types. As Robinson
briefly discusses, for some of them we can easily find names and forms
But for many more there are no obvious
from the textbooks of logic.
See
names, or forms, a point which Vlastos neglects to mention.
Robinson 1
28

[

]

.
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There is

a

particular argument 29 that Vlastos takes as

his guide to his exegesis of the standard elenchos.

the notorious argument of Socrates against Polus.

evaluate this argument in some detail in my Chapter
so for now

I

will follow Vlastos' interpretation.)

It is
(I

and

5,

in this

example, Socrates is said to be trying to show Polus the

falsehood of p by defending, according to Vlastos, what

Socrates takes to be its "logical contradictory," not-p.
The argument is prompted by

a

discussion in which Polus

maintains, and he says everyone else does also

p

To do injustice is better then to suffer it.

Socrates says Polus is wrong, and so is everyone else.
Socrates believes, and he says everyone else does too once
they see their mistaken belief

not-p

To suffer injustice is better than to do it.

Polus is indignant.

He cannot believe this view can be

seriously maintained.

But arguing in an elenctic fashion

Socrates gets Polus to agree to

29

This is Vlastos' only
elenchos in the Gorgias The
purported to be fraught with
Vlastos' strong claim of the
.

g.

working example for the operation of
dearth of examples from a dialogue
elenctic activity greatly undercuts
indubitable success of elenchos.

30
Clearly, p and not-p as stated by Vlastos are
Vlastos [1], p 19
It is puzzling why Vlastos would think
not "logical" contradictories.
to say here is that these two
entitled
is
Socrates
they are. All
statements are, in some informal sense, contraries. They cannot both be
true, but they can both be false.
.

.
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To do injustice is more disgraceful 31 than to
suffer it.

g

Socrates also gets him to agree to r and other premises,

whose contents Vlastos leaves out for the moment. 32
Socrates gets Polus to agree that q and r entail not-p.

So

following Vlastos' blueprint of standard elenchos, we can

characterize this particular elenchos, in its most
skeletal 33 form, as follows:
1.

2.
3.

To do injustice is more disgraceful than to suffer it.
If to do injustice is more disgraceful than to suffer
it, then to suffer injustice is better than to do it.
Therefore, to suffer injustice is better than to do it.

Here Socrates is not really entitled to say that he has

proved that not-p, to suffer injustice is better than to do
But, Vlastos claims that "Socrates feels empowered to

it.

tell Polus

true." 34

.

.

.

that his own thesis, not-p

,

has been proved

Why does Vlastos "believe" Socrates when all

Socrates is entitled to say that he has established the

inconsistency of p with premises q and
not established in the argument?

r,

Because Socrates thinks

In Vlastos' view,

that q and r are true.

whose truth he has

Socrates

aischion, also translated as 'base', 'ugly' or 'shameful'. For an
excellent discussion of the terms in this argument, see Adkins, p.153-168.
31

32

Vlastos [1], p.20.

For the content of r see my Chapter

5.

The argument is in fact much more complicated than this little
extract does justice to. But the point of discussion is the status of the
premises, so I will save discussion of the real argument until Chapter 5.
33

34

Vlastos [1], p

.

20

;

cf.

[3],

Chapter

5.

)
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establishes not-p, because "not-p follows from premises

which are true,

[which] is to prove not-p true ." 35

Let us start assessing the merits of Vlastos' claim by

discussing first what is left out in his account of the
elenchos.

Pointing out what his claim omits is as important

as pointing out what it contains,

treatment obstructs
does establish.

a full

for such an incomplete

view of what elenchos can and

First, Vlastos does not address whether or

not all the premises Socrates uses in his elenctic arguments

express moral beliefs.

Given his implicit restrictions of

the content of the premises in an elenctic argument, as

I

have discussed above, it is safe to assume that Vlastos

thinks that all elenctic premises express moral beliefs

36
.

Accordingly, he seems to think that the moral conclusions of
the elenchos are not derived from non-moral premises

37
.

However, in the Gorgias many crucial premises in arguments

which Vlastos would accept as elenctic cannot, on face
value, be categorized as moral propositions

38
.

If such

premises are included in Socrates' set of moral beliefs,
however, then Vlastos must to do two things:

Either he must

Vlastos [1], p.28; cf. p.36, fn.16.
36

See Vlastos [1], p.69,

37

See for an objection to this view, Polansky, and Kraut [3].

fn.7; p.5-6; p.56-58.

For example, "If somebody acts upon something there is necessarily
also something that has something done to it by the one acting upon it."
476b5
38

(
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give up his frequently stated claim that Socrates
is

a

philosopher concerned only with moral propositions
or he
must answer the difficult question of how moral
conclusions
can be derived from nonmoral premises.

He does neither.

The closest Vlastos comes to addressing

a

relevant is when he disavows in

a

point remotely

brief footnote his earlier

claim that Socrates needs non-endoxic premises in deducing

contra-endoxic conclusions

39
.

Whether it is possible to

derive normative conclusions from factual claims

is,

of

course, a worry that occupies many contemporary ethicists.
In all fairness to Vlastos, this point appears to be

undecidable by textual evidence, at least in the Gorgias.
Given the importance he assigns to elenchos in moral
philosophy, however, Vlastos should nevertheless consider
the implications of such

elenchos.

a

possibility for his account of

Moreover, according to his thesis, Tl,

it is

clear that Vlastos leaves out any possibility that Socrates
can obtain some of his premises nonelenctically

.

As

I

will

discuss shortly, however, there is evidence, at least in the
Gorgias, that this is not the case.

Finally, Vlastos leaves

out all questions relating to the logical validity of

inferring not-p from q and

validly deduced

39

40
.

r,

and assumes that not-p is

He holds that Socrates knows that the

Vlastos [1], p.16, fn.45.

Vlastos [1], p.20, fn.60; he leaves the task to Santas [1], who
amazingly finds no invalidity in Socratic arguments.
40

66

conclusion, validly deduced,

is true. 41

only with the task of providing

a

This leaves him

plausible answer to the

question why Socrates thinks his premises such as
g and r
are true.
Vlastos grants that g

&

r are "moral beliefs" 42 which

guide the Socratic elenctic process.
host of them in the Gorgias

.

Socrates has

a

whole

For example, Socrates

expresses, among others, the following beliefs.

Note that

B1-B10 are not unlike g or r.

Happiness is determined entirely by education
[paideias] and justice [dikaiosunfes]
The admirable
and good [kalon k'agathon] man or woman is happy
[eudaimona], the unjust and wicked are unhappy. (470e6)

B1

.

.

.

B2

The happiest man is one who has no evil in his soul...
And second [happiest] is the man who gets rid of it...
This is the man who gets punished. (478d-e)

B3

Not paying what's due when one has committed
injustice is naturally the most serious and
foremost evil of all.
(479d5)

B4

Punishment gets rid of [apallage] evil in the
soul.

(479d)

B5

Of all evils, the ultimate is that of arriving in
Hades with one's soul stuffed full of unjust
actions. (522e)

B6

The unjust man [adikos] is thoroughly miserable [pantos
athlios]
and more miserable if he doesn't pay justice
[didd diken] and suffer what's due [tuchane timdrias],
but less miserable if he pays justice and suffers
what's due at the hands of both gods and men. (472e5)
,

Vlastos

[

1

]

,

p. 45

.

Vlastos sometimes calls them "theses," and sometimes "beliefs." I
Though I
See Vlastos [1], p.35-36.
will call all such theses "beliefs.
the
issue,
the
of
complexities
the
surface
of
the
scratch
can only
notion of belief, I take it, involves this: If Socrates believes that p,
he takes it that p is true.
42

.
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A soul is good if it gets to have organization
[taxis] and order [kosmos]
(504b5)

B7

.

B8

An orderly soul [psuchfe kosmon] is
controlled one [sophron].
(506e5)

B9

The orderly people [tous kosmous] are happier than the
licentious [tdn akolastOn]
(493d2-4)

a

self-

.

BIO

It is necessarily very much the case [polle ananke]
that the self-controlled man, because he is just and
brave and pious, is a completely good man [agathon],
that the good man does well and admirable whatever he
does, and that the man who does well is blessed and
happy [makarion and eudaimona].
507b8-508c5)
(

How is a belief such as B4
and defended?

,

or B9 actually arrived at

If we take Vlastos thesis T1 to mean that

elenchos is Socrates' only source of moral knowledge, such
beliefs must also have been obtained by an elenchos.
is,

B4

,

That

etc., must be a conclusion of a previous elenchos,

for example, which Socrates now uses as a premise in his

elenchos against Polus.

So the previous elenchos must also

have premises obtained by another elenchos and so on.

Strictly speaking, then, T1 generates

problem to which

I

a

will return shortly.

regression,

There is no

evidence, however, at least in the Gorgias

beliefs are all established by elenchoi.

a

,

that these

That is, there is

not necessarily an elenchos in sight every time Socrates

propounds one of these strong moral claims. 43
fact,

In point of

Socrates uses his moral beliefs such as B1-B10

sometimes as premises, and sometimes he merely asserts them.

Neither can elenchos as understood by Vlastos be found throughout
See Kahn [1], p.233-258 for a detailed discussion of this
the dialogue.
point
43

68

Sometimes they appear to be impressive conclusions
of very
unimpressive arguments.
So how does Vlastos support
his

thesis?

Vlastos defends his thesis by claiming that elenctic

knowledge is derived inductively from the repeated and
successful elenctic experience of Socrates.

That is, we

need not attribute to Socrates, Vlastos claims, the view
that his individual elenctic arguments are used to establish

these theses.

On Vlastos' view, what Socrates knows is not

a collection of individual items of knowledge,

each of which

is a conclusion established by a previous elenchos.

Rather,

Vlastos wants to argue that Socrates uses his beliefs, g or
r or B1-B10

as starting points in his elenchos,

,

because he

has a belief-set which consists entirely of true beliefs.

Socrates infers the consistency of the set from the track-

record in his own experience. 44
consistency, have failed.

All others, when tested for

Apparently, conducting elenchos

year after year, Socrates comes to see, with fantastic
regularity, that he can always find beliefs in their belief

system which entail the negation of their thesis.

(This is

why Polus could not prevent not-p from being deduced from q
&

r by giving up, say, g.

Vlastos' Socrates could start all

over again and find other premises inside Polus' belief

system to negate the trouble belief, p. 4S

44

Vlastos [1], p.27, fn.69.

45

Vlastos

[

1

)

,

p. 22

.

)

He has inductive

.

:
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evidence that his own elenctically tested moral
beliefs are
at any time consistent.
So long as consistency stands as
proof against challenges, Vlastos argues, Socrates
is

justified in holding that his belief set consists entirely
beliefs.

For that reason, Vlastos argues,

Socrates is confident that any belief he uses in any

elenchos will be universally certifiable by the elenctic

method to anyone

47
.

We do not, of course, know whether the historical

Socrates had actually claimed the kind of confidence Vlastos

assigns him.

The early dialogues show that he did not.

Socrates does not talk like

a

person who believes that he

has only true beliefs at any given time.

Scholars rightly

note that Vlastos' claim undermines the very core of the

Socratic practice in the early dialogues, namely, aporia.
Curiously, Vlastos makes little mention of aporia either in
the Platonic corpus or specifically in the Gorgias

Although he talks

46

Vlastos

[1]

a

p. 28

,

4*
.

tough game here, Socrates on several

.

47

Assumption [A]: Whoever has a false moral belief will always have
at the same time true beliefs entailing the negation of that false
belief

Assumption [B]: The set of elenctically tested moral beliefs held
by Socrates is consistent.
Assumption C
Therefore, the set of moral beliefs held by
Socrates at any time is true.
See Vlastos [7a].
Although Vlastos dropped Assumption [C] in his
it
is
there
spirit.
in
[1],
[

]

Matthews [1], p.3 ff. for criticism of Vlastos [3]. Why the
Gorgias displays few of the philosophical perplexity of the earlier ones
is of course the controversy here.

70

occasions expresses reservations about his own
elenctic
accomplishments. As Benson amply documents, there
are

passages, which, borrowing Benson's terminology,
dilute the
strength of elenchos. 49 For example, Socrates,
upon

completion of many elenchoi, assesses his predicament
with
the following or similar words, "If these things are

true,"

or "so at least it appears from the argument."

Immediately

after he claims to have "proved," for instance, the unjust

person is most miserable unless he is punished, he says, "I
don't know how these things are." (480al-2; 479c4-5; 480b25;

509a2-bl

50
.

)

If Socrates is not as confident in his method as

Vlastos would have us believe, where does he find positive
support for his premises?
moral belief guestionable

And,
,

if he has to consider every

doesn't the elenchos generate an

infinite regression?

Vlastos presents

block the objection.

According to Vlastos, Socrates does

a

curious category to

not consider every moral belief questionable until they have

been subjected to elenctic testing.

51

Socrates accepts what

Vlastos takes to be "utterly uncontroversial " propositions
which his fellow citizens take as moral knowledge, and uses
them as premises in elenctic argument.

4Q

According to

Benson [1], Section 2.4.7.

50

Although Vlastos attempts to explain away this perplexity by his
distinction of knowledge,-- and knowledge E there is nothing in the text
that warrants such a distinction.
,

51

Vlastos [1], p.138.
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Vlastos, these are propositions such as
"temperance is a
virtue," "virtue is good," or "justice is a virtue,"
which
are neither self-evidently true nor undoubtable.
The

crucial point, according to Vlastos, is that they
are truly
held by the interlocutor.
If they survive the elenctic
5

-

testing, Vlastos argues, they will be added as elenctic

knowledge to Socrates' depository of moral doctrines.
I

do not see how the enigmatic category of "presumptive

elenctic knowledge" helps Vlastos defend his thesis for the
Gorgias.

Surprisingly,

Vlastos does not use

a

in his explication of this category,

single example from the Gorgias.

In

fact, he only uses one such moral commonplace proposed by

Laches (La. 190e)

However, presumptive elenctic knowledge

is an important criterion for our understanding of the

nature of the premises of the elenchos.

It is unfortunate

that Vlastos fails to show examples from the dialogue that

according to him, the paradigm of elenchos.

is,

It is also

unclear whether the propositions mentioned by Vlastos are
indeed moral commonplaces, or whether they are utterly

uncontroversial.

One could find in studies of Greek popular

morality in the age of Plato examples to the contrary. 53
Furthermore,

5

I

will discuss shortly that some of Socrates'

In 1983 Vlastos claimed that Socrates requires non-endoxic
premises to reach contra-endoxic conclusions. Various critics have
objected, and Vlastos renounced this claim altogether.
See Vlastos
p. 16

p.

,

-

fn.

[1],

45.

53
Dover [1], especially p.69-73, and p.226-242.
172-189.
Also see C.C.W. Taylor [2], p.233 ff.

Also see Adkins,

.

72

beliefs that are employed as premises in the elenchos are

themselves utterly controversial and not at all commonplace.
Why else would Polus so frequently charge that Socrates is
always "saying things the likes of which no human being

would believe?"

(473e)

More importantly, however, the presumptive elenctic

knowledge account would require that elenchos makes use of
unexamined moral commonplaces as premises in the elenchos.
If Socrates uses as premises propositions which "the vast

majority of his fellows take as moral knowledge," then
Socrates' ground zero is ultimately moral commonplaces.

this view does not square well with the Gorgias

But

For

example, when in his discussion with Polus, who defends what
he says is

a

moral commonplace that the unjust are happy,

Socrates says,
Cl

Nearly every Athenian and foreigner will take your
side on the things you're saying, if it's
witnesses you want to produce against me to show
that what I say isn't true.
Though I am only
one person, I don't agree with you; you don't
compel me. (472b6)
.

.

C2

the majority of men
I think it is better to have
disagree with me [me homolegein] and contradict me
[enantia legein] than to be out of harmony with myself
and contradict myself. (482cl-3)

C3

disregard the things held in honor by the majority of
people. (526d5)

.

.

.

I

C1-C3 suggest that Vlastos is right in claiming that

Socrates appears to have an intellectual commitment to the
truth of certain propositions and

a

resolution to act upon

,

.

73

them.

However,

if Socrates "proves" certain doctrines,

as

Vlastos claims, the premises he uses in elenchos cannot be

commonplaces that he will employ in an argument without ever
checking first to see if they are true.

So if Vlastos'

claim is true that Socrates ultimately relies on presumptive

elenctic knowledge, then Vlastos' defense of Socratic
elenchos in the Gorgias is mistaken.

For this is a dialogue

in which Socrates is explicitly against using moral

commonplaces in the elenchos, whether it is held by the

majority or by the individual.
So,

presumptive elenctic knowledge does not solve

Vlastos' dilemma of regression.
solution.

Vlastos offers another

He writes,

[Socrates] has a method that works well... It
organizes his moral intuitions into a set which is
reassuringly consistent, and moreover, proves
practically viable in his own experience 54
.

The solution is the category of "moral intuition."

I

cannot

.

Since

do justice here to the epistemological complexities

concerning the concept of intuition, or intuitionism

Vlastos is not explicit as to how he is using this

notoriously difficult concept,

I

can only hypothesize.

can see two plausible construals, either of which poses

I

a

problem for his thesis.
Perhaps by "intuition" Vlastos means what is ordinarily

meant by it, namely,

54

Vlastos

[

1

]

p. 36

a

hunch.

Suppose Socrates simply has

a

.

74

hunch that g (or r, or B1-B10 above)

is true.

it is hard to

understand why anyone would launch an elenchos on
Let us grant, however, that Socrates is

a

a hunch.

cantankerous man

who loves to argue and will jump in at any opportunity
to

show his argumentative skills.

Given that elenchos is his

life-long activity, 55 he would have to have many hunches to

work with.

Just how many hunches on moral matters can one

have during

a

lifetime?

It may be the case, however, that

Socrates really does not have an unlimited number of
hunches, but that he simply is a

strange 56 man who will

always have more hunches than his interlocutors. 57

And let

us also grant that he has organized them into a consistent
set.

But,

somewhere early in his career, the beliefs from

which he now starts, must somehow have been chosen. 58
Before the first conclusion was arrived, if he simply went
on a hunch, and that hunch got the elenchos off the ground,

Socrates did not rely solely on elenchos for his moral
knowledge.
But perhaps by "intuition" Vlastos has in mind

something more philosophically significant and stronger than
a hunch.

55

Perhaps he means it is knowledge that has not gone

See my Chapter

1

for Socratic occupation.

See my Chapter
Socrates

1

for a discussion of the strangeness [atopos] of

56

57
Vlastos responds similarly to Kraut [3] for his objection to
Vlastos conception of elenctic experience, see Vlastos [1], p.24, fn.63.

58
For the role of intuition in Plato's hypothetical method, see
Robinson (1), p.109.
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through elenchos, that is to say, some direct
and immediate
knowledge that Socrates intuits, perhaps even by
a

faculty other than his senses.

ability to

-see''

special

He might even have an

by this special faculty that there are some

good states of affairs, and some evil ones.

In fact, many

scholars, including Vlastos, acknowledge that Socrates
takes

intuitive insight very seriously— whether it is expressed
in
dreams, in the utterance of the Pythia or in the inner voice
of Socrates

daimonion

'

mystery cults.

-

,

or rites and passages of various

But if Vlastos thinks Socrates has moral

intuitions which he relies on as premises in the elenchos,
then Socrates makes use of knowledge he has obtained non-

elenctically

.

So for all the reasons

I

give above, Vlastos'

defense of his thesis that elenchos is Socrates' sole access
to moral knowledge is unsatisfactory.
Socrates' Religious Beliefs

There are good reasons, however, to take intuition, let
us say, knowledge nonelenctically obtained, especially of a

religious kind, seriously in the Gorgias

.

As

I

indicated

earlier, Socrates' positive and dogmatic tone in the Gorgias
is one of the fundamental pieces of the elenchos puzzle.

Why is Socrates certain in this dialogue that his beliefs
are true?

w

Theories are plentiful as to the change in

Some suggest that daimonion is that special faculty which reveals
Socrates divine truths; see Dodds "Plato and the Irrational Soul" in
Vlastos [10b], p.219 ff. Others argue that Socrates has a special
reason to trust elenctic results, because his daimonion never stops him
from conducting elenchos, see Brickhouse and Smith [3], p.148.

:

,

76

Socrates

'

tone.

61

Although all commentators note that

Socrates is more dogmatic in the Gorgias
the possibility of Socratic dogmatism as

explanation for his behavior.
and
a

"missionary," and

a

"moralist." 61

notion that Socrates is

a

a

viable

Vlastos himself describes,

believe rightly so, Socrates as

I

none even explores

,

"street evangelist,"

a

But he rejects the

dogmatist of any kind. 62

Vlastos

claims
First and foremost elenchus is search.
Its object
is always that positive outreach for truth which is
expressed by words of searching
inquiring
investigating. 63
.

.

.

.

.

.

In practice, this never happens in the Gorgias.

.

.

In this

dialogue, Socrates' convictions press upon him with great

force and fervor.

Consider the following statement by

Socrates
I know well that whenever you agree with me about
the things which my soul believes, this is the
very truth [aiethe]
(486e5)
.

This does not represent the sentiment of someone who is in

mode of search for moral truth.

There are many passages

where Socrates expresses the sentiments of
someone who asserts
fact.

60

a

.

Vlastos [1], p.7; cf. Vlastos [7a].

62

Vlastos [1], p.19.

63

Vlastos

1

]

.

p. 4

dogmatist, of

— for

a

which he gives

Irwin [4], p.6-7; Benson [1], p.64; Vlastos [1].

;

61

(

a

matter of his opinion as if it were

When Socrates makes the statement

Dodds [2], p 16

a

.
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no argument

responds,

that the good is not the pleasurable,
Callicles

"That is your opinion, Socrates."

(495b7)

Another

striking example for the dogmatic character of Socratic
beliefs can be found in

a

crucial passage where Socrates

says that Polus and people like him attempt to but

ultimately fail to "dislodge me from my property, the truth
[ekbalein me t6s ousias kai tou alethous]." (472b6)

in

another interesting and mysterious passage, Socrates claims,
"what is true is never refuted."

(473b)

My disagreement

with Vlastos turns on these passages and their implications
for the elenchos.
So far as

I

can see, Socratic evangelism for Vlastos

carries only moral and not any specific religious
connotation.

The present distinction inevitably raises the

question of the relation between religion and morality, the
status and origin of moral principles, and the nature of
evangelism, which

I

cannot address here.

I

am only

concerned with Vlastos' account of elenchos in the Gorgias
I

.

maintain that he ignores altogether Socrates' religious

belief 64 in a real future existence and punishment after

death for the actions done before death.

Socrates as

a

street evangelist most certainly implores, coaxes, and
cajoles people so as to get them to change their minds to
care for their souls.

64

He does so,

because he thinks such

By "religious" belief I mean a belief in a divine source that
issues in human conduct, e.g., morality. Admittedly this is a loose
meaning, and stricter ones are available.

a

78

commitment will ultimately reward them in the afterlife.
This belief affords Socrates certain principles such as

those expressed in B1-B10 (or q and r above) which provide

a

basis for his elenchoi as well as his moral conduct

unavailable to

nonbeliever, Callicles for example.

a

Addressing him, Socrates says,

—

The three of you, the wisest of Greeks today you,
Polus and Gorgias you are not able to prove
apodeixai that there's any other life one should
live than the one which will clearly turn out to
be advantageous [sumpheron] in that world. (527bl)

—

[

]

To confirm this reading,

elenchoi, which

I

I

want to present two

extract from the text following Vlastos'

own characterization of standard elenchos. 65

In these

elenchoi Socrates employs certain premises which, though

taken for granted by him, are not necessarily accepted by
the interlocutors.

There is no textual evidence for

elenctic support for these premises.

Nor is there any

reason to think that they have been established by repeated

elenctic success.

I

want to make the case that Socrates

accepts them as being true, because they express
truth of religion.

certain

It is for that reason he claims that

what is true is never refuted.
For instance,

a

(473b,

cf.

523a)

in one elenchos Socrates investigates

Polus' thesis

65
Again, these arguments are much simplified versions of what
actually takes place in the text. Although I am merely following
Vlastos' recommendations, the objection still holds that his account of
elenchos abridges very complicated arguments for which there are no easy
forms or names.

,

.
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It is possible for an unjust man to be
happy.

p

Socrates believes the opposite is true.

He asserts but is

rebuked by Polus that
B6

The unjust man is thoroughly unhappy and more so
unless he is punished. (472e5)

Paying him no heed, Socrates continues with his argument
during the course of which he gets Polus to agree to
of other premises

happiness

host

(such as B2 and B3 on the nature of

justice and punishment)

,

a

.

They can be bundled up

in

Punishment purifies the soul of evil.

B4

(479d)

Socrates then argues that B6 and B4 together with other

premises entail not-p.

Therefore, he concludes,

it is not

possible for an unjust man to be happy.
This particular argument has traditionally been

evaluated as part of
punishment.

a

Recently,

secular debate on the merits of
it has been argued that Euthyphro and

Charmides be viewed as special examples of Socratic attempts
to sort out the confusion about the concept of piety

resulting from the emergence of new religious beliefs in
Athens. 66

I

suggest we re-view the Gorgias in

a

similar

manner and evaluate this argument in the context of Socratic
care for the soul's safe passage to the Isles of the
Blessed.

66

Morgan

[2]

p. 21

80

There is another elenchos which strengthens this

general reading.

Callicles

,

This is the purported elenchos against

who believes

The self-controlled man is not happy.

p

In an elenchos that he conducts by himself

refuses to accept any of his premises

— Callicles

— Socrates

asserts and

agrees to

Orderliness makes something good, and goodness makes
someone happy. (506e)

Bll

He then continues to assert, among others, premises such as
B7 and B9

,

which can be condensed into

Self-controlled man is an orderly man.

B8

(506e)

Socrates then argues that Bll and B8 together with other

premises entail not-p.

Therefore, he concludes, self-

controlled man is happy.
Where does Socrates find support for the premises he
uses in these arguments?

Let us start by viewing Socrates

in the historical context of the religious turbulence of

Athens.

Greek religion, as it developed in the sixth and

fifth centuries, was an amalgam of rituals, myths,
offerings, oracles, injunctions and beliefs. 67

Athens was

an arena in a wide array of festivals, holy days, and many

rituals, with which Socrates was frequently associated.

One

of the most important religious developments of the latter

part of the fifth century was the introduction of

67

Hadas, p.34 ff.

a

belief

81

in a general judgement of the soul after death.

The idea

that virtue and vice in this life determine the character of
the afterlife, and that the pure soul receives the reward of

living forever in bliss seemed

a

barbarous tenet to most of

the Greeks, who viewed this belief as

mortals to be like gods. 6

*

a

hubristic attempt by

Key to this new belief 69 was the

idea that death was a release of the soul from the body
[sOma], which was seen as the tomb [s6ma] of the soul.

Once

released from the body, the soul traveled to Hades where it
stood before judges who examined it and consigned it to an

existence which would be according to its deserts:

punishment for the wicked in Tartarus and happiness for the
good in the Isles of the Blessed.

In order to receive the

rewards, a quiet and orderly life was required.

The ascetic

ideal of happiness involved the perfect purification of the
soul.

The ideal of purity in turn required that the

appetites and passions of the body be subdued and the soul
be nourished through contemplation and other mystical

activities. 70

Hence the new religious ideal prescribed

a

Dover, p.263; Adkins, p.179 ff; Dodds in Vlastos [10b], p.219 ff.
Also Guthrie [3], and Morgan [2], p.19 ff.
68

For those who associate these beliefs with Orphism, see Guthrie
Lloyd- Jones, and Bremmer.

69

[4],

70

[3],

p.

See Harrison, p.454 ff; Morgan [1], chapters
153-171 p.183-243; Adkins, p.141 ff.
,

1

and 2; Guthrie

.

,

)

82

life of asceticism and disciplined rational
activity of

self-examination

71

Socrates attempts to convince Callicles that
the life
of pleasure brings only corruption to the
soul, not
happiness.

His specific moral recommendation for the health

of the soul is the attainment of order [kosmos],

specifically, self-control
that

a

[

pure soul is just.

which is

a

sophrosune]

.

Socrates believes

Justice makes people temperate,

treatment against corruption.

And punishment is

an important way to achieve justice for someone who has been

unjust, that is, not practiced self-control.
504a,

(478a,

491e,

Socrates makes these statements without any

507c)

apparent elenchos, and admits that "these things on the
whole seem
a

a

bit strange [atopa]"

(493c4)

72

He then gives

reason why we should believe these strange doctrines.

He

says

Wise men [hoi sophoi] 73 claim that partnership and
friendship, orderliness, self-control, and justice
hold together heaven and earth, and gods and men,
and that is why they call this universe a worldorder [kosmon]
and not an undisciplined worlddisorder [akosmian].
507e5-508a4
,

(

71

That is why Socrates thinks
happily ever after. (526c)

a

philosopher is most certain to live

72

I think Vlastos' translation of this word as 'outrageous' is too
strong.
Socrates simply means here that these doctrines are strange,
and literally, 'out of place.'
Note that 'atopos' is also the nickname
that many of his interlocutors use to call Socrates, cf. my Chapter 1.
7?
Regularly used by Plato indicate Pythagoreans whose religious
cult was considered peculiar, see Dodds [1], p.338.

;

.

83

Socrates frequently says he believes the accounts given by
these wise men and other such people.

(524b;

526d;

527a5-9)

He says to Callicles,

suppose you'll think it's a tale [muthos] 74 but
think it's an account [logos]; for I'll tell you
what I'm about to tell you in the belief that it's
I
I

true.

(523a)

75

Why does Socrates place such confidence in the stories of

wise men?

I

think we can find part of the answer in Plato's

Seventh Letter.

He writes,

We must always truly believe the ancient and holy
doctrines [logois] which reveal to us that the
soul is immortal and has judges and pays great
penalties when it is released from the body. On
account of the[se doctrines] we must also
consider suffering injustice to be a lesser evil
than doing it. (335a-b)
In his interpretation of elenchos, Vlastos is committed

to a chronology of the Platonic dialogues which preserves

the thought of the historic Socrates. 76

In his ten theses,

Vlastos argues that what distinguishes Socrates from Plato
is that Socrates has neither the interest in nor the

proficiency for issues involving the soul. 77

Vlastos claims

74

Kirk claims that Plato was the fist user of the term muthologia
As it was used by the Greeks, muthos had a wide range of senses from a
'story' to an 'account'. See Kirk, p.8 ff.

.

For competing views of what Socrates might mean by logos and
muthos, See Morgan [2], p.73-74; Dodds [1], p.376-377; Irwin [6], p.24275

244.

See my Chapter 1, and see for differing chronologies Brandwood
Kahn [3], p.306; cf. Guthrie [1], p.236.

16

[

1

]

Thesis IIB, Vlastos [3], p.48. Vlastos is careful to qualify
what he says here: Socrates has no theory of a separable soul which
learns by recollection.
77

.

84

that the "strange" doctrines of the soul belong
exclusively
to "Plato's middle period," 78 starting with the
Meno
He

says it is "only by tenuous inference" that one can
claim

that there are anticipations of
the Gorgias

a

doctrine of the soul in

79
,

What Vlastos claims may be true for the theory of
recollection.

However, the doctrine of the body and soul as

being distinct entities, the composition of the soul with

distinct parts, and the idea of the soul surviving death to
travel to a place where it will live forever in bliss if it
is pure are more than subtle hints in the Gorgias.* 0

I

agree

with the line of thinking that detects "non-Socratic
elements" in the Gorgias.

If this line of thinking is

right, either we do not have Vlastos' Socrates in the

Gorgias, or this Socrates had certain beliefs that Vlastos

overlooks, because it would scuttle his interpretation of

the elenchos.

Either way, Vlastos' account won't do.

Consider the following passages from the Gorgias.
Socrates says,

There is, I take it, something you call body and
something you call soul.
(463e9-10)

78

Vlastos (1), p 29
.

79

,

f n.

73;

cf.

p.32,

fn.51.

Vlastos [3], p.54, and fn.32.

80
Unlike Vlastos many scholars believe that there is good evidence
that by the time he wrote the Gorgias, Plato had developed the moral
psychology of the middle dialogues. They argue that the myths present in
this dialogue presuppose a doctrine of the soul of the middle dialogues.
Irwin too acknowledges "non-Socratic" elements in the
See Klosko [1].
Gorgias; see his [4] notes on 491d4, p.190-191; 493a, p.195; 3499e-500a,
507ab, p.221-222.
p 203-208
.

;

)

.

85

He claims that if the soul didn't govern
the body but the

body governed itself, "the world according to
Anaxagoras

would prevail." (465d)

81

Socrates argues that the body and

the soul are two distinct things, and so

Death [thanatos]
it seems to me, is in fact nothing
other than the separation [dialusis] of two things
[duoin pragmatoin], the soul and the body from each
other [t6s psuches kai tou sOmatos ap alleioin
524b2
,

'

1

(

In a passage which some scholars take to be the precursor to

the Platonic tripartition of the soul, 82 Socrates says,

heard one of the wise men say that
our body
[sOma] is our tomb [sema], and the part of the soul
[t6s psuches] in which we have desires [epithumiai] is
liable to be persuaded anapeithestai
(493a2-5)
I

.

[

]

.

.

.

Why does Socrates in the Gorgias insist on caring for
the soul?

Socrates says

a

clever mythologist, perhaps

a

Sicilian or Italian, 81 came up with an analogy for the
impure soul, which is that of

a

leaky jar. 84

He called

people foolish [anoetoi] if they were uninitiated [amuetoi]
into the faith.

He said,

"the part of the souls of fools

where their appetites are located is their undisciplined
part,

one not tightly closed,

a

leaking jar."

(493b)

They

are fools because they do not believe in purifying their

His principle, "all things mixed together," describes a state where
no distinction is possible.
83
See Dodds in Vlastos (10b), p.300.
Against Taylor and Burnet,
Dodds claims tripartition appears first in the Republic Taylor and Burnet
claimed tripartition of the soul to be Pythagorean in origin.
.

83

Places traditionally associated with Orphics and Pythagoreans.

84
He is clever because he called the soul a jar [pithos] on account
of its being persuadable (pithanon).

86

souls from passions and appetites, and leading

controlled life.

a

self-

Further, they do not believe in punishment

in order to relieve their souls from the evils of excess.

Socrates says he does not want to be

most concerned with maintaining
ten psuchen]

,

a

a

fool,

and hence he is

healthy soul [hygeistaten

because he believes that on Judgement Day

Every man who has passed his life justly [dikaios]
and piously [hosiOs]
when he dies, departs to the
Isles of the Blessed and live in complete
happiness eudaimonia
away from all evils, but
the man who had lived unjustly [adikbs] and
godlessly [atheOs] goes to the prison
[desmbtferion] of retribution [tiseos] and justice
[dikes]
52 3a6-b5
,

[

.

]

(

)

,

.

Socrates says he believes that these accounts have convinced
him that it is on the condition of one's soul that happiness
is determined.

He says he believes that all that is in the

soul is evident after it has been stripped naked out of the
body.

The judges can see that the soul that is full of evil

is due to "luxury,

actions."

arrogance and incontinence in its

This is also the soul that has not properly been

punished, and hence purified of evil.

When the judge sees

such a soul he dismisses it straight to the punishment house

where it awaits intensely painful and frightening suffering.
(524d-525a)

That is why he says he thinks about how he

will reveal "to the judge
can be."

a

soul that is as healthy as it

So he says he tries

,

.

.
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to be and live as a very good man, and when I die,
to die like that.
I call on [parakalo] 85 all
other people as well to this way of life ... I
take you to task, because you won't be able to
come to protect yourself when you appear at the
trial and judgement I was talking about just now
(526d5-e5)

Since some of the details 86 in the myths of the Gorgias

also appear in documents loosely described as "Orphic" it
has been argued that Plato drew his material from Orphic
sources.

Although the source of all of these myths is

uncertain (some were undisputedly Pythagorean in orgin)

,

and

the point is subject to scholarly controversy, it is

uncontroversial that they express important religious
teachings.

The tendency among scholars is to demythologize

the messages contained in these stories and argue that these

myths reflect general rules of conduct which Socrates

established by the preceding arguments.
fail to find in these stories

a

Accordingly, they

specific belief in

threatening future punishment for wrongdoing. 87
the status of these myths is

a

really

To be sure,

matter of terrific scholarly

The controversy is between those who, in the

controversy.

words of

a

a

commentator, "want philosophy to be

85

Socrates says he calls on others because he wishes to persuade them
of these things in order to induce them to make a change
metathesthai " (493c5 ff; cf. 493dl)

[peisai]

.

[

]

86
Especially certain topographical details such as leimbn as the
meadow of the blessed souls and the place of judgement; and triodous as
See for more detail, Dodds (1], p.373-376.
the infernal crossroads.

87

Dodds

(

1

]

p. 386

88

'professional' with its uniform and distinct medium " 88
and
others who reject a crude dichotomy between myth and

argument.

Although

Vlastos seems to belong to the first group.
a

substantial portion of the Gorgias is devoted to

Socrates' claims that he believes the accounts given by

these myths, Vlastos is dismissive of them.

He declares the

stories to be "pure fable," and "embroidery," which come
"only after hard-won elenctic argument has established the

great truths ." 89
The Gorgias is a curious dialogue for many reasons.

One of the most curious things about it is that

a

dialogue

that is supposed to exhibit, in Vlastos' view, the triumph
of elenchos in proving certain positive convictions about

the just life concludes with no elenchos in sight.
of the passages discussed above,

In light

it is hard to understand

why Vlastos does not "believe" Socrates when he says he

believes in

real afterlife and so must care for his soul

a

If the answer is that this is Socratic irony,

now.

need

a

then we

set of standards to determine when Socrates is being

serious and when he is being ironic.

But Vlastos provides

no such criteria.

Vlastos presents elenctic knowledge in the Gorgias as
superior source of information about moral matters.

88

Annas

[

2

]

,

p. 119

If

I

a

am

.

89
Vlastos [3], p.116-7, fn.46.
completely ignore these myths.

Likewise, Irwin [6] and Santas [1]

89

right, however,

it is Socrates'

religious insights regarding

an orderly life that guides his elenctic activity.

There is

no textual evidence that suggests that Socrates acquired

these specific insights as

elenctic arguments.
of a new dogma.

If

a

consequence of repeated

Rather, they appear to be certain items
I

am right, elenchos is not the only

means for Socrates to generate moral knowledge, at least in
the Gorgias.

merely as

a

In some cases at least elenchos functions

means to sermonize.

Evaluating elenchos in

light of this kind of knowledge leads us to see Socrates in
a

different light, perhaps less congenial, but all the same,

it leads us more directly to the man in the text.

I

believe

this presents a more plausible reading of Socrates in the

Gorgias

,

some of whose moral teachings are rooted first in

faith, then passed on by elenchos.

.

CHAPTER

5

SOCRATES AND FALLACY

Does a Philosopher Cheat?
Does Socrates ever willingly cheat at elenchos?

Vlastos thinks, clearly not.

He assumes that Socrates'

philosophical temperament will keep him from misusing his
method.

Because Socrates does not cheat, Vlastos argues,

Socrates refutes his interlocutors fair and square.

If he

refutes them, then he is successful in persuading them of
the importance of

a

more virtuous life than the one they are

defending
Vlastos seems to rely on the notion that acting

virtuously requires that Socrates conduct honest arguments.
But what if by honest arguments Socrates is unable to

persuade his interlocutor of the principles that he is
advocating, principles which are necessary for virtuous
life?

Under such circumstances, does Socrates resort to

tricks in argument so that his interlocutor is compelled to
accept the Socratic principles?

Does the end justify the

wily means?
Vlastos rejects this possibility offhand, and in my
view, too hastily.

In Vlastos' treatment,

method perfect, so is the man who uses
cheats in his elenchos.

1

1

it:

not only is the

Socrates never

It is on this simple assumption

Vlastos [3], especially "Introduction" and Chapter 5; cf. p.144See also his seminal piece on the elenchos
p.279.

146, p.155, p.236,
[7a], p.27 ff.

,
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that Vlastos treats Socrates' notoriously
fallacious

arguments in the Gorgias

as being fixable

2
.

Imposing his

characteristically inspiring distinctions on the perennially
puzzling arguments of Socrates, Vlastos restores a
3

flawless

elenchos as the proper and the only method of moral
philosophy.

6
Socrates
would never use this method to "bully"

interlocutors into views they are not persuaded that they
should hold, because this behavior would be inconsonant with
the Socrates' "character and activity" as a philosopher

4
.

Interestingly, most commentators, even if they are

critical of Vlastos' treatment of elenchos, fail to

challenge the assumption of Socrates' character, and in his
person, the character of the philosopher
ear li e *" scholars

5
.

While some

had been willing to concede that Socrates

is not above the ploys of the sophists' of his day

Santas [1], and Irwin (3),

[4],

[6]

— he

may

make the same assumption.

3

Vlastos argues that Socrates both does and does not mean what he
says, he both knows and does not know how one ought to live, he believes
and doubts the truth of certain moral propositions. See Vlastos [1], and
[3] for his relevant arguments for these distinctions.
4

See Vlastos [3], p.147.

5

See Irwin,

6

Dodds [1); Friedlander; Guthrie [1].

[3],

and Genzler.

See below for a discussion of who is a sophist.
For the purposes
of this paper, a 'sophist' will be a general term including Gorgias,
Polus, and Callicles, though the latter was not known as being one.
7

,
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use deliberate fallacies*

— Vlastos

rejects this view.
9

He

writes
None of the scholars who have seriously believed
that Socrates employed
consciously
fallacious inferences
has ever tried to
explain how such infidelity to the quest of truth
could be reconciled with
philosophizing.
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Yet there is ample evidence for Socratic cheating,

especially in the Gorgias.

So how does Vlastos explain the

apparent Socratic "infidelity to the quest of truth"?

Vlastos suggests the following distinction: In his "metaelenctic capers" Socrates cheats, but "when arguing
seriously" he does not cheat.
is not conducting elenchos,

11
’

Vlastos thinks that when he

Socrates has fun teasing his

interlocutors with verbal tricks, and mental puzzles.

But

in his god-given work, elenchos, Socrates is "dead earnest."

Here he would not joke around, as this is the most serious

task of

a

search for the right way to live.

(cf.

G.

500b-c.)

So if there appears to be a fallacy in his arguments when he
is arguing seriously,

in it,

it must be because there are ellipses

not because he is cheating.

8
By a 'fallacy' I mean an argument in which the conclusion does
not follow from the premises; by 'deliberate fallacy' I mean a fallacy
which is not a result of simply a mistake in logic but of a deliberate
attempt to deceive or confuse. Whether or not a sophistical argument is
necessarily a deliberate fallacy, I am not in a position to evaluate in
this paper. See Klosko [2] for a distinction between fallacy and
See Robinson [2] for Plato's use of fallacy.
sophistry.

9

Vlastos [3], p.155.

This distinction is supplemented by his
Vlastos [3], p. 138-139
treatment of Socratic irony, which cannot be discussed here. The
distinction above is sufficient for my purposes.
10

.

,
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Vlastos suggests that there is "no reason to believe
that the tacit premises [are] suppressed with the intention

causing deceit."

He maintains that a "sane stand on

this issue" would allow "stylistic reasons" for such
ellipses.

In the quick pace that is characteristic of

elenchos, Socrates simply has no time to fill out certain

phrases.

He clips his sentences to "reduce verbal

baggage ." 12

Vlastos writes,

To cheat his partners in this search would be to
sabotage the process by which he hopes to discover
moral truth himself; to cheat his interlocutors
would be to cheat himself.
I want to argue that
such a thing could not happen within the limits of
Plato's characterization of Socrates 13
.

In their review of Vlastos' Socrates : Ironist and Moral

Philosopher

Brickhouse and Smith correctly, albeit briefly,

point out the inadequacy of the distinction between "meta-

elenctic capers" and "arguing seriously ."
that Vlastos needs

a

14

They suggest

criterion for "arguing seriously," as

it is difficult to know exactly when that is taking place.

Agreeing with this general assessment,
further.
issue,

I

I

propose to go

At the risk of taking an "insane" stand on this

will argue that Socrates cheats when arguing

"

Vlastos [3], p.133, especially, fn.9.

12

Vlastos [3], p.141.

My emphasis.

See my Chapter 4 for the
Vlastos [3]. p.135. My emphasis.
philosophical problems arising from the notion of "discovery" of moral
truth in elenchos; cf. Vlastos [1], Chapter One.
13

14

Brickhouse and Smith [2].

.
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seriously, and for good reason.

This reading has two

advantages over Vlastos': It is supported by
reading of the text, and offers

a

interpretation of Socrates as

philosopher

a

a

more natural

more defensible overall

Let us now turn to one of the most controversial

arguments in the early dialogues:
Polus in the Gorgias.

elenchos"

1

,

I

the elenchos against

By re-evaluating this "standard

hope to make clear the two cross-cutting

interpretations, Vlastos' and mine.

I

believe this will

provide compelling reasons for rejecting Vlastos' reading in
favor of my own.

The elenchos at hand is the famous

"refutation" of Polus, Gorgias' young admirer, and his

expressed belief that

life of doing injustice is better

a

than the life of suffering injustice

16
.

It is a notoriously

flawed argument, and has been the focal point of many

conflicting evaluations
fixable,

17
.

Though ultimately he thinks it

Vlastos himself was bothered by this argument;

indeed he dubbed it, "The Rotten Argument ."

18

See my Chapter Three for a discussion of what Vlastos' calls the
"standard" elenchos; cf. Vlastos [1], [7a], and [13].
16

Socrates has three distinct elenchoi against Polus: Sophists and
tyrants have no power in the city (466a-468e); Doing an unjust thing is
worse than suffering it (474c-475e); The unjust are miserable unless
they are punished (476a-480a).
I will only consider the second
elenchos, as that is the controversial one.
17

It has been evaluated at least 10 times in print within the last
thirty years.
See Vlastos [3], p.139-48; cf. Vlastos [11]; Dodds [1];
Friedlander; Guthrie [1]; Irwin [4], [6]; Kahn [3]; Klosko [2]; Santas
[1], and more recently, Genzler.

Vlastos [3], p. 146 ; cf. Vlastos [11]. It is "rotten" because it
is hard to account for it in the "noble" pages of the Gorgias.
I!<
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Before we take

a

look at the argument,

it is worthwhile

to note a piece of advice from Aristotle
on Socratic

arguments.

Aristotle warned,

The discourses of Socrates are never commonplace;
always exhibit grace and originality and thought; they
but
perfection in everything can hardly be expected
(trans.
Barnes.) 19
,

The argument at hand is prefaced by

a

discussion

between Socrates and Polus over the nature of rhetoric
(461b
ff.).

Socrates suggests that the true nature of rhetoric is

flattery: rhetoricians are panderers.

But Polus says that

rhetoricians do not need to pander to anyone since they have
power in the city.

They are like tyrants: they do what they

think fit and get away with it.

Socrates delivers an

extraordinary claim that those who do what they think fit
without intelligence are in reality powerless and miserable,
because someone who does injustice is miserable, more so if
he is unpunished, than

injustices.

a

person who suffers even the worst

To Polus this is sheer nonsense.

says incredulously,

including you, Socrates, would choose to

suffer injustice rather than to do it.
is shocking:

No one, Polus

Socrates' response

Not only would he so choose, but so would

anyone else once he sees that doing injustice is worse than

suffering it.

Here is how Socrates "proves" his point and

refutes Polus' view.

19

Barnes [2], Politics, ii,

6,

1265al0.

)
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The R otten Argument

(

474c5-475el^ 20

P1

*

Do

P2

.

If it is more kakos,

i^

injustice [to adikein] is more kakos than
ln j ustlce [to adikesthai]. (No
objection by

[aischion] 22
P3

21

it is also more shameful

.

Shameful and kakos are the same thing [tauton]
So are
beautiful [kalon] 23 and good [agathon].
(Polus objects
that they are not the same.)

.

.

P4

.

P5

*

Things are called 'beautiful' on account of their
pleasure [dia hedon^n tina] or benefit [dphelian] or
both, and 'shameful' by the opposite, pain [lupfe]
and
kakos or both.
(Polus does not object.)
something is more beautiful than another thing, then
it surpasses the other in either pleasure or benefit.
If something is more shameful than another thing, then
it surpasses the other either in pain or kakos. (Taken

as self-evident.)

If doing injustice is more shameful than suffering it,
then it surpasses suffering it either in pain or in
kakos. (Lemma from P2 P3 and P4

LI.

,

,

.

P6.

Doing injustice does not surpass suffering it in pain.
(Polus does not quite understand why this is true, but
he concedes.)

L2

.

Therefore, doing injustice surpasses suffering it in
kakos.
(Lemma from P5 and P6.)

P7

.

No one would choose something more kakos and more
shameful over that which that is less so.

Therefore, no one would choose doing injustice over
suffering it.

C.

2,1

The argument is extracted from the text, and the premises are
stripped down for simplicity.

kakos is the term upon which the argument turns. The word has
been translated both as 'bad' and 'evil', neither of which captures the
fullness of the term in Greek.
I will keep the term in its Greek to
avoid the additional connotations of 'evil' and the hollowness of 'bad'.
::

Also translated as 'ugly' or 'base'.

23

Also translated as 'admirable' and 'fine'.
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The argument leaves Polus dumbfounded.

concedes that no one would choose

a

He reluctantly

life of doing injustice

over a life full of suffering injustice, "at
least on this
argument," (475e2)
Has Socrates proved his point? Vlastos
.

believes that once we clarify what Socrates means in
P3

,

we

can confidently say that Socrates has refuted Polus
fair and
square, and proved his point.
Let us briefly pause to get clear on what P3 amounts
to.

Socrates is aware that Polus does not agree that

aischios and kakos

,

thing" as he claims.

and kalos and agathos are "the same

Polus could have objected that there

are many shameful things that are not kakos or many things

beautiful but not good.

(Socrates himself makes that very

point in the when he says in the Hippias Minor that

a

liar

is shameful and beautiful for he has the power of intellect

to lie,

368a.)

But Polus is quiet (Callicles says Polus was

ashamed to contradict Socrates)

.

Socrates delivers P4 as

a

general conclusion arrived by an epagogue 24 so as to get
Polus to agree to P2 and P3

He secures Polus' agreement

.

that bodies are called 'beautiful'

[kalos] because they are

An epagogue is an argument in which one's mind is "led on" to a
general characteristic from the observation of particular examples.
Whether an epagogue is true induction or not is, of course,
controversial.
For the view that it is, see Guthrie [1], vol. Ill,
For the opposite view, see Robinson [1],
p.426-437; Gulley, p.13-22.
p.35-38; Vlastos [13], p. xxix, f n 18 45; [7a], p.30; [2], p.267-269.
Arguing that epagogic arguments are reinforcements to a general
statement, Vlastos says that epagogue is intuitive induction, whereby a
conclusion of the universal is intuited before the particular cases. In
this case, the purpose of the examples is to help us understand the
conclusion rather than demonstrate it.
.

,
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either useful or pleasant, or both.
shapes, colors, sounds,

laws,

The same is true of

and learning.

Hence, the

general conclusion is that all things are
called beautiful
because they are either useful or pleasant, or
both.

That

is why we think,

Socrates argues, beautiful and good, and

shameful and kakos are the same thing.
So,

it appears that by P4 Socrates assumes that
the

pleasurableness of an object is
its beauty.

a

sufficient condition for

But how can that be?

Surely there are objects

that are pleasurable but not beautiful. 25
up to?

Vlastos has an answer.

He says, Look,

could not possibly mean what he says in P4
look at what he says in the Hippias Major.

declares that
to view.

a

What is Socrates

.

Socrates

Why?

Take a

There Socrates

most pleasurable experience may be ugliest

In an ongoing discussion about the nature of the

beautiful [to kalos] Socrates says,
'As to the act of sexual love [ta aphrodisia], we
should all, no doubt, contend that it is most
pleasant [hediston] but that one must, if he
perform it, do it so that no one else shall see,
because it is most repulsive to see. [aischiston
horasthai]'. (trans.
H.N. Fowler.) 26
,

,

Relying exclusively on this quotation, Vlastos says,
"It is made completely clear that [Socrates] does not

consider the pleasurableness of an object of experience

a

Socrates himself is a case in point. Though notoriously ugly,
Socrates is an object of pleasure for many, i.e., for Alcibiades.
26

HMa 299a7-8.
the quotation marks.
.

See below for the explanation of the presence of

.
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sufficient condition of its beauty." 27

So,

although in P4

Socrates says that objects are beautiful
on account of their
pleasurableness, Vlastos thinks that Socrates
means
something different. In other words, we can

"fix" P4 once we

get clear on what Socrates could possibly
mean by it. 2s

Hippias Major is rather an unfortunate choice
for
fixing P4
There are three major reasons this interpretive
ploy is unacceptable.
First, and most obviously, if Vlastos
.

is right,

every time there is an unsecured premise in

a

particular argument we have to resort to other dialogues.
If one rejects the view that dialogues cannot profitably
be

read without reference to one another, this quotation

becomes unhelpful in making sense of P4
Vlastos' choice of Hippias Major is puzzling in

obvious way as well.

a

less

This is one of the great "aporetic"

dialogues, in which Socrates rejects every definition of the

beautiful as unsatisfactory, and the result of the dialogue
is a deadlock

[aporia]

.

Then there is the case of "a

certain man" who threw Socrates himself into deadlock [tis
eis aporian me katebalen],

(286c5-6).

The dialogue proceeds

on Socrates' contention that this man is sure to find fault

with every definition proposed on the beautiful.
21

28

The

Vlastos [3], p.141.

There have been many other attempts to "fix" Socratic arguments,
"Suppose we correct Socrates' mistake," Santas [1], p.238, p.138.)
In a surprising statement, Vlastos says that no scholar before Santas
and Irwin noticed the exact point a fallacy might appear to be taking
place in this argument, Vlastos [3] p.139. See however, Robinson [2],
first published in 1942.
(cf.

,

.
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particular text Vlastos quotes pertains to
the perplexity,
generated by this man, at the claim that the
beautiful is
that which is pleasing through the senses. 29
The category
of "a certain man" and its significance
in this and
other

dialogues has been the subject of scholarly debate.
Vlastos, however, neither addresses the controversy
nor

addresses the role of aporia in this dialogue.
This brings me to the third objection to relying
on the

Hippias Major for help in reading the Rotten Argument, and
this is that Plato puts forward the same analysis of the

beautiful in the Republic as the one given in P4

.

At this

point, Vlastos might object and say that the Socrates in the

Republic Book V is not the same Socrates in the Hippias

Major

311
.

But this would be

a

weak objection indeed, as we

do not know what criterion he uses to pick and choose the

definitive answers held by the Socrates in the Hippias
Major.

The issue in the Republic is the shamefulness

[aischrios] of older female guardians exercising in the
nude.

For Plato the important issue is having qualified

guardians for the good of the city, not the "ugly" sight of
sagging flesh.

So those who ridicule the idea of unclad

women forget what is in their benefit in the long run.

He

says

"9
"If this man of whom
ask us", HMa 298d7.

30

I

speak [ouro; ov XeY u / ou tos on legO] should

Vlastos' Socrates, as he defends in his ten theses [3], p.46 ff.
See my Chapter One for the chronology of the dialogues Vlastos accepts.
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For the fairest [kallista] thing that
is
ever will be said is this, that what is said or
useful is
beautiful, and what is hurtful ugly [to men
bphelimon kalon, to de blaberon aischron.l (R
457b) 31
So the Hippias Major quotation does not in
fact help

make Vlastos' case here.
quotation.

Let us, however, grant Vlastos his

For the important point is this.

Vlastos thinks

Socrates means by P4 that what makes an object beautiful

evidently is the pleasure the viewer derives from viewing
(1)
(hearing,

feeling, etc.) the object.

On Vlastos' view, when

we
(1) make the necessary substitutions to provide what Socrates

must have 32 left

out, we get the following. 33

When Socrates says:
Doing injustice is not more painful than suffering

it.

(2)

He means:

Doing injustice is not more painful for the wrongdoer
than is suffering injustice for the victim.

*

When Socrates says:
Doing injustice is either more painful or worse than
(2)
suffering it.
He means:
* Doing injustice is either more painful or worse for the
wrongdoer than suffering it is for the victim.

When Socrates says:
Doing injustice is worse than suffering it.
(3)
He means:

31

This is one of the texts cited for the alleged utilitarianism in
Plato's moral "theory." (ophelimon suggests both 'benefit' and
'utility'.) This is a controversy which I cannot address here, but see
Irwin [6], who supports the view, and Vlastos' rejection [9b].
3:

See Vlastos [3], p.141: "There can be no reasonable doubt.
close reading of the text should convince anyone that this is indeed
what is meant."
.

33

Vlastos [3], p.143-44.

.

A
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(3)* Doing injustice is worse for the
wrongdoer than is
suffering it for the victim.

But why, we ask, does Socrates say what he
does, if

this is what he means?

Particularly vexing in Vlastos'

account of the Socratic method are his assumptions
that
Socrates argues with "elliptical expressions for what

he

means," and that when the argument seems like
then Socrates speaks in an abbreviated way.

verbal baggage, as he always does.
quite usual for Socrates.

a

fallacy,

Socrates prunes

Vlastos claims this is

He writes,

For Socrates to say (3) when (3*) is exactly what
he means using the former as though it were
merely an abbreviated way of saying the latter is
not exceptional 34

—

—

So given what Vlastos calls the "thoroughly unsound"

Rotten Argument, it appears that either Socrates is cheating
to trick Polus

— the

problem in P4 seems to escape Polus

Plato is unaware of the slip.

— or

Since Socrates does not

cheat, Vlastos argues, Plato must be ignorant of the

ellipses.

1

'’

Before we get to the part about why Vlastos

thinks Socrates would not cheat,

let us pause a minute on

Vlastos' claim to know what Socrates means.

There is

a

helpful distinction, drawn by Jerry Fodor, between what

a

Vlastos [3], p.145. Vlastos "shows" other abbreviations in the
text: "What he thinks" at 467a-b is a contraction to "what he thinks is
best" in 468d, and "believing that is better" at 468b is a contraction
for "believing that it is better for ourselves."
35
Vlastos [3], p.144 ff., and see on p.148. "Surely it is simpler
to suppose that he is himself unaware of the fallacy."
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sentence x means and what someone, say Socrates,
means by
6
sentence x.'
Fodor argues that what sentence x means
may
be explained by the appropriate conventions
of language,

while what Socrates means by sentence x is an
unanswerable
question.
Fodor argues that this is due to the fact
that

every speech act is

a

meaning or intending.
distinctions:

(a)

result of an internal, mental act of
So we have the following

what sentence x means

Socrates means by sentence x.
always possible that
Fodor
for

s

(b)

(a)

and

and

(b)

If Fodor is right,
(b)

are different.

what
it is

Again, on

distinction, Vlastos claims to have an explanation

while all he can give is an explanation for

(a)

.

The best we can say with respect to P4 is that the scope of
'pleasure',

'benefit', etc.

is using them.

is unclear in the way Socrates

The purpose of the unclarity is, of course,

the controversial point here.

There are two other problems with the Rotten Argument,

which Vlastos overlooks.

First, Vlastos does not address

why Socrates claims that P6 is true, that is, why doing
injustice does not surpass suffering injustice in pain.
(475c ff.).

argument.

Socrates and Vlastos both assume P6 without
The operative word here is 'pain'

is clearly equivocal;

36

Fodor, p.499-509.

[lupfe],

it could mean physical pain or

which
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'psychological distress' or both. 37

Neither Socrates, nor

Polus, nor Vlastos makes a distinction
between these senses.
But which sense is meant matters for the
outcome of the

elenchos.

For if lupe is meant in the physical
sense, then

P6 ma V be true; those doing injustice may
either directly or

indirectly cause physical pain to others, while they

themselves experience no such pain.

A tyrant may jail,

torture or otherwise abuse another, for instance.

So doing

injustice may not surpass suffering it with in terms of
pain
caused.
But if lupe is meant in a psychological sense,

then

surely P6 is false.

A person doing injustice may suffer

great psychological distress even while doing the bad deed.
In fact,

this sense of the word is consistent with the

general Socratic conception of justice for the individual as
the psychic order of soul, and injustice as the corrupt
order.
d.)

So,

(G.

491d-e,

506d-e,

508a; cf. R.

345a-c,

347e,

351c-

doing injustice may indeed surpass suffering it in

pain if it is meant by 'pain' psychological distress.

Another important point that is overlooked by Vlastos
is what this particular elenchos is about,

namely, a choice:

Socrates asks Polus which life he would choose,

doing or one of suffering injustice.

a

life of

The conclusion of the

argument states that no one would choose doing injustice
over suffering it, and Polus consents to the conclusion.

17

Irwin's translation suggests that lup£ refers to psychological
distress; see Irwin [4], p.46, also, p.156 fn.
Zeyl translates it as
'pain' and keeps it neutral, p. 40-42.

.

.
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However,

is he going to be compelled to choose a
life of

suffering injustice as

a

result of this argument?

thinks he will have to since he is defeated.

clearly will not opt for

a

a

life,

But Polus

life of suffering injustice.

That is why he says he will not act in such

choose such

Vlastos

a

way so as to

but it seems [phainetai] that suffering

injustice is preferable, "at least on this argument [kata

touton ton logon]."

In fact,

Polus agrees to the

conclusions of other elenchoi against him always with the
same tentativeness of "so it seems [phainetai]"
d5)

(i.e.

479dl,

What is particularly telling, which Vlastos fails to

mention,

is that to the famous proclamation 38 by Socrates

that he has proved
[alethfe],

[

apodedeiktai

]

what was asserted as true

Polus again responds with the same ambivalence,

"so it seems [phainetai],"

(479e9).

In other words,

elenchos has no persuasive power to compel Polus to make the

necessary internal change to live by the principles of

a

virtuous life, it only silences him for the moment. 34
A more promising approach in evaluating this argument

comes from evaluating its purpose.

In his discussion of

this particular argument in the Gorgias

,

Charles Kahn

w See my Chapter Three, and Vlastos [7a].
He builds his
interpretation of the positive result of elenchos upon this quotation.
39
That is also why Socrates is reduced to conducting an elenchos by
himself at the end of the dialogue (506c-510a), as no one is persuaded
by his arguments, and no one is unwilling to answer any of his
Oddly, this fact gets no serious attention at all in the
questions.
Vlastos does not mention it, not even in a
current scholarship.
footnote

.
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persuasively argues that it is ad hominem.

it is directed

against Polus himself, not his statements, because
Socrates
wants to shame him into seeing that he "cannot
give
an

account of good and bad, right and wrong, that is
consistent
with [his] own life and [his] own convictions." 40
Though I
do not agree with Kahn's assessment of the reason for
the ad

hominem

that Socrates wanted Polus see in Socrates the very

paradigm of the just--I think that Socrates' "refutation" of
Polus is an example of cheating in argument.

Callicles

In fact,

who is on to the fact that Socrates is cheating,

,

puts it well when he says to Socrates,
If a person is ashamed [aischuntai] and doesn't
dare to say what he thinks, he is forced
[anakazetai] to contradict himself [enantia
legein]
This is the clever [to sophon] trick
you've thought of, with which you work mischief
[kakourgeis] in your arguments [logois]. (483al)
.

Is Socrates a Sophist?

Why does Vlastos insist that there is "no reason to

believe" that Socrates would have intentions to deceive?

I

think the answer, though Vlastos does not say it explicitly,
is that Socrates has good moral character.

I

think that the

reluctance to attribute to Socrates the behavior purportedly

characteristic of

a

lesser person is due to the mistaken

assumptions that there are two methods of

a

different moral

order, philosophical, and sophistical, and that anyone who

40

Kahn

[

2

]

,

p. 119

.

.

.
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practices the first method would never stoop to
practice the
second
It is commonplace to describe Socratic elenchos
as a

philosophical argument.

The format involves questions and

short answers between two parties to get at the truth.

By

contrast, the sophistical method is supposed to be one which

involves long rhetoric and verbal tactics to score points

against an opponent.

It is also commonplace to point out

the inadequacies of using length or question-and-answer

format as a criterion to distinguish philosophy from
sophistry, because there are many instances in which

Socrates delivers long speeches (cf.
4

65e)

,

519e; 490d; but

G.

and many others in which a sophist performs in

question-and-short-answer format (cf
So,

what,

if anything,

of the method of Socrates,

G.

a

449b; 461e-462a)

can we say about the character
and the man himself?

Socrates supposed to be different from

a

How is

sophist?

The

answer to this question is treated as self-evident in the

current literature: philosophy is distinct from sophistry by

virtue of its method.

However, distinctions familiar to us

between sophistry and philosophy from Plato's and

Aristotle's writings were by no means commonly known, let
alone accepted, by most people during most of the fifth and
fourth centuries in Athens.

The term 'sophist' in its

negative connotations was largely due to its later usage

determined by the influence of Plato and Aristotle.

In
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their depiction,

'sophist' came to denote,

in opposition to

'philosopher', someone who seemed to have
philosophical
ability, but in fact did not have, and who
gained his

effects from fallacious arguments not directed
at truth.
But in fifth century, the word was still general

in scope

and neutral in tone.

"it could be used to denote anyone

pressing exceptional knowledge, skill or talent of any
kind,
and was not necessarily deragotary or ironical." 41
In a system such as Athenian democracy, which some

scholars dub as "government by public meeting," 42 the

ability to speak and persuade others was clearly of utmost
importance.

The use of persuasion was

a

central feature of

Athenian public life in the 5th and 4th centuries, B.C.

The

meaning of the term 'sophist' was in principle quite wide,
ranging from

a

poet and

a

diviner [sophistai] used by Hesiod

and Pindar, to a teacher of wisdom.

term was often applied to Socrates. 43

In this wide sense, the

More narrowly,

a

sophist was someone who taught persuasion, usually for
namely, how to speak in public and to defend ideas

fee,

before the assembly or in
a

a

a

court of law. 44

In other words,

sophist was concerned with the art of words, either by

teaching this art to others, or, sometimes, showing it in

41

Hussey, p.114 and ff.

42

Buxton.

43

Kerferd, p.55-57.

44

de Romilly [1], p.l ff.

,

.
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public displays.

4

Yet,

"'

from the sophists was
Plato.

a

just how to separate 46 Socrates

matter of serious concern for

Indeed, Plato's own attitude toward persuasion
is

one of mystery.

In the Gorgias

,

and elsewhere 48 Plato

displays contempt for the art of professional persuasion.
But the Gorgias as a whole depicts Socrates in an untiring

attempt to persuade his interlocutors.
Vlastos wants to separate Socrates from the sophists of
his day on the basis of his method.

But it is not clear

whether sophists of the Socratic period had

a method,

by

which they could be identified, in the way Vlastos thinks
Socrates can be identified as
elenchos.

This is

a

a

philosopher on the basis of

serious problem. If Vlastos is right

about there being two characters in the Platonic dialogues,
both with the name 'Socrates'

— and

that the earlier

dialogues represent the views of the historical man named
'

Socrates --then he must give us
'

a

convincing reason for why

we should believe that Socrates is so confident in his

philosophic method as that which separates him from other
methods.

And this Vlastos must do when history tells us

45

Such displays are a constant feature of the writing of both
Euripides and Thucydides. They were not "invented" by the sophists.
They are already to be found in Sophocles and are a central feature of
See de Romilly [1].
even the earliest comedies.
The most famous example is of course Aeschines who classified
both Demosthenes and Socrates as sophists, In Timarch.113, 175, cf. 125.
46

47
For views on the problem of separating Socrates from the
sophists, see Nehamas [2] and Kerferd.

48

For instance, Phaedrus

or late books of the Republic

.

.
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that the boundary between philosophy and
sophistry had not
clearly been drawn. After all, isn't it due
to the very
confusion over this boundary that Socrates gave up
his life?

Isocrates is

a

case in point for the confusion on this

very issue still reigning in Athens even after the
death of
44
Socrates
A contemporary of Plato, Isocrates struggles

with Plato for the correct understanding of philosophy. 50

Against Plato, he argues that it is impossible to attain

knowledge

[epistfemfe]

we should live.

of anything,

let alone knowledge of how

Because knowledge is impossible, the next

best thing, he argues,

is to have true opinions

about practical matters,

(Ant.

271,

cf.184).

[doxa] 51

Philosophy

turns out to be education in such matters for Isocrates,
namely, the art of discourse [tous logous], both in speaking

well [to legein eh] and thinking right [to phronein]

,

(Ant.

This education enables one to govern wisely oneself

278)

as well as the state,

as no one who learns to speak well and

49
Isocrates, Antidosis Against the Sophists
abbreviated Ant., Ag Soph, Helen, Peace.
•

,

,

Helen, On the Peace,

.

50
Interestingly, Isocrates is not usually discussed as a
philosopher, even though he says he is one. Recently, Edward Schiappa
has argued that Isocrates is "marginalized" in the current philosophical
literature, because his work does not match our current conception of
what is really philosophy.
Because his work does not fit in that
conception, Isocrates becomes by definition a non-philosopher.
See his
"Isocrates and Canons," presented to the Society for Ancient Greek
Philosophy, December 30, 1993.

Doxa and epist&m& comprise the root of the epistemological and
It
metaphysical difference between Isocrates and Plato, respectively.
can be argued that Plato's use of 'dialectic' was an effort to find a
method to separate epistGme from doxa. This is not the place to pursue
the nature of this effort, it is sufficient to point out, however, that
the dispute was by no means settled.
51

Ill

think properly would support unjust [adikas]
or petty
affairs, (Ant. 285). Instead, he would habituate
[sunethizomenos] himself in choosing the right action

because of his right thinking, thereby he becomes
devoted to
the common good, (Ant. 276)
In fact, a true philosopher

is

.

a

wise man [sophos] who wants to persuade others [peithein

boulomenos] in the affairs of righteousness,
275; cf. Peace,

34)

(Ant.

278;

282;

Those who teach the kind of speaking

.

that is not conducive to right thinking and right action,

mock and mimic the philosopher,
can teach righteousness for

displays

[

epideixeis

]

,

a

(Ant.

284).

They claim they

small fee; they perform public

contest each other [diagonizomenous]

and argue in a disputatious fashion [erizontas],
cf.

Ag

.

Soph.

7,

19).

(Ant.

,

147;

These people claim to be teachers of

wisdom [sophian didaskontas]

,

but do not deserve their name.

It is not clear how much Isocrates and Plato influenced

each other.

For instance, all the words in brackets above

also appear in Platonic texts, the implications of which

cannot fully explore here.

I

Isocrates separates true

sophists 52 (philosophers) from the "imitation" sophists.
His derision of the imitation sophists resonates in Plato's
own criticism of them (cf. G.
5

519c,

460e; R.

539 ). 53

They

Isocrates considers Protagoras, Gorgias, the universally accepted
sophists, in the same category as Parmenides, Zeno, Melissus, and
Empedocles, (Helen 1-3; cf. Plato's Phdr. 261d).
~

53
Plato ridicules only the lesser characters who claim to be wise,
He also
not the "real” sophists such as Gorgias or Protagoras.
separates Isocrates from other sophists when he says that Isocrates has
by nature a bit of philosophy [tis philosophia] in his mind (Phdr.,

.

112

both emphasize 'eristic' and 'antilogic' as
being

significant tools of the sophists.

Although it is controversial whether or not these
terms
denote particular forms of arguments, I will take

them to be

merely describing the techniques with which an argument
can
54
be used and manipulated
For my purposes, it is
.

su ffi c en t to have a general sense of the purported
contrast
i-

between eristic and antilogic, on the one hand, and
elenchos, on the other.

Named after Eris, the goddess of

discord and strife, eristic is contentiousness in argument.
The aim of an eristic argument is to score points and win
the argument.
fallacy.

It is not clear whether this requires a

However, eristic has pejorative connotations both

for Plato and Isocrates.

They both regard the techniques of

eristic beneath what they each take to be the philosophic
practice, as it is more concerned with victory than the

quest for truth.

It will be remembered that this is exactly

the same attitude Vlastos takes Socrates to be holding.
'Antilogic,' on the other hand, refers to argument used
for the purpose of generating contradiction.

Again,

it is a

matter of considerable scholarly controversy just what this
entails.

In a famous passage of the Republic

complains that when the young get

a

,

Socrates

taste for reasoned

279a)
54
Kerferd argues that they are particular forms of argument, while
in a convincing rebuttal, Nehamas [2] claims they merely refer to the
ways in which an argument are used.

,
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argument [logos], they play with it. Imitating those
who
cross-examine them exelenchontas
they use arguments
[

]

for

,

the purpose of establishing contradictions [eis
antilogian]
(

599b3-6

)

.

Older men, on the other hand, would clearly not

take part in such craziness [mania]; they choose to imitate

those who converse together

[

dialegesthai

]

to discover the

truth rather than those who play around simply to generate

contradictions

[

antilegonta

]

.

(G.

539c5-8; cf. 500b-c.)

Appealing to this passage, some commentators, like
Vlastos, suggest that antilogic is elenchos gone bad, and

that the contrast between antilogic and elenchos is one of
purpose, not method.

On that view, Socratic elenchos is

conducted for the purpose of finding the true path to the

virtuous life, and antilogic for the exclusive and unsavory
purpose of victory. 55

And since he is the "model" of the

virtuous philosopher whose purpose is to persuade people of
the righteous life, Socrates could not possibly conduct

eristic arguments, nor would he employ antilogic.

He would

be the old man who chooses to have a conversation to

discover the truth rather than play around with arguments to
win or contradict the views of his interlocutors.

Unfortunately, this is too easy
if true,

55

a

conclusion.

First,

the abovementioned view conflates Plato's depiction

Vlastos [3],

[7a]; Genzler,

Nehamas [2].

)
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of dialectic with Socrates'

elenchos

56
.

if we grant Vlastos

the view that the early dialogues are
representative of the
views and method of Socrates, then we have no
good reason
for that conclusion.
Even if we grant difference in motive,
there is nothing in appearance that would preclude
Socrates
from using the very arguments sophists would use

57
.

since

we cannot distinguish the methods without interpretative

schemes for motive, we have no grounds to claim that the

behavior is different.

Second, the argument against Polus

is an instance of both eristic and antilogic,

cheating.

could score

and as such,

It is only by employing such means that Socrates
a

point against Polus, for scoring points is the

only accomplishment in an argument Polus understands.
I

Here

am operating with an assumption that the character and the

depth of elenchos is intimately connected to the character
and the philosophic acumen of his respondents.

5

*

Whom

Socrates talks with determines the length and complexity of
the elenchos against him: his elenchos against the young

Against many contemporary commentators, I am not assuming that
elenchos, practiced by Socrates, is the same procedure that Plato names
as 'dialectic' in the later dialogues.
(For my argument, see my
Appendix
.

57
Plato is aware of the fact that a sophist may well appear
identical to the philosopher, but he argues that the appearance is not
real, (cf. Sop. 268cl; R. 454a-c, Tht
164c-d).
See Nehamas [2] for the
view that Plato had to come up with the theory of Forms and dialectic in
order to justify the apparent difference.
.

58

See Coventry and Teloh for an in-depth discussion of this point.

,

.

.
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"colt" 59 Polus eristically,

understand best.

for that is what he will

Polus is young, and contentious as well as

self-righteous about his moral ideals.

It is obvious that

he would not hesitate to cheat Socrates in argument if he

possibly could.

According to Vlastos, however, none of this

would be sufficient for Socrates to conduct eristic

arguments with Polus.

Resorting, again, to another dialogue

to fix the problem here, Vlastos writes,

[Socrates] does not believe in returning harm for
harm [Cr. 49c-d]--and to deceive Polus in this
argument would certainly be to harm him by
aggravating the moral bef uddlement duping him
into thinking that those delusive inferences
secure foundation for a tremendous moral truth. 60
,

But if Polus can be duped this easily, why does

Socrates present this befuddling argument to him?
give the simpleminded something really simple?

Why not

Why bother

with this puzzling refutation of ambiguities, equivocations,
and tacit premises?

Since Vlastos does not agree with my

assumption that Socrates uses different kinds of elenchos
with different kinds of people for different purposes,

Vlastos cannot answer this question.

Or he might say that

there is nothing particularly befuddling about this
argument, and that Socrates always argues like this.

But

this still fails to explain why he goes to such lengths.

I

"The young colt here is young and hasty [pOlos hode neos esti kai
oxus]" (G. 463e2). 'Colt' is a pun on Polus' name, suggesting that Polus
is untamed, and wild, hence unphilosophical
59

60

Vlastos

[

3

]

p. 148
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believe

a

Polus.

Polus would be the first to use the very tricks

more compelling answer lies in the character of

Socrates uses, for he is the kind of man whose purpose in
life is to get ahead, and score big against others.

Socrates scores against him by silencing him.
round.

He wins the

Though this silence is not going to generate an

internal change in Polus toward

a

virtuous life, it will at

least force him to come up with better arguments to support
his views next time.

Now

I

go back to something Vlastos says, namely, that

no one who believes that Socrates cheats can reconcile this

"infidelity to the quest for truth" with philosophizing. In
light of the discussion above,

I

suggest that this very

conception is informed by Vlastos' unexamined assumptions
about what

philosopher does, and is further in conflict

a

with his conception of the cooperative activity of Socratic
elenchos.

If Vlastos is right,

essentially

a

lonely endeavor.

then the quest for truth is
It does not involve others,

because the philosopher does not need to entertain others'
views, nor does he have to win anyone over.

concessions.

He makes no

One either takes it or leaves it.

But at the

same time, Vlastos thinks of the Socratic method as being

powerful tool of persuasion.

a

But this surely involves

cajoling others to drop certain beliefs, take up other and
better, and even true ones.

So if this strand of Vlastos'

thinking is right, then the quest for truth is essentially

a
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sociable activity.

Hence, Vlastos not only fails to answer

why victory in the quest of truth is incompatible with
philosophizing, but also allows the conflict in his thinking
to misdirect his interpretation of Socrates.

CHAPTER

6

CONCLUSION

Vlastos

'

work on the method of Socrates has raised many

compelling questions; among them

I

have concentrated on

those concerning the foundation of moral knowledge and the
use of method.

Vlastos' treatment of the Socratic method is

unique both in its originality and in its command over the
texts.

Vlastos' command over the philosophical and

philological concerns in those texts is also awe-inspiring.
It nevertheless raises important issues related to doing

history of philosophy.
interpretation.

The most pressing issue is over-

Here we have a straight jacket reading of

the texts, the Gorgias in particular,

in which certain

sections are omitted and certain themes underexamined as
they might jeopardize

a

particular interpretation.

As

I

have shown, Vlastos' skillful design in approaching the

Socratic dialogues relies on many distinctions, which in his
judgement are waiting to be made in the dialogues.

Once

they are made, Vlastos hopes to show that notorious

ambiguities and difficulties in the text fade, bringing
forth a clear picture of the Socratic method.

Although

Vlastos' layout is magnificent, the question is, of course,

whether the picture is really this clear.
On Vlastos' reading, the Gorgias is a dialogue which

shows what elenchos can establish.
and the philosophical method,

The father of philosophy

it seems,

relies only on his
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own rational method in order to hold beliefs that
he

justifies by this method.

In the way Vlastos presents his

Socrates, one might think that this Socrates would never
fall into moral perplexity

1

himself as to how to persuade

people into right conduct for righteous life.

He is not the

man who tries all the tricks in the book, uses an ambiguous

word here, makes

a

false substitution there, at times, just

to win his argument.

He is not the man who exhorts, urges

and sometimes outright pesters his interlocutors.

It is as

if we have a schizophrenic 2 at hand.

However, as

I

discuss in my Chapter Four, it is unclear

exactly what this method consists in.

There are no

sufficient examples of it, nor is there

depiction of the elenctic argument.
and grasping at metaphors.

a

particular

This leaves us stranded

Furthermore, Vlastos'

interpretation of the rational and confident Socrates forces
an exceedingly one-sided portrayal of this enigmatic man.

Just as there was in the 19th century

a

pronounced

resistance among the leading Platonic scholars even to
address Platonic homosexuality as

a

significant

consideration in understanding his ethics, so there is now

a

similar resistance in Socratic scholarship, led by Vlastos,
I thank Gary Matthews for sharing his paper on Socratic perplexity,
See Matthews [1].
with most of which I am in complete agreement.
1

Vlastos argued that Socrates of the earlier Platonic dialogues and
Socrates of the later ones were so different in content and method that
"they could not have been depicted as cohabiting the same brain throughout
unless it had been the brain of a schizophrenic," Vlastos [3], p.46.
My point here is that the real schizophrenic might be Vlastos' Socrates.

.
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to take seriously Socrates' belief in the extra-rational
as

providing
elenchos.

significant epistemological ground for his

a

What is at stake here is how much reasoning is

needed to arrive at basic moral judgements.
there is often

On this issue

split between those who hold that

a

all

[A]

moral knowledge is obtained by moral reasoning, and others

who hold that
way,

[B]

moral knowledge is acguired some other

for example, by direct apprehension or revelation.

While it is clear that Vlastos wants to present and defend

Socratic elenchos in

a

way consistent only with [A], his own

account leaves open the possibility of an interpretation

consistent with

[B]

As has been suggested by others,

I

take the Gorgias as

the paradigm not of the power of elenchos, but of its

limitations.

This of course revives,

in a much needed way,

an older debate which has gotten lost in the recent one on

the limits of Socratic epistemology.

more natural reading of the Gorgias

,

If

I

am right,

in a

method is not all.

Socrates needs elenchos not for acquiring his moral
doctrines, but only for dispensing them.

Of course, to

show that elenchos is not essential for moral knowledge does
not undermine the fact that Socrates has and imparts

positive moral knowledge.

It simply suggests a more

compelling explanation, namely, that the Socratic method is
one of the tools at the service of Socratic moral doctrines.
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Socrates persuades his interlocutors of the truth of his

convictions in

number of different ways.

a

Another issue in Vlastos' interpretive scheme
classical assumption that
do virtuous acts.

a

is his

virtuous man will automatically

The problem here is that this assumption

is informed by post-Socratic assessments about virtue and

virtuous acts, such as those expressed by Aristotle.

I

think that this assumption, lurking in the back of Vlastos'

assessment of the powers of the Socratic method, forces him
to quote selectively, and build arguments on other such

selective evidence.
Gorgias

Again,

in a more natural reading of the

the dialogue which Vlastos takes to witness the

,

integrity of the philosopher and philosophic method,

different conclusion emerges.
and,

as

I

show,

a

Socrates does in fact cheat,

cheats for good reasons.

To show that

Socrates cheats does not undermine Vlastos' assumptions
about

a

model philosopher, it only undermines Socrates, and

in his person the philosopher as that model.

In conclusion, while

I

applaud Vlastos for

singlehandedly reawakening interest in these fundamental
questions,

I

urge caution in relying on his interpretation

to understand Socrates and his method.

Vlastos and Friends

are now forcing a new direction in the scholarship that

frequently discourages the natural reading of texts.
hope to have shown in this dissertation that although

elaborate explanations of the thought of Socrates are

I

.
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inspirational, after a while the explanations may no longer
^©flsc-t the thought of Socrates,

himself

but of the interpreter

APPENDIX
ELENCHOS AND DIALECTIC

It is well for us to realize in advance that the
term 'dialectic' is not used by all philosophers

with the same meaning.

Alexander, On Aristotle's Topics

In the debate on elenchos,

frequently comes up:

a

curious assertion

That the Socratic elenchos can best be

understood as Socratic dialectic, or that Socratic dialectic
is the method Socrates practices as elenchos

Initially,

1

.

two problems arise from the claim that elenchos is the same

procedure as dialectic.

The first problem is what G.B.

Kerferd calls the "meaning and reference confusion ."
is a useful distinction,

problem at hand.

2

This

and it applies directly to the

Those who treat elenchos as 'dialectic,'

seem to be thinking that these two words have exactly the
same meaning, and hence could be used interchangeably.

Admittedly, one might use cognates of the two terms to refer
to the same practice or the same person. For instance, the

person who practices elenchos and the person who practices

dialectic might both be Socrates.

1

I

Yet,

the terms for these

use 'elenchos' and 'Socratic method' interchangeably.

At issue is the interchangeable use of the
Kerferd, p. 62 ff.
following Platonic technical terms: eristic and dialectic; eristic and
See Nehamas
antilogic eristic and elenchos ; elenchos and dialectic
[2], p 5 ff. for a criticism of Kerferd's view.
2

.

;

.

,

.
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practices need not have the same meaning.

Indeed, they do

This is a problem, but it is the minor problem.

not.

The second and more important difficulty is this.

if

one claims that elenchos is Socratic dialectic, then one

must have some notion of elenchos and some notion of
dialectic.

But this is just the problem.

Suppose by

'elenchos' one is referring to the Socratic argument

described by Vlastos as "standard elenchos."

What is the

counterpart for 'dialectic?' There is no such distinct
practice wo which refer.

As

I

will show,

'dialectic' has

four distinct meanings, but not one of these meanings

matches the practice described as elenchos.
But first,

let us take a quick look at how 'elenchos'

and 'dialectic' are equated in the literature.

they are used as if they were are synonyms.

Sometimes

Gail Fine, for

example, writes one word after another and says, "Elenchus,

dialectic," is "the Socratic method of cross-examination, of

critically testing beliefs against general principles and
examples ."

Charles Kahn offers

3

a

description of dialectic

as a methodical discussion by questions and short answers.

"No doubt this was a genuine conversational

He thinks,

practice of the historical Socrates
exercised in elenchos ." 4
Roland Hall offers

3

Fine, p.103,

4

Kahn

[

3

]

a

.

.

.

regularly

Under the entry "Dialectic,"

different sense of elenchos.

fn.34; cf. p.99, p.112, respectively.

p. 317

He

"

"

,

.
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writes,

The Socratic elenchus was perhaps

a

refined form of

Zeno's paradoxes, a prolonged cross-examination which

refutes the opponent's original thesis ."

5

Aside from the tradition of associating elenchos and
dialectic, and dialectic with Zenoan paradoxes, there is

another distinguished tradition, in which Socratic elenchos
is understood as precursor either to Plato's dialectic or

Aristotle's dialectic.

For instance, R.M. Hare maintains

that elenchos as "the Socratic method of scrutiny

...

is

further developed by Plato, who uses the name 'dialectic'
for the developed form of it ." 6

Terry Irwin also agrees

with this idea: "Dialectic is Plato's name for the sort of

systematic discussion that is practiced in Plato's Socratic

dialogues

.

.

.

using the Socratic Method ."

7

Some scholars

suggest, on the other hand, that Socratic elenchos can best
be understood as the practice described by Aristotle as

"Elenchus qua

For instance, Hugh Benson writes,

dialectic.

dialectical argument

.

.

.

comes very close to what

Aristotle describes as the dialectical method

.

8

Eleonore

Stump agrees: "Aristotle wants to codify the Socratic style

Encyclopedia of Philosophy vol. 1, reprint ed., New York:
MacMillan Publishing Company and the Free Press, 1972, p.385-86.
s

6

Hare, p.43,

cf.14.

7

Irwin

p. 7

[

la

]

,

8
Benson [6], p.72 and fn.6. Also see D.W. Hamlyn, p.465: "What
Aristotle says about dialectic in Topics certainly fits to a large
extent with what Plato exhibits as Socratic practice in the earlier
dialogues
.

.
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of arguing into an art, the possession of which
will make a

person adept at the sort of dialectical disputation Socrates
engaged in ." 9
I

am not suggesting that the views listed above are

peculiar to these thinkers, or that the use of 'dialectic'
as a quick replacement for 'elenchos'

is novel.

The kinds

of assertions made in the current secondary literature are
in fact duplicate earlier ones.

For instance, George Grote

used 'dialectic' in the Zenoian sense.

He suggested that

Zeno was "the inventor of dialectic: that is, as the first

person, of whose skill,

in the art of cross-examination and

refutation, conspicuous illustrative specimens were

preserved ."
claimed,

1,1

Agreeing with Grote, John Burnet later

"Zeno [was] the real inventor of Dialectic, that is

to say, the art of argument by question and answer ."

11

He

maintained that dialectic in the Socratic sense is this art
1

of question and answer

1

.

-

Like Hare and Irwin, Norman

Gulley proposed, "Let us follow Plato and call the Socratic

method 'dialectic '."

g

10

Richard Robinson also suggested,

13

Stump, p.3 ff.

Grote, vol.

1,

p.96.

For more of the same view on method of question and answer, see
Owen, p.214; cf. p.153.
11

12

Burnet, p.162-64.

See Russell, p.92, also for the Zenonian

sense
13
Gulley, p 32 ff; cf. 207,
view.
this
.

fn.40.

Gulley cites Robinson

[1]

for

.
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"Plato's dialectic presupposes... Socratic elenchus." u

Gilbert Ryle suggested, however, that we must understand
'dialectic'

in its Aristotelian sense.

He maintained that

elenchos is "identical" with what Aristotle names as
'dialectic' in the Topics.

*’
1

All of these claims naturally depict four 16 senses of
'dialectic'
51

Dialectic is the method of seeking knowledge in a
conversation by means of question and answer; elenchos
is that method.
(Fine,

Burnet, Kahn, Benson)

52

Dialectic is what Zeno the Eleatic invented in the form
of paradoxes; elenchos is that invention.
(Grote, Russell, Hall, Burnet)

53

'Dialectic' is Plato's name for a method of
philosophical inquiry; elenchos is that method.
(Robinson, Gulley,

Irwin)

'Dialectic' is Aristotle's name of a particular form of
argument; elenchos is that argument.
(Ryle, Stump, Hamlyn, Benson)

54

The Origin of the Word

Before

I

turn to the examination of the abovementioned

let me make some preliminary remarks.

senses,

First, the

origin of the word 'dialectic' and the origin of the

practice of dialectic may not be simultaneous.

14

Robinson [1], p.89.

15

Ryle

,

p 18
.

'Dialectic'

.

16
This may not be an exhaustive list of the different senses of the
What is relevant to my discussion are the senses up to and
word.
For medieval uses, see Stump; for later uses see
including Aristotle's.
Keywords by Raymond Williams, Oxford University Press, 1976, p.90-91.
,

128

surely is used as

a

technical term, but to what practice it

refers is the controversial point here. For now, let me turn
to some historical discussion of the origin of the word,

unquestionably one of the most puzzling terms in ancient
philosophy.

Etymologically, it means "discussion" or

"debate," or the giving and receiving of reasons in such

discourse.

As to its origin, we have conflicting accounts.

In his Lives of Eminent Philosophers

Laertius

17

,

Diogenes

tells us that 'dialectic' is the name of

a

branch

of philosophy in which dialectic, the art of reasoning,

practiced

18
.

a

is

Diogenes writes,

Dialectic is the art of discourse [dialektikfe he
esti techno logon] through which we either refute
or establish some proposition [ti] by means of
question and answer on the part of the
interlocutors
(trans.
R.D. Hicks)
14

.

,

Diogenes attributes to Aristotle the assertion that Zeno the
Eleatic,

21
’

though he did not use the word as

a

technical

It is generally accepted that Diogenes's accounts of
(b.225?)
the thoughts of major philosophers are mostly superficial and often
Despite his lack of philosophical acumen, however, he is
unreliable.
one of the most important sources for the history of Greek philosophy,
He
as many primary sources and earlier secondary compilations are lost.
has 1186 specific references to 365 books by 250 authors, and 350 books
by anonymous writers from the ancient world.
17

18
The other two are physics and ethics.
Diogenes, I. 18.
Diogenes traces the origin of physics to Archelaus, the natural
philosopher who was the pupil of Anaxagoras, the alleged teacher of
Socrates, and the origin of ethics to Socrates; cf. II. 16; III. 20.

19

Diogenes,

III.

20

Diogenes,

I.

48.

18-19.

I

.
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term, was the "inventor"

[heuretfen]

of this art

21
.

According to Diogenes, who relies on the authority of
Favorinus 22

,

it was Plato who first coined the term

'dialectic' in philosophy [prCtos en philosophia antipodas

Onomase kai stoicheion kai dialektikfen
the first to use the method.

23
]

Plato was also

This method was one of

a

dialogue involving question and answer. Criticizing those
who say that it was Zeno the Eleatic who first argued in

a

dialogue form, Diogenes writes, "In my opinion Plato, who
brought this form of writing to perfection, ought to be

adjudged the prize for its invention as well as for its

embellishment

.

" 24

In his book on Socrates,

Diogenes mentions discussion

as being important for Socratic philosophy

[dielechthfe]

but he makes no mention of 'dialectic' as

that Socrates used.

21

a

formidable public speaker

[en tois rhetorikois deinos],

Diogenes,

IX.

technical term

Diogenes emphasizes the idea that

Socrates was, first of all,
himself,

a

2 '’,

and second, he taught

25-26.

Favorinus, (c. 80-150), a polymath and a friend of Plutarch. See
Favorina Di Arelate, Opere, ed., Adelmo Barigazzi, Felice le Monnier,
Firenze, 1966, p.219 Diogenes says, "houtos prOtos en erOtesei logon
parenegken, hos phfesi PhabOrinos," III. 24.
21

23

Diogenes, III, 24.

But he
Lives, III. 48.
"dialect icians whom Dionysius
of the fact that they arranged
answering," Diogenes, II. 106,
24

,

25

Lives,

11.20.

also says Euclid studied the works of
of Chalchedon first named thus on account
the arguments for questioning and
my emphasis.

,
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rhetoric [rhetorein edidakse].

Diogenes claims that

Socrates taught the art of argument [teknas logbn] to anyone
who would converse with him [dialegomenols]

on

But,

.

Diogenes' report, Socrates' aim in argument was not to alter
opinions,

like other sophists, but to get at the truth [to

alfethes ekmathein]

26
.

Another commentator, Xenophon, makes

stronger case

a

for the significance of conversation in the Socratic

practice.

Xenophon says it was Socrates who first

discovered the merit of conversation

[

dialegesthai

]

for

philosophy, because, on Xenophon's view, Socrates thought

that being skilled at conversation makes men excellent
[aristous]

in leadership [hegemonikbtatous]

.

He writes of

Socrates
He said that the best and happiest men are also
the most able at conversation. And he also said
that conversation is named after the act of
getting together to deliberate in common in order
to pick out things dialegontas according to
their kind. (Mem. IV. v. 12.)
[

]

According to Xenophon, Socrates thought that those who
know what any given thing is [ti hekaston eie ton ontbn] can
also expound it to others.

Those who do not know are misled
For this reason,

themselves and mislead others.

a

philosophical discussion makes one an able and happy person.
Here Xenophon seems to be making
etymology, between dialegomai

26

Diogenes, II. 22.

a

distinction based on

(discuss,

reason, talk with)

.
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and dialegO (pick out, sort out, classify)

.

There is no

evidence, however, that Socrates made this particular

distinction.

Questioning Xenophon's philosophical acumen, some
scholars turn to Aristotle as the definitive authority on
the origin of the word.

Unfortunately, Aristotle's claims

as to the origin of both the word and the art are also

inconclusive.

First,

it is not clear just who Aristotle

thought the inventor of the art of dialectic was.

Metaphysics

In the

he attributes the beginning of formal reasoning

,

to Socrates.

He says in Met.

1078b25,

It was natural that Socrates should seek the
essence
[to ti esti] of things]. For he was
trying to deduce sullogizesthai
and the essence
For there
is the starting point of deductions.
was yet none of the dialectical power [dunamin]
which enables people even without knowledge of the
essence to speculate about contraries and inguire
whether the same science deals with contraries.
For two things may be fairly ascribed to Socrates:
inductive reasoning [epaktikous logous] and
universal definition [to horizesthai kathalou]
Both of these are associated with the starting
point of scientific knowledge [archen epist6m£s].
(trans.
J. Barnes.)
[

]

,

,

This is

a

puzzling paragraph for reasons which cannot be

discussed here in toto.

However,

it is important to note

that Aristotle makes certain distinctions that he takes to
be self-evident, two of which are of interest for us, that
is,

2
between scientific sullogismos , epagogue and

dialectic.

27

His general point seems to be that even though

See my Chapter

3

for a discussion of epagogue.
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Socrates was the first to give attention to sullogismos to
arrive at general definitions, he had yet to acguire

proficiency in dialectic.

All he was capable of at the time

was to conduct epagogic arguments.

And neither was

formalized as dialectical argument.
On the other hand, again in the Metaphysics

Aristotle

,

names Plato as the one who first instigated the practice of
dialectic.

On Aristotle's view, Platonic Forms were indeed

the result of his investigations in dialectic. 28

Yet,

he

also seems to think that he himself is the founder of

dialectic, which he developed as a special branch of logic.
In writing Topics, Aristotle says that his purpose was

discover [heurein]

a

"to

method by which we shall be able to

reason from generally accepted opinions."

He repeats the

notion of "discovery" in the Sophistical Refutations when he
says that his purpose "was to discover a faculty [or power,

dunamin] which could reason on the problem set before us."
(Top.

100al8 ff., SR. 183a37.)

Later commentators follow

Aristotle's lead and claim that it was Aristotle who
discovered and developed dialectic as an art.

So,

perhaps the best we can do at this point is to suggest that
Plato, not Socrates

— if

we grant their difference

— used

'dialectic' as a technical term for the first time.

Aristotle used the same name for

a

special branch of logic.

Perhaps Aristotle had in mind the logical moves one makes in
2X

987b32-34

;

cf.

1004bl9-25.
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the paradoxes of the Zeno, when he attributed to Zeno the

invention of dialectic.

Whether or not any of these

'dialectics' refer to the same practice is of course the

controversial topic here.
is any sense

'dialectic'

,

To see whether Socratic elenchos
let us turn to the four senses of

this puzzling word.
Four Senses of 'Dialectic'

Dialectic is the method of seeking knowledge in
conversation by means of guestion and answer;
elenchos is that method.

SI

This is the generic sense of the word.

philosophical conversation

modeled after

a

24
.

It means,

a

roughly,

Some claim that dialectic

"give-and-take" type of conversation because

it is also the way the human mind works

111
.

The general
Since we

assumption behind the assertion seems to be this.

cannot get at the "truth" by any direct inspection, we need
The way to do that is in a critical

to tease it out.

interplay between the contradictory positions in

a

conversation, either by the interlocutors or within the

heart of

a

single inquirer.

As used by A E Taylor, Gulley, Vlastos [7a], Kosman, Rorty,
Seeskin. A quick inspection of any major dictionary shows that the
following characteristics are regularly attributed to dialectic as a
philosophical conversation: that it seeks "truth", and that it
"resolves contradictions" in "systematic" reasoning, it is a critica
interplay" which takes place by way of question and answer.
29

.

.

See Seeskin, p.22-24; also Richard Lewis
Taylor, p.155-156.
A E
goes on
"
A process analogous to that of questioning others
Nett leship:
Republic, 2nd
Plato's
on
Lectures
inquirer."
single
a
of
mind
in the
278-79.
ed.
1901, reprint., New York: St. Martin Press, 1967.
30

.

,

.

.

,
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In a famous scene Socrates grows impatient with

Protagoras' long speeches to his seemingly simple questions.
He says to Protagoras,

short if

"You will have to cut your answers

am going to follow you."

I

Protagoras protests by

saying that if he had to cut his answers short, he would not
be superior to anyone in public speech.

This makes Socrates

conclude
[Protagoras] would no longer be willing to go on
answering in a dialectical discussion, so I considered
my work with him to be finished, (trans. Lombardo and
31

Bell.

)

No doubt drawing on these scenes and others, many scholars

think of 'dialectic' as

a

and short 32 answer format.

dialectic with
given to

a

conversation conducted in question
So SI seems to equate the art of

conversation in which short answers are

questioner.

a

Now if SI is true, dialectic and elenchos are

interchangeable.

But if all that is meant by 'dialectic'

is

"discussion conducted in question by short answer," and

elenchos means exactly the same, then SI is of course only

vacuously true.

Therefore, SI fails to be philosophically
Let us then turn to S2, to see if that is any

significant.

help

31

Pr.

334d-335c; cf. G. 449b-c.

modes
A controversial claim is that there might be two different
fn.10
fn.9,
Nehamas
[2], P-5,
of elenchos, one short and one long. See,
p.28-31.
Gulley,
fn 449c2
Dodds, p 195
32

.

,

.

;

.
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Dialectic is what Zeno the Eleatic invented in the
form of paradoxes; elenchos is that invention.

S2

This is

a

popular claim that the seed of the Socratic

elenchos could be found in the paradoxes of Zeno.

As we

have seen, this claim is due to Aristotle who said that Zeno
is the father of dialectic.

Despite the influence of his

paradoxes in philosophy, our information on Zeno's life and

philosophic achievements is scant, and comes, not
surprisingly, from the famous story in Plato's Parmenides
(cf 127e-128c)
.

In the dialogue,

Zeno explains to

Socrates that he was incensed at the opponents of Parmenides
who ridiculed his ’’Theory of One."

He reads the arguments

he had written down as a young and contentious man against

those who maintained that there are many existences. 34

In

each argument, Zeno says, he attempted to offer proof
[tekmferion]

esti].

that there does not exist many things [ou polla

His intention was to show that this argument,

if

carried out, was more laughable [geloitera] than Parmenides'

hypothesis that there exists one [hen esti].
Since Proclus, scholars have dubbed Zeno's attempts to

reduce the opponents' proposition to absurdity as the first

For the view that the dialogue might be historically accurate,
see Vlastos entry, "Zeno the Eleatic" in, Encyclopedls of Philosophy
vol iv p 369
33

'

.

,

.

in
34
cf. 128el: Zeno also says that these arguments were written
the spirit of controversy when he was a young man; and someone stole
them from him.

,

.
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instance of reductio

35
.

However, opinions are split about

the form of these puzzles

16
.

Jonathan Barnes convincingly

argues that the surviving fragments of Zeno contains no

reductio as

a

technique for disproof.

The original

contribution of his method, according to Barnes, was to
merely expose paradoxes by taking his opponent's hypothesis
and deriving contradictory conclusions from it.

never makes the characteristic move of reductio

inference to the falsity of the hypothesis ." 37

"But he
,

the

Kirk and

Raven suggest that we simply do not have enough reliable

information (both Plato and Aristotle either misrepresent or
give conflicting descriptions of Zeno's reductions) to be
able to make conclusive statements about the form and plan
of these arguments. The best we can say of these arguments,

they suggest,

is that they were "antinomies," by which Zeno

derived contradictory consequences from

a

given thesis. 3K

Another proposal, offered by John Burnet, states that the
only thing we can say about Zeno's arguments is that they

were ad hominem.

They were designed to attack and shame

Zeno is said to have worked out forty of these reductions.
Barnes argues that they were possibly in the following form: P (there
exist many things); If P, then {Q and not-Q}. Q and not-Q may have
consisted of pairs of opposites such as {like and unlike}, {large and
small}, {equal and unequal}, {finite and infinite}, and so on.
35

36

a)

p

.

See Kirk and Raven [1], p.264-65.

37
Barnes, p.236. Barnes also argues that it is doubtful that Zeno
cf.
had a plan to defend Parmenides, and b) Parmenides was a monist;

231
38

Kirk [1], p.264-65. Hussey has

a

similar view, see his p.99 100
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those who ridiculed Parmenides, and as such they were

entirely successful. 39
So,

what earned for Zeno the title as the founder of

dialectic?

Some scholars suggest that Zeno was among the

first who composed dialogues.

Since dialogues are "the

earliest known manifestations of Grecian dialectic," Zeno
must therefore be the inventor of dialectic. 40

Aristotle in

one passage refers to "the answerer and Zeno the

questioner," thereby suggesting that he may have used

dialogue form in conducting his arguments.

a

(But he is also

quoted as giving others the honor of being the first in

composing dialogues.) 41

But nothing in the testimonies of

descriptions of the arguments conclusively supports the view
that Zeno's reductions were in
In what sense,

then,

a

dialogue form. 42

is S2 true?

That is how is

elenchos supposed to be Zenoan reductios

moment they are reductios ?

,

assuming for

a

If by S2 one means that Socratic

elenchos also exposes paradoxes, then there is the problem
of showing that every elenchos has this feature, which is of

course not true.
S2

,

There is an more important obstacle for

which Vlastos calls the problem of "unasserted

Burnet, p. 82-85.
He cites for authority Diogenes, IX. 26Grote, vol.I, p. 96 ff.
Book
III. 48 that in his opinion it was Plato
in
claims
28. But Diogenes
not Zeno who first wrote dialogues.
40

41

Diels-Kranz, 29, A14.

4:

See Freeman, p.154.
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premises

.

"

It was standard for Greek forms of argument

and refutation, as in geometry, to proceed from either

hypothetical or unasserted premises (cf. Euclid's geometry,
Each of the reductions attributed to Zeno operates on

1.5).

exactly these sorts of premises, i.e., "if there are many
things" [ei polla esti], or "let it be so" [estb].

However,

elenchos for Socrates is, first and foremost, an argument
from the asserted premises of the respondent. So, even if
Zeno is claimed be the inventor of ingenious philosophical

puzzles, those puzzles are not the sort elenchos is supposed
to be.

Therefore, S2 is false.

Let us then turn to the

Platonic sense of 'dialectic' to see if that provides help.
S3

'Dialectic' is Plato's name for a method of
philosophical inquiry; elenchos is that method.

This is the claim that what Plato names explicitly in
the later dialogues, under the proper name 'dialectic', is
the same practice as what he has Socrates practice as

elenchos in the early dialogues.

Thus,

although Plato does

not use the word in the early dialogues, dialectic for Plato
is what elenchos is for Socrates.

This is

a

strange claim,

because settling exactly what 'dialectic' means for Plato is
no easy task.

Plato uses 'dialectic' mostly in connection with

metaphors and poetic imagery, and the term does not always
have the same meaning.
43

It seems to be at once a road and a

Vlastos [1], p.2-3; cf. Vlastos [7a].
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method, an art, a science,

journey of the soul, and

a

a

power of reasoning, and the task of division and collection.

Exactly what dialectic is
gives us no help.

a

road to or an account of, Plato

In the Republic , when Glaucon asks

Socrates to give him

a

definition of dialectic,

a

description of its nature and divisions, and its ways,
Socrates grows impatient with the question.
who ask such
further,

a

He says those

question will not be able to follow him any

for he, Socrates, can only show analogies,

"images

and symbols" of his meaning, not the very truth itself
(533al-3).

In an attempt to explain Socrates'

frustration,

Paul Shorey suggests that Plato does not want to state

principle or

a

a

method, or an absolute definition of

dialectic, because that would only lead to

misinterpretation.

Therefore, conclusions to which they

might lead can only be suggested by images and symbols, and
only to those whose own experience have prepared them to
understand. 44
Let us now take

a

look at some of the images and

symbols that Plato uses to describe the function and nature
of a dialectic.

The dialectician is the wise farmer who

knows the art of planting and raising that which is selfsufficient. In the Phaedrus

,

he says of the wise farmer,

When one employs the dialectic method [dialektikfe
teknfe] and plants and sows in a fitting soul
intelligent words [epist6m6s logous] words which
44

Shorey, p.200.

.

)

,
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are able to help themselves and him who planted
them, which are not fruitless, but yield seed from
which there spring up in other minds words capable
of continuing the process forever (276e-277a) 45

The dialectician is also the hunter who knows what he
has caught and what to do with it.

By analogy,

geometricians and astronomers are said to be hunters; they
hand over their discoveries to the dialecticians to use
properly, as they themselves do not know what they have
Socrates says

acquired and how to make use of their prey.
in Eud

.

290c5 that geometricians and astronomers,

not knowing how to use their prey but only how to
hunt, they hand over their discoveries to the
dialecticians dialektikois to use properly.
Lamb.
(trans.
[

]

,

The dialectician is also

a

good butcher.

For,

a

bad

butcher would break the parts, when he tries to cut the meat

according to the principle of "dividing things by classes

where the natural joints are," {Phdr

.

265e2)

who is skilled at cutting well is called

"whether the name

I

a

.

The butcher

dialectician,

give to those who can do this is right

or wrong, god knows,"

{Phdr.

266b9)

Dialecticians are also heroes because they are wise and
clever.

Like heroes they have special talents, one of which

is the ability to ask and answer questions,

390cll, d5)

45

trans., Lamb, p.568.

(Cra.

398d7,

.

.,

.

.
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Aside from theses metaphors, Plato most frequently uses
'dialectic' as a way a road,
dialektikfe methodos]
16b,

58a)

In fact,

.

.

(

R

.

method, Dialectic is the [he

a

511b,

533c; Prm

135 ff; Phlb.

it is referred to as "the best" and the

[malista kai prdton ten methodon]

"first" method,

Socrates remarks ruefully in Philebus

285d9.)

,

(

.

Pltc

for

instance, that dialectic as the ideal method has eluded him
in his youth. 46

Now that he is older and wiser he knows

that "there certainly is no better road [than dialectic]
nor can there ever be."

But,

as Socrates admits, this road,

this method is "one which is easy to point out but very

difficult to follow." (Phlb. 16b7).
How does it

What does Plato understand by his method?

Plato gives us various answers; while all are

work?

evocative, none is specific.

involves
Sph.

a

253),

390c; Sph.

Dialectical method mainly

way of collecting and dividing

(

Phdr

.

265d; cf

and knowledge thereof (Phlb. 58a, Eud
253).

29b,

Cra.

Plato mentions dialectic as ability to

divide by forms [kat' eide dunaton einai diairein]
286e; cf. Phdr. 265d6)

.

(Pltc.

Dialectic primarily concerns itself

with the knowledge of "what is common" to all things and

collecting and dividing dispersed pluralities according to

Socrates who could
Presumably, this remark is referring to young
in the
Forms
of
Theory
the
of
criticism
not reply to Parmenides'
Parmenides, i.e., "The Third Man Argument."
46

:
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their kind [kata genos]

47

This is the knowledge and

ability to distinguish how individual things can or cannot
be associated with one another,

Dialectic as

a

(cf.

Sph. 253e.)

method of division and collection, and

knowledge thereof is no common matter; it is
from the gods.

a

special gift

Dialectic was handed down so that the

mortals learned the way in which all existing things are
arranged.

It is a search and a hunt for what each thing is,

that which neither comes into being, nor passes away, but is

always identically the same.

There is no other method of

inquiry other than dialectic which systematically attempts
in every case to grasp the nature of each thing as it is in

itself and stands as "the coping stone" of the whole

structure of reality,

(cf.

R.

534a ff.). 4s

Socrates,

reportedly a lover himself of division and collection as
aids to speech and thought, remarks that he will follow any
"as if he were a god," man who is able to see things

man,

that can naturally be collected into one and divided into
many.

(

Phdr

.

266b6,

trans.

Fowler.)

The serious task that the philosopher has as the master

dialectician will be to operate, not with assumptions like

The controversial point here is whether or not kind [genos] is
synonymous with Form [eide].
47

The final status of the Forms and what is to be considered real
controversy,
in the later dialogues of Plato is a matter of scholarly
has to
controversy
The
paper.
this
of
confines
the
beyond
well
is
which
the
constitute
which
Republic,
the
do with the fact that the Forms of
Philebus,
only objects of reality there, are ontologically suspect in
Theaetetus and in the Sophist.
48

.

.

.

.
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the mathematician, but only with what is real and beyond

hypotheses.

He will embark upon an "upward journey of the

soul," during which he will be trained in mathematics,

astronomy, and music 4g before he gets to dialectic.

With

mathematics he will be dragged out from the cave to

a

where he can see shadows and reflections.

point

As for reaching

summit where he will look directly at the things themselves,
and unaided by his sense will "see" the real. Plato writes,
P] hilosophic discussion
dialegesthai
[is
needed] by one who aspires, through the discourse
of reason [logon] unaided by any of the senses, to
make his way in every case to the essential
reality and perseveres until he has grasped by
pure intelligence the very nature of Goodness
itself. This journey [poreian] is what we call
dialectic. (R.532a)
[

[

]

Sl1

Just as one needs grammar to know which letters join

with others in making certain words, and an art of music to

dissect the connection of sounds,

a

needed for the journey of dialectic,
253c5)

(

Sph

.

227b,

226c,

Reason [logos] itself provides this ability

[dialegesthai dunamei].

dialectic as
R.

special ability is

a

511b; Phlb.

{R.

511b,

533a; cf

Phlb

.

57e;

voyage of reason through arguments, Tht
58d5.)

186;

The soul is or has the faculty which

views the essence of that which is common to all things,

Timaeus, one of the later Platonic dialogues, takes up Astronomy
and Harmonics as demonstrating the beautiful and harmonious order of the
There is no mention of dialectic there,
heavens and of sounds.
presumably because these sciences do not know what to make of their own
49

discoveries
50

Cornford [1], p.252.

.
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reflecting within itself.

For it is impossible to grasp

that is which common to all either through hearing or

through sight.

(Tht.

185-186). It is thus with the cognitive

power of dialectic that one achieves knowledge, for

knowledge is not in the sensations but in the process of
reasoning about them (Tht. 186d)

,

performed by the soul.

51

The power of dialectics enables reason to rise to that
which requires no assumption and is the starting point
of all things [panthos archen] 52 R 511b7)
.

(

.

S3 claims that dialectic and elenchos are the one and

the same.

How in the Platonic sense is elenchos dialectic?

Some scholars have suggested that the greatest science of

dialectic can only be practiced in

a

question and answer

format, since this format is essential to the discovery of

And since Socrates is engaged in conversation,

truth.

dialectic and elenchos are the same method.

Although

Socrates is involved in conversation in the early dialogues,
a

customary pastime for Athenians, there is nothing in the

later dialogues to indicate that conversation is essential
to the supreme method.

Perhaps all what is meant by S3 is

that elenchos shares with the dialectic the general features
of hunting for the truth.

sense in which S3 is true.

This would indeed be
If S3

very weak

is the stronger claim that

elenchos is identical with Platonic dialectic,

51

a

I

hope the

See for alternative translations of "soul," Cornford [1], P-104.

See Shorey, p.110 note a, and p. 114 note c on the controversy
over the description of "arche" as applying to transcendental first
5:

principle
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abovementioned distinctions and difficuties have shown that
the assertion is false.

'Dialectic' is Aristotle's name of a particular form of
argument; elenchos is that argument.

S4

S4 states that the form of argument described by

Aristotle in the Topics [Top.] and Sophistical Refutations
is the method earlier used by Socrates.

[SR]

D.

Hamlyn's

W.

claim is typical: "What Aristotle says about dialectic in
the Topics certainly fits to a large extent with what Plato

exhibits as Socratic practice in the earlier dialogues." 51
Let us see how this could be true. If dialectic is the same

kind of conversational argument for both Socrates and
Aristotle, it must contain the same kind of premises.
Famously, Socrates conducts conversational arguments with

whoever is willing to talk and reason with him,
30a)

.

(Ap.

29d;

In his god-given mission he seeks to find the answer

to how one ought to live, and tests everyone's opinions on

the subject,

(G.

500c3-4; cf. 487e-488a; R.I 352d)

.

When he

engages someone in an argument, he emphatically demands that
the interlocutor say what he truly believes, not something

that is in truth contrary to his beliefs,
Cr.

49c-d)

.

(G.

346a;

500b; R.

For Socrates, all opinions should be honored,

whether it is of the wise or the majority,

(Cr.

47a-d)

.

If

someone puts forward an opinion of the wise or of the many,

53

Hamlyn, p.465.
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he treats that as one's own opinion and examines it as if it

had never been tested before.

After he gets the

interlocutor to assert what Socrates takes to be his real
beliefs, Socrates proceeds with his elenchos by using such

beliefs as premises of his arguments.
For Aristotle, on the other hand, of the four 54 kinds
of arguments used in philosophical discussions, dialectical

arguments are those which start from premises which state

generally accepted opinions [ek tdn endoxOn] and proceed to

contradiction

[

antiphasebs

(SR.

.

]

"

165b.)

Dialectical

arguments are designed to explore the implications of what
most people believe.

Dialectic is conducted in

and-answer format, "for such

a

a

proceeding always involves

relation with another party." (Top. 155b9-10; cf
'No'

questions, Top.

on the other hand,

question-

.

a

'Yes' and

Peirastic,

158al7-18; SR 172a34ff).

They are

are examination-arguments.

conducted with the intention of examining, specifically, the
beliefs of the interlocutors, premises are the opinions held
by the answerer [ek dokountbn apokr inomenO

]

.

These opinions

must necessarily [anakaidn] be the opinions of the answerer,
as he claims to have knowledge of the subject in question.
(SR 165bl-6

;

cf.

Top.

159a25 ff.)

dialectical
Didactic didaskalikoi
peirast ikoi and contentious [eristikoi].
54

[

[

]

]

,

[

dialektioi

]

,

examinational

.
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Given the textual evidence for Socrates' insistence on

operating on the opinions of the answerers, 55 it is clear
that Aristotle's dialectic does not operate on the same

kinds of premises as Socrates' elenchos.
way can they said to be similar?

So in what other

Perhaps we can try to

answer the question by investigating further how they are
different.

The most telling difference between Aristotle's

dialectic and Socrates' elenchos is for whom they are
intended.

Aristotle is quite adamant that dialectical

arguments are not everyone's cup of tea.

He sees the

function of dialectic as discovering an ability 56 [heurein
dunamin) which could reason on the problem proposed from

most generally accepted premisses that exist. "This is the

function [ergon] of dialectic in itself." (SR. 183a38-bl)
So Aristotle he thinks of dialectic as a special skill.

The

whole purpose of the Topics and Sophistical Refutations is
to present a "handbook" of sorts to develop and sharpen this

skill and empower the participant in argumentation.

Aristotle warns the reader that dialectic also takes
special patience.

a

It cannot be practiced by anybody.

Practicing beginners quickly turn to contentious arguments
and employ any means to come up with

164b5-15

55

)

.

a

contradiction,

(Top.

Therefore, he warns the would-be dialectician

For Vlastos' say-what-you-believe-rule, see my Chapter Three.

Some translations render dunamin as a "faculty," which would be
For Aristotle means dialectic to be a skill the right sort
too strong.
of person can learn.
56

.
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not to conduct this argument with everybody.

He says,

"You

ought not practice dialectic with everybody [ouk hapanti

dialekteon]

,

for at the hands of casual persons [tuchontas]

"

dialectic can deteriorate, and turn into
[ponerologian]

{Top.

.

a

base argument

Dialectic should best be

I64b8-10.)

conducted with other dialecticians, not the multitudes.
157al7-25)

(Top.

Clearly, Socrates is also worried about this problem.
He too complains about the young and inexperienced debaters'

insistence on winning rather than conducting an argument for
truth,

(

R

.

539b2-5; Phlb.

15e)

However,

.

it is also clear

that he conducts elenchos with anyone who is willing to

converse with him.

For listen to what Socrates says about

his art: "I examine anyone of you

given time,"
foreigner,"

(Ap.
(Ap.

29d)

30a).

men,

happen to meet at any

"whomever, young or old, citizen or
Elenchos, more than being

skill that only a few can have,

enough can learn.

I

In fact,

a

special

is a skill anyone competent

Socrates complains that young

once they learn from him how to use elenchos, go around

applying it to others.

(Ap.

23c5)

Socratic elenchos, far

from being the choice tool of the philosopher for other

philosophers, seems to be

a

philosophical instrument for the

nonphilosopher to use.
If the nature of their premises are different,

and

their respective practitioners are different, in what way

,
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can Aristotle's dialectic, and Socrates' elenchos still said
to be similar?

Perhaps we can turn to their subject matter.

Aristotle's dialectic is perfectly general.

Aristotle tells

us that dialectic depends on common principles which do not

fall under any one art.

(SR 170a37 ff.)

"Dialectical

argument is not about something definite [ti horismenon]
nor does it demonstrate anything [deiktikos oudenos]

172al2-13 ff.)

."

{SR.

For dialectic is common to every art;

someone without any scientific knowledge can use it to

examine another who is also without knowledge.
elenchos, on the other hand,

moral life.

Socratic

is first and foremost about the

The subject matter is almost always is about

affairs of morality, whether moral virtue can be taught, who
is happy,

how one ought to live and the nature of happiness.

Though it can be practiced by anyone, it must always be
about moral issues.
elenchos do not

If Aristotle's dialectic and Socrates'

operate on similar premises, and are not operated by similar
people, do not require the same subject matter, is there any

other way can they still said to be similar?

answer is in the Sophistical Refutations.

I

think the

In a puzzling and

complicated statement, Aristotle states dialectic and

peirastic arguments are both arts of examination.

While the

former examines general opinion, the latter is concerned

with the opinions of the interlocutor.
everyone,

Accordingly,

including the private people [ididtai], i.e.,

)

150

nonexpert users, can make use of both of them

— though

it is

best if the experts use them to conduct arguments with other
experts.

Nonexperts of dialectic and peirastic use them to

test those who profess knowledge.

In that sense,

all

ordinary users of dialectic and peirastic use them as

refutations [elenchousin hapantes]

.

This is due to the fact

that the nonexperts perform the task unmethodically
[ateknds], and experts perform it methodically [enteknds],

and that is called 'dialectic'.

carries out an examination
of reasoning

172a35-37

[

Accordingly, the person who

peirastikos

[tekne sullogistik£

]

]

by means of the art

is a dialectician."

(SR.

.

Perhaps only as

a

mode of examination elenchos can be

said to be similar to Aristotle's dialectic.

However, as we

have seen, elenchos is best understood as Aristotelian
peirastic.

If by S4

it is claimed that elenchos is in this

special sense Aristotelian dialectic, the relation is too

tenuous to warrant as strong an assertion as S4

.

It is

therefore best to try to understand elenchos in its own

without attempting to reduce it to other practices.

s

.

.

.

.

.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ackrill John. Aristotle the Philosopher
University Press, 1980.
,

Oxford: Oxford

Adkins, Arthur W. H.
Merit and Responsibility A Study in
Greek Values.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960.
:

Allen, R. E.
The Dialogues of Plato.
Yale University Press, 1984.

vol.

1.

New Haven:

Annas, Julia. [1]
"Plato the Sceptic." Oxford Studies of
Ancient Philosophy (OSAP) : Methods of Interpreting
Plato and His Dialogues
Supplemental Volume 1992: 4372

.

"Plato's Myths of Judgement."

[2]

.

119-43

Phronesis 1982:

.

Anton, John and Preus, Anthony, eds.,
Essays in Ancient
Greek Philosophy III: Plato. Albany: State University
of New York Press, 1989.

Aristotle. [1] Metaphysics, trans., Hugh Tredennick.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973.

Posterior Analytics, trans., Hugh Tredennick.
[2]
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973.
.

Sophistical Refutations, trans., E.S. Forster.
[3]
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973.
.

Belief Truth and Knowledge
Armstrong, D. M.
Cambridge University Press, 1973.
,

Ast,

Fredericus D. Lexicon Platonicum
Berlin 1908

ed

.

,

,

Munich,

Cambridge:

1835; 2nd

,

"The Strangeness of Socrates."
Barabas, Marina.
Philosophical Investigations 9:2 1986: 89-130.
London

The Presocratic Philosophers
Barnes, Jonathan. [1]
and New York: Routledge, 1989.
2 vols.
Complete Works of Aristotle.
[2] ed.,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
.

Aristotle's Posterior Analytics.
Oxford University Press, 1975.
.

[3a]

ed.,

Oxford:

.

.

'

.

152
[3b]

.

ed.,

Articles on Aristotle:

I Science.

London,

1975

Benson, Hugh H. [1]
"The Dissolution of the Problem of the
Elenchos."
(Photocopied.)
1993.

"Misunderstanding the What-is-Fness?
[2]
Question." Benson [3]: 123-37.
'

.

Essays on the Philosophy of Socrates.
[3] ed.,
York and London: Oxford University Press, 1992.
.

New

"The Priority of Definition and the Socratic
[4]
Elenchus." OSAP 1990: 19-65.
.

"Meno, the Slave Boy and the Elenchus."
[5]
Phronesis 1990: 128-58.
.

"The Problem of the Elenchus Reconsidered."
67-85.
Ancient Philosophy 7 1987:
[6]

.

"Vlastos's Quest for the Historical
Beversluis, John. [1]
293-312.
Socrates." Ancient Philosophy 13 1993:
"Does Socrates Commit Socratic Fallacy?"
American Philosophical Quarterly 1987: 211-23. Also
Benson [3]: 107-23.
[2]

.

"Socratic Definition."
Quarterly 1974: 331-36.
.

[3]

American Philosophical

The Chronology of Plato's
Brandwood, Leonard. [1]
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
Dialogues
1990
.

[2]

A Word Index to Plato.

Leeds,

1976.

The Early Greek Concept of the Soul.
Bremmer, Jan.
1983.
Princeton: Princeton University Press,

Brickhouse, Thomas C. and Smith, Nicholas D. [1] Plato's
New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
Socrates.

Review of Socrates: Ironist and Moral
Philosopher by Gregory Vlastos. Ancient Philosophy
1993: 395-410.
[2]

[3]

"Socrates

'

Elenctic Mission."

OSAP 1991: 131-

61.

Socrates on Trial.
University Press, 1989.
[4]

13

Princeton: Princeton

I

.

153
[5]

.

"Vlastos on the Elenchus."

OSAP 1984:

185-95.

"Plato and Comedy." Craik: 39-49.

Brock, Roger.

Burnet, John.
Greek Philosophy Thales to Plato. London,
1914; reprint ed., London: Macmillan and Company, 1961.
:

Theaetetus of Plato.
Burnyeat, Myles F. [1]
Hackett Publishing Company, 1990.
[2]

.

Indianapolis:

"The Sceptic In His Place and Time."

R.

Rorty:

225-55.

The Skeptical Tradition. Berkeley:
[3] ed.
University of California Press, 1983.
.

,

"Idealism and Greek Philosophy."
[4]
Review January 1982: 3-40.
.

Persuasion in Greek Tragedy.
Buxton, R.G.A.
Cambridge University Press, 1982.

Ordinary Language.
Chappell, Vere. ed.,
Prentice Hall, 1964.

Philosophical
Cambridge:

Englewood Cliffs:

Plato's Theory of
trans.
Cornford, Francis.
[1]
Knowledge Theaetetus and the Sophist. New York:
Macmillan, 1989.
,

:

"The Athenian Philosophical Schools, I: The
Philosophy of Socrates." Cambridge Ancient History.
Cambridge, 1933.
[2]

.

"Relation of the Apology of Socrates to
Couter James A.
Gorgias' Defense of Palamedes and Plato's Critigue of
Gorgianic Rhetoric." Erickson: 31-91.
,

"The Role of the Interlocutor in Plato's
Coventry, Lucinda.
Dialogues: Theory and Practice." Pelling: 174-96.

Owls to Athens: Essays on Classical
Subjects Presented to Sir Kenneth Dover. Oxford.
Clarendon Press, 1990.

Craik, E.M.

,

ed.

"What Metaphors Mean." Inquiries into
Davidson, Donald.
Oxford: Oxford University
Truth and Interpretation
Press, 1980.

DeLacey, Phillip.
Skepticism."

"oh mallon and the Antecedents of Ancient
Phronesis 1958: 59-71.

.

.

.

.

.

.

,

154

Denyer, Nicholas.
Language Thought and Falsehood in
Ancient Greek Philosophy
London and New York:
Routledge, 1991.
,

De Romilly Jacqueline. [1]
The Great Sophists in Periclean
Athens, trans.
Janet Lloyd.
Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1992
,

,

.

"Plato and Conjuring."

[2]

.

Erickson:

153-69.

Magic and Rhetoric in Ancient Greece.
[3]
Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1987.
.

Diels, Hermann and Kranz, Walther.
Die Fragmente Der
Vorsokratiker
Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung
1934
.

.

Diogenes Laertius. Lives of Eminent Philosophers. 2 vols
trans., R.D. Hicks; reprint ed., London: William
Heinemann, 1991.
Oxford University
trans., Plato: Gorgias
Dodds. E. R. [1]
New York: Clarendon Press,
Press, 1959; reprint ed
1992
.

,

.

The Greeks and the Irrational.
[2]
University of California Press, 1951.
.

Berkeley:

"The Portrayal of Moral Evaluation in
Dover, Kenneth R. [1]
Greek Poetry." The Journal of History 103: 35-48.

Greek Homosexuality
University Press, 1978.
.

[2]

Cambridge: Cambridge

Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and
reprint ed., Indianapolis: Hackett
Aristotle.
1994.
Company,
Publishing
.

[3]

"Was Socrates as Rational as Professor
Dybikowski, John.
Vlastos?" Yale Review 1975: 293-96.

Ehrenberg Victor. From Solon to Socrates
London: Methuen and Company, 1973.

2nd ed.

,

,

Plato: True and Sophistic Rhetoric.
Erickson, Keith V.
Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1979.

Aristotle's Concept of Dialectic
Evans. J. D. G.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

I

.

.

)

.

155

Everson, Stephen.

Psychology

[1] ed., Companions To Ancient Thought:
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1991.

Companions To Ancient Thought: Epistemology.
[2] ed.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
.

,

Fred.
Introductory Ethics.
Feldman,
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1978.

Englewood Cliffs, New

The Legacy of Greece: A New Appraisal
Findlay, M. I.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981.

"Knowledge and Belief in Republic V-VII."
Everson [2]: 85-116.

Fine, Gail.

"'What Do You Mean?'"
Philosophy LVII 1960: 499-506.

Fodor, Jerry A.

Ethics.
Frankena, William.
Prentice Hall, 1963.

The Journal of

Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:

"Plato's Arguments and the Dialogue Form."
OSAP Supplemental Volume 1992: 201-21.

Frede, Michael.

The Pre-Socratic Philosophers A
Freeman, Kathleen.
Companion to Diels , Fraamente der Vorsokratiker
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1946.
:

Friedlander Paul. Plato, trans.
New York: Panthenon, 1969.
,

,

Hans Meyerhoff.,

.

3

vols.

"The Background of Ancient Skepticism."
Gallop, David.
(Photocopied.)
1987.

"Plato's Euthyphro: An Analysis and
Commentary." Monist 1966: 369-72.

Geach, Peter.

"Socrates As Mob Orator." 1993.
Genzler, Jyl.
(Photocopied.
Socratic
eds.,
and Stokes, Michael C.
Socrates and
of
Philosophy
the
Questions : New Essays on
ledge,
Rout
York:
New
and
London
Its Significance
1992

Gower, Barry,

S.

,

.

Platonic
Platonic Writings
Griswold, Charles L. ed
1988.
ledge,
Rout
Readings London and New York:
.

,

,

Plato and The Other Companions of Socrates.
Grote, George.
London: John Murray, 1875.
3 vols.

.

.

.

.

156

Grube, G. M. A.

Plato's Thought.
[1]
Publishing Company, 1980.

Indianapolis: Hackett

Meno. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
[2] trans.
Company, 1976.
•

,

[3] trans., The Trial of Socrates: Euthyphro,
Apology , Crito, Death Scene from Phaedo. 2nd ed.,
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1986.
.

trans., Plato's Republic.
Indianapolis:
[4]
Hackett Publishing Company, 1974.
.

Gulley, Norman.
Macmillan,

The Philosophy of Socrates.

New York:

1968.

Guthrie, W. K. C. [1] A History of Greek Philosophy, vol.
iv.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.
vol. iii.
A History of Greek Philosophy
Press,
1969.
Cambridge: Cambridge University
.

[2]

Orpheus and Greek Religion A Study of the
Orphic Movement. New York: W.W. Norton and Company,
.

[3]

:

1966
.

[4]

Press,

The Greeks and Their Gods.

Boston: Beacon

1951.

Plato's Phaedrus
Hackforth, Reginald.
[1]
1972.
Press,
the University
"Great Thinkers: Socrates."
1933: 259-72.
.

[2]

Cambridge: At

Philosophy July

The Greek Ideal and Its Survival.
Hadas, Moses.
Harper and Row Publishers, 1960.

"Aristotle on Dialectic."

Hamlyn, D. W.
465-76.

Hankey, Robin.

Philosophy 1990:

"Evil in the Odyssey ." Craik: 87-95

Plato.

Hare, R. M.

New York:

1982.

Oxford: Oxford University Press,

Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion
Harrison, Jane.
Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing
3rd ed.
Company, 1922.
,

The Thirteen Books of Euclid's Elements
Heath, T.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1926.
2nd ed.,

3

vols

.

.

.

.

157

A History of Greek Mathematics.
[2]
Oxford University Press, 1921.
.

vol.l.

Oxford:

Huby, Pamela and Neal, Gordon, eds.,
The Criterion of
Truth.
Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1989.

Hussey, Edward.
The Presocratics
Scribner's Sons, 1972.

New York: Charles

Inwood, Brad & Gerson, L. P.
trans.
Hellenistic
Philosophy: Introductory Readings
Indiana: Hackett
Publishing Company, 1988.
,

Aristotle's First Principles.
Irwin, Terrence, [la]
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988.
.

[lb]

.

[2]

"Socrates and The Tragic Hero." Pucci: 55-83.
"Reply to David

L.

Roochnik." Griswold: 194-99.

"Coercion and Objectivity in Plato's Dialectic.
Revue Internationale de Philosophie 68 1986: 49-74.
.

[3]

.

[4]

Plato: Gorgias. Oxford: Clarendon Press,

1979.

"Aristotle's Discovery of Metaphysics." Review
of Metaphysics 1978: 210-29.
.

[5]

.

[6]

1977

Plato's Moral Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press,

.

Isocrates in Three Volumes, trans., George
Isocrates.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968.
Nor lin
.

Jordan, William. Ancient Concepts of Philosophy
New York: Routledge, 1990.
Kahn, Charles H.
233-58

[1]

"Vlastos's Socrates."

London and

Phronesis 1992:

"Drama and Dialectic in Plato's Gorgias." OSAP
1983: 75-122.
.

[2]

"Did Plato Write Socratic Dialogues?" Classical
Quarterly 1981: 305-20. Also Benson [3]: 35-53.
[3]

"Why Existence does not Emerge as a Distinct
der
Concept in Greek Philosophy." Archiv FUr Geschichte
Philosophie 1976: 323-34.
[4]

The Sophistic Movement. Cambridge: Cambridge
Kerferd, G. B.
University Press, 1981.

.

.

158

Kidd,

"Socratic Questions." Gower: 82-93.

Ian.

trans
The Concept of Irony.
Lee
Kierkegaard, Soeren.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965.
Capel
.

,

.

King,

"Elenchus. Self -Blame and the Socratic
James.
Paradox." Review of Metaphysics 1987: 105-26.

Kirk,

The
G. S., Raven, J. E., and Schofield, M. [1]
Presocratic Philosophers. 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1983.

Myth: Its Meaning and Functions in Ancient and
Berkeley: University of California
Other Cultures
Press, 1970.
[2]

Klosko George. [1] "The Refutation of Callicles in Plato's
Greece & Rome XXXI 2 October 1984: 126-39.
Gorgias."
,

:

"Criteria of Fallacy and Sophistry For User in
Classical
The Analysis of Platonic Dialogues."
363-74.
Quarterly 33 (ii) 1983:
[2]

The Development of Logic.
Kneale William and Kneale, Mary.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962.
,

Proceedings of the
"Commentary on Teloh."
Kosman, Aryeh.
(BACAP)
Philosophy
Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient
1987: 39-43.
The Cambridge Companion to Plato.
Kraut, Richard, [la] ed.,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

"Introduction to
[lb]
1-51.
[la]

the Study of Plato." Kraut

:

Socrates and the State. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1984.
[2]

"Comments on Gregory Vlastos'
Elenchus." OSAP 1983: 59-70.
[3]

The Socratic

"Socratic Disavowal of Knowledge."
History of Philosophy 1987: 275-88.

Lesher, J.

Journal of

Greek-English
Liddell, Henry George and Scott, Robert.
1989.
Oxford: Clarendon Press,
Lexicon.
Cambridge:
Magic, Reason, and Experience.
Lloyd, G. E. R.
Cambridge University Press, 1979.

)

:

159

Berkeley:
The Justice of Zeus.
Lloyd- Jones, Hugh.
1971.
University of California Press,
Protagoras.
trans
Lombardo, Stanley, and Bell, Karen.
1992.
Company,
Publishing
Hackett
Indianapolis:
.

,

"Socrates in Hellenistic Philosophy."
[1]
38 (i) 1988: 150-71.
Quarterly
Classical

Long, Anthony A.

2 vols.
The Hellenistic Philosophers.
1987.
Press,
University
Cambridge
Cambridge:

ed.,

[2]

"The Relationship of Philosophy to its
MacIntyre, Alisdair.
31-49.
Past." R. Rorty:
"The Virtues of Sociatic
Mackenzie, Mary Margaret.
Quarterly 38 (ii) 1988: 331-50.
Classical
Ignorance."

Matthews, Gareth.
(Photocopied

[1]

"Socrates Unperplexed."

1993.

.

"Paradoxical Statements." American
Philosophical Quarterly April 1974: 133-39.
[2]

"Senses and Kinds."
March 1972: 149-57.
[3]

The Journal of Philosophy

"Socratic Reason and Socratic Revelation.
McPherran Mark.
345-73
Journal of the History of Philosophy July 1991:
Morgan, Michael.
227-47
[la]
:

[1]

"Plato and Greek Religion." Kraut

.

Platonic Piety: Philosophy and Ritual in Fourth
Press,
Century Athens. New Haven: Yale University
[2]

1990

.

"Mathematical Method and Philosophical
Mueller, Ian.
Truth." Kraut [la]: 170-99.
"Meno's Paradox and Socrates as
Nehamas, Alexander. [1]
298-317.
Teacher " Benson [3]
.

Dialectic:^
"Eristic, Antilogic, Sophistic,
From Sophistry
Plato's Demarcation of Philosophy January 1990. 3
History of Philosophy Quarterly 7
1987: 275-316
"Socratic Intellectualism " BACAP
[3]
[2]

.

The Fragility of Goodness.
1]
Nussbaum, Martha.
Press, 198b.
Cambridge: Cambridge University
[

,

160

"Aristophanes and Socrates on Learning Practical
[2]
Wisdom." Yale Classical Studies 26 1980: 43-97.
•

Ostwald Martin. trans.
Merrill, 1956.
,

,

Protagoras.

New York: Bobb-

Owen, G. E. L.
Logic , Science & Dialectic : Collected Papers
in Greek Philosophy
Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1986
.

.

Pelling, Christopher, ed., Characterization and
Individuality in Greek Literature. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1990.
Penner, Terry. [1]
"Socrates and the Early Dialogues."
Kraut [la]: 121-69.

"Desire and Power in Socrates: The Argument of
Gorgias 466A-468 That Orators and Tyrants Have No Power
Aperion xxiv:3 September 1991: 147-202.
in the City."
.

[2]

.

[3]

1973:

"The Unity of Virtue."
35-68.

Philosophical Review 82

Statesman. Philebus. trans., H.N. Fowler. Ion.
Plato. [1]
Cambridge: Harvard
trans., W.R.M. Lamb; reprint ed.
University Press, 1975.
,

Cratylus Parmenides Greater Hippias, Lesser
Cambridge:
Hippias., trans., H.N. Fowler; reprint ed.
1977.
Press,
Harvard University
[2a]

.

,

,

,

trans.,
Laches , Protagoras , Meno, Euthydemus
University
Harvard
W.R.M. Lamb; reprint ed., Cambridge:
Press, 1977.
.

[2b]

.

,

Republic I. trans., Paul Shorey; reprint ed.,
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982.
.

[3]

Lysis , Symposium Gorgias. trans., W.R.M. Lamb;
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983.
reprint ed.
.

[4]

,

,

.

Charmides Alcibiades Hipparchus , The Lovers ,
trans., W.R.M. Lamb;
Theages, Minos and Epinomis.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986.
reprint ed.
[5]

.

,

,

Republic II. trans., Paul Shorey; reprint ed.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987.
.

[6a]

Theaetetus and Sophist, trans., H.N. Fowler;
1987.
reprint ed., Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
[6b]

..

.

.

"

.

.

161

Euthyphro, Apology , Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus
H.N. Fowler; reprint ed., Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1990.
[7]

.

trans.

,

Polansky, Ronald M.
"Professor Vlastos's Analysis of
Socratic Elenchus." OSAP 1985: 247-60.

Language and the Tragic Hero.
Pucci, Pietro, ed.,
Scholars Press, 1988.

Atlanta:

"The Meaning of 'Meaning'." Mind, Language
Putnam, Hilary.
vol. 2.
Cambridge:
and Reality: Philosophical Papers.
Cambridge University Press, 1975.

Socrates in the Apology.
Hackett Publishing Company, 1989.

Reeve, C. D. C.

Rist, J.
The Stoics.
Press, 1978.

Indianapolis:

Berkeley: University of California

Plato's Earlier Dialectic
Robinson, Richard.
[1]
Press, 1953.
University
Oxford
Ithaca:
ed.

2nd

,

"Plato's Consciousness of Fallacy."

[2]

.

Mind 1942:

97-114

"Socrates's Use of the Techne-Analogy
Roochnik, David L.
Benson [3]: 185-98.
.

.

"Terrence Irwin's Reading of Plato." Griswold:

[2]

183-94

"Commentary on Nehamas: The
Rorty, Amelie Osenberg. [1]
Did Socrates teach
Intellectualism.
Limits of Socratic
317-30.
arete?" BACAP 1987:

Essays on Aristotle's Ethics.
University of California Press, 1980.
.

Rorty

[2]

ed.

Berkeley:

,

Philosophy of History Essays on the
Cambridge: Cambridge
Historiography of Philosophy
University Press, 1984.
,

Richard, ed.

Ross, W. D.
Press,

:

,

Plato's Theory of Ideas.

Oxford: Clarendon

1951.

Reprint
History of Western Philosophy
Russell, Bertrand.
Schuster,
and
Simon
New York: Touchstone Books,
ed.
1972
,

.

Principles of Mathematics.
Cambridge University Press, 1933.
[2]

2nd ed., Cambridge:

..

.

.

162

Ryle, Gilbert.

Plato's Progress
University Press, 1966.

Cambridge: Cambridge

Santas, Gerasimos X. [1]
Socrates: Philosophy in Plato's
Early Dialogues.
London and New York: Routledge, 1979.
"The Socratic Fallacy."
[2]
Philosophy 1972: 124-41.
.

Journal of History of

Schofield, Malcolm, ed.
Doubt and Dogmatism.
Clarendon Press, 1987.
,

Oxford:

Seeskin, Kenneth. [1]
"Vlastos on Elenchos and
Mathematics." Ancient Philosophy 13 1993: 37-53.
[2]

.

Method.
1987

Dialogue and Discovery A Study in Socratic
Albany: State University of New York Press,
:

.

Reprint ed.,
The Unity of Plato's Thought.
Shorey, Paul.
Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1968.

Outlines of the History of Ethics.
Sidgwick, Henry. [1]
London: Macmillan and Company, 1881; reprint ed., 1946.
[2]

.

288-307

"The Sophists." Journal of Philology

4

1872:

.

T.G.
trans.
The Discovery of the Mind.
Bruno.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953.
Rosenmeyer.

Snell,

,

The
Spielberg, Herbert, and Morgan, B. Quincy, eds.,
Socratic Enigma. New York: The Library of Liberal
Arts, 1964.

Sprague, Rosamond. K. [1] trans., Euthydemus
Hackett Publishing Company, 1993.
trans., Laches and Charmides
Hackett Publishing Company, 1992.
.

[2]

Indianapolis:

Indianapolis:

Plato's Use of Fallacy: A Study of the
London and New
Euthydemus and Some Other Dialogues
York: Routledge, 1962.
.

[3]

Stokes, Michael

C.

[1]

"Socrates' Mission." Gower: 26-82.

Plato's Socratic Conversations Drama and
Dialectic in Three Dialogues. Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1986.
[2]

:

.

163

Stump, Eleonore.
Dialectic and Its Place in the Development
of Medieval Logic.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1989
.

Taylor. Alfred. E. [1]
Socrates.
Garden City, New York:
Doubleday Anchor Books, 1953.
Plato: The Man and His Work.

[2]

.

1937

Taylor,

C.

C.

Craik:
[3]

.

Press,

W.

[1]

"Socratic Ethics." Gower: 137-53.

"Popular Morality and Unpopular Philosophy."
233-43.

[2]

.

4th ed., London,

.

ed.,
The Greeks on Pleasure.
1982.

Oxford: Clarendon

"The Importance of Interlocutors' Characters
Teloh, Henry.
in Plato's Early Dialogues." BACAP 1987: 25-38.

Socratic Studies, ed. Myles
Vlastos, Gregory. [1]
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
Burnyeat.
,

1994

.

[2] "Elenchus and Mathematics: A Turning Point in
Plato's Philosophical Development." Benson [3]: 137.

62

.

Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher
[3]
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991.
.

"Is the 'Socratic Fallacy' Socratic?" Ancient
Philosophy 10 1990: 1-13.
.

[4]

.

[5]

"Socratic Irony." Classical Quarterly

(i)

1987:

79-96.

"Socrates' Disavowal of Knowledge."
Philosophical Quarterly 1985: 1-31.
.

[6]

[7a]

"The Socratic Elenchus." OSAP 1983: 27-58.

[7b]

"Afterthoughts on the Socratic Elenchus."

1983:

OSAP

71-4.

"The Socratic Elenchus."
1982: 711-14.
[8]

Journal of Philosophy

Review of H. Cherniss, "Selected Papers," ed.,
537-43.
Taran, American Journal of Philology 1978:

[9a]
L.

The

.

.

164
[9b]
Review of Plato's Moral Theory: The Early and
Middle Dialogues by Terry Irwin.
The Times Literary
Supplement February 24 1987.
•

[10a]
Plato I: Metaphysics and Epistemology A
Collection of Critical Essays. Garden City, New York:
Doubleday Anchor Books, 1971.
•

[10b]
Plato II: Ethics. Politics and Philosophy of
Art and Religion. A Collection of Critical Essays.
Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1971.
•

[10c]
The Philosophy of Socrates: A Collection of
Critical Essays.
Garden City, New York: Doubleday
Anchor Books, 1971.
.

"Was Polus Refuted?" American Journal of
[11]
Philology 83 1967: 454-60.
.

"Socratic Knowledge and Platonic Pessimism."
[12]
Philosophical Review 1957: 226-38.
.

"Editor's Introduction to Plato's Protagoras."
[13]
Ostwald: vii-lvi.
.

trans.
Four Texts
West, Thomas G. and West, Grace Starry.
Ithaca and
on Socrates: Plato and Aristophanes.
London: Cornell University Press, 1984.
,

A Companion to Plato's Republic
White, Nicholas. [1]
Hackett Publishing Company, 1979.
Indianapolis:

Plato on Knowledge and Reality.
[2]
Hackett Publishing Company, 1976.
.

Indianapolis:

"Plato's Early Theory of Knowledge."
Woodruff, Paul. [1]
Benson [3]: 86-107.
"The Skeptical Side of Plato's Method." Revue
[2]
Internationale de Philosophie 1987: 22-37.
.

[3] trans., Plato: Hippias Major.
Hackett Publishing Company, 1982.

Indianapolis:

.

Xenophon. [1] Recollections of Socrates and Socrates'
Defense Before the Jury trans., Anna S. Benjamin. New
York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1965.
,

trans., E.C.
Memorabilia and Oeconomicus
Press, 1938.
University
Harvard
Cambridge:
Merchant.
.

[2]

I

.,

165

Yandell, Keith E.
The Epistemology of Religious Experience
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Zeller, Eduard.
Socrates and the Socratic Schools.
O. J. Reichel, London, 1885.
Zeyl,

trans.

Donald J. [1]
"Socrates and Hedonism: Protagoras
351-358d. " Phronesis 25 1980: 250-69.
Indianapolis: Hackett
[2] trans., Gorgias
Publishing Company, 1987.
.

.

